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I examine the impact of labor unionization on monitoring costs, voluntary disclosure, and 
corporate finance. To test my empirical inquiries, I use firm-level collective bargaining 
datasets (programmatically extracted from companies’ 10-K filings), including both 
unionized and non-unionized firms, an element that is absent in most prior research. My 
thesis consists of the following three empirical chapters. 
In the first, I examine the impact of labor unions on audit fees. My findings suggest 
that audit fees, become significantly higher at firms with organized labor. I show that 
unionized firms have more complex structures than nonunionized firms and that these 
structures increase both the risk and the magnitude of audit fees. I also show that monitoring 
agents consider political ideology supportive of labor unions, so the predominant political 
ideology of a region can further increase monitoring costs. I demonstrate that audit fees are 
significantly lower at firms with employee share ownership. I conclude that labor 
unionization increases the costs incurred by monitoring agents and that this burden is then 
further amplified or mitigated according to the structure of industrial relations. 
In the second, I analyze the impact of labor unionization on CSR reporting. My 
findings suggest that firms are more likely to adopt CSR reporting strategies as a response to 
labor unionization. I show that the effect of union influence on CSR reporting is prominent in 
areas with incremental union power, attributable to political ideology, the legal environment, 
and corporate spatial clustering. Overall, my findings add new evidence to a growing body of 
literature regarding the influential role of dominant stakeholders on managerial decisions. 
In the third and final chapter, I investigate the impact of labor unionization on IPO 
underpricing. My analyses indicate that unionized IPOs are associated with less underpricing, 
with downward offer price revisions, and with lower aftermarket volatility. I demonstrate that 
information asymmetry and salient agency costs discourage the participation of investors in 
an IPO and also compromise the demand investors have for an IPO. I use Right-to-Work laws 
as an exogenous variation in the strength of labor unions in order to show that those unions 
which are located in regions with incremental union power have a considerable effect on 
first-day returns. I offer implication and suggestions for future research.  
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1.1 The purpose of the thesis 
As of 2014, more than seven million private-sector workers in the U.S. were represented by 
unions (Division of Labor Force Statistics, 2015), while 33 out of the largest 100 industrial 
firms had unionized labor force (Campello, et al., in press). Unionization is commonly 
thought of as a means to advance employees’ claims for better wages, better hours, and better 
working conditions and to extract rents through collective bargaining, industrial action, and 
activism. The business press provides examples of actions that unions undertake to pursue 
their claims. To name but a few, labor unions persuaded Walt Disney Company’s 
shareholders to deposition the chairman of the board of directors (Reilly, 2005); and 
successfully secured a 17.5% stake in the $20 billion owed them by the firm after the General 
Motors’ reorganization in 2009, compared to bondholders who managed to secure only a 
10% stake in the $27 billion owed them (Leung, et al., 2009). Labor unions’ actions may 
cause adversity, as well. In 2000, for example, the Teamsters organized a ten month long 
strike against Overnite Transportation Co. that forced the company to halt its IPO (Schulz, 
2000). 
Labor is a salient stakeholder that makes important contributions to corporate 
functions and operations (Chyz, et al., 2013; Pendleton and Gospel, 2013), and even more 
important become the contributions when labor unions are present. The impact which labor 
unions have on corporate matters has sparked researchers’ interest. Previous studies 
demonstrate that unions’ rent-seeking behavior induces costs for the firm because their 
rent-seeking diverts resources away from shareholders and other economic agents (e.g., 
Faleye, et al., 2006) and opposes the interests of both shareholders and managers, who aim to 
increase shareholder value and reduce the cost of capital (Chen, et al., 2011a). 
Where unions are present, firms shelter corporate income from unions’ claims by 
taking such strategic actions as reporting higher losses (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991), 
issuing more debt (Matsa, 2010), curbing cash balances (Klasa, et al., 2009), adopting 
income-decreasing accounting methods (Bowen, et al., 1995), and smoothing earning paths 
(Hamm, et al., in press), to name but a few. Another strand of the literature demonstrates 
managers’ intention to maintain high levels of information asymmetry (Cheng, 2017; Hilary, 
2006) through such strategies as withholding good news from unions (Chung, et al., 2016) 
and missing analysts’ earnings estimates in order to be able to communicate a negative 
outlook to unions (Bova, 2013). 
10 
Introduction 
Changes in the legal environment and in the political landscape of the U.S. have the 
potential to alter the structure of industrial relations and affect the impact unions have on 
corporations. During the past decade, for example, the Democratic Party has introduced legal 
reforms, though unsuccessfully, with the aim of strengthening workers’ rights and labor 
union organization. The Right-to-Work laws recently passed four U.S. states are legislation 
that inhibits the labor union organization of unions and decreases the power of unions. 
Against this background and considering that in the presence of unions, labor 
becomes a more dominant stakeholder than unorganized individual employees, characterized 
by distinctive incentives, motivations, goals, and risk preferences, voluminous research into 
industrial relations and corporate finance has examined the impact of labor unionization on 
core economic matters, and on corporate decision making. However, too little attention has 
been paid to the relationship between unionization and monitoring costs, voluntary 
disclosure, and IPO underpricing. This thesis intends to bridge these gaps by bringing to the 
fore the role of organized labor. 
1.2 Research questions 
In order to examine the impact of unions on corporate matters, I perform three investigations. 
First, I explore the impact of unions on audit pricing. Second, I examine the impact of 
unionization on CSR reporting. Managers are more likely to intensify their CSR reporting 
activity to disclose information on the firm’s attitudes, motives, strategies, and policies, thus 
gaining mechanisms by which they might keep union influence at bay. Third, I investigate 
how labor unions shape the dynamics of an IPO, as their presence compromises investors 
demand to participate to the IPO, attributable to the negative impact of unions on firm value 
and performance. I address the following research questions: 
1. What impact do labor unions have on monitoring costs? 
2. Do managers of unionized firms rely more intensively on CSR reporting? 
3. How does labor unionization affect the pricing and performance of U.S. IPOs? 
4. Is the effect of unionization more prominent in regions which are more supportive of 
labor unions because of political ideology, legislation, and corporate spatial clustering? 
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1.3 Empirical findings 
The findings of Chapter 2 suggest that auditors charge unionized firms a significant fee 
premium in order to compensate for the incremental business risk which arises out of the 
higher complexity of unionized contexts as well as the disparities between the principal’s 
interests and the employees’ claims. I show that in the presence of unions, auditors must 
devote additional time and must undertake more thorough audit procedures, which increase 
billing rates. I further show that the fee premium (1) increases in geographical areas where 
legislation and dominant political ideologies are supportive of unions, and (2) decreases with 
employee participation in ownership because auditors consider such contexts to be less risky 
and thus devote less time and effort to monitoring activities. 
In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that, in the presence of unions, managers more intensively 
engage in CSR reporting as part of a broader strategy of response to stakeholder expectations 
as well as to pressure exerted by stakeholders. I also provide evidence for how managers’ 
propensity to CSR reporting increases when firms operate in contexts where corporate spatial 
clustering, legislation, and a dominant political ideology are supportive of labor unions and 
congruent with their values. 
In Chapter 4, I document the significant negative effect which labor unions have on 
IPO underpricing. My findings suggest that unionization is a contributing factor to negative 
offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility, both of which are clear manifestations 
of investors’ modest demand for participation in the issue. I also demonstrate that the 
negative effect of unionization on IPO underpricing is more prominent in regions where 
legislation is supportive of labor unions. 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
Labor unions heavily impact corporate matters, which is why I consider it imperative that the 
research be extended to the underexplored relations between unionization, on the one hand, 
and monitoring costs, CSR reporting, and IPO underpricing, on the other. My thesis makes a 
significant contribution to exactly this part of the research. 
Chapter 2 furthers the research into industrial relations by demonstrating that 
unionization considerably increases corporate contractual complexities and thereby raises 
monitoring costs; or, in the agency-theory framework of this chapter, unionization and 
monitoring stand in a complementary relation. It is also demonstrated (1) that monitoring 
12 
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agents take account of political ideology as well as legal environments supportive of unions 
and increase their billing rates accordingly and (2) that monitoring agents consider employee 
share ownership as an alignment mechanism between employees’ and shareholders’ interests 
and reduce the cost of monitoring accordingly. 
Chapter 3, contributes by establishing labor unionization as an important factor in the 
activity of CSR reporting, makes an important contribution to that strand in CSR literature 
which documents the influential role of dominant stakeholders on managerial decision 
making. The empirical evidence indicates that the structure of corporate industrial relations 
affects the corporate “voice” in CSR. Managers intensify their efforts to develop corporate 
responses in CSR reports as countervailing responses to the influence wielded by unionized 
labor. It also makes apparent how labor unions gain an effect on CSR reporting. Unions are 
able to enhance or consolidate power when a region exhibits political ideology, legislation, or 
corporate spatial clustering favorable to union power. 
Chapter 4 establishes labor unionization as an important dimension both to the IPO 
and to the corporate finance literature. I extend our knowledge on the roles played by 
important stakeholders in IPO pricing, as I document that labor unionization becomes a factor 
in the investor’s decision whether or not to participate in an IPO. I also enhance research into 
the costs of labor unionization on equity capital because I evidence that IPOs which are done 
in the presence of organized labor incur significant costs and that these costs vary according 
to the incremental power of unions. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
My thesis consists of five chapters: this, the introduction; Chapters 2, 3, and 4, in which I 
investigate the research questions empirically; and the conclusion, Chapter 5. The middle 
chapters are, to a large, self-contained, i.e. they have separate literature reviews, exploit 
different datasets, and answer unique research questions. My investigation focuses on the 
context of the U.S. because, besides being highly influential on the global stage, the U.S. 
provides a useful halfway house between countries where unionization is practically not 
institutionalized and countries where union presence in corporations is dominant. 
In order to test my empirical inquiries, I employ firm-level collective bargaining 
datasets (programmatically extracted from companies’ 10-K filings), which element is absent 
from most of the research. I conduct a battery of sensitivity tests and robustness exercises to 
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stress the validity of my inferences. In particular, I employ alternative definitions of 
unionization as well as alternative specifications of both dependent and control variables. I 
further test my findings for specification issues related to variable omission and selection 
bias, while specifying my sampling methods according to different standards. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the impact of unionization on monitoring costs and investigates 
the relation between organized labor and audit fees. Chapter 3 examines the propensity of 
managers to resort to CSR reporting when faced with increasing pressure from labor in 
unionized contexts. Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of unionization on the IPO process, laying 
particular emphasis on the immediate aftermarket performance, aftermarket volatility, and 
offer price revisions of U.S. IPOs. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 may profitably be read independently of one another, but the 
following links do bind them. In chapters 2 and 4, I employ agency theory as my overarching 
theory to interpret my results and evidence that unionization induces higher costs to the firm 
(i.e., significantly higher audit fees and downward offer price revisions, as well as lower 
aftermarket volatility and lower first-day returns). Chapter 2, in its own right, though, 
predicts that the salient agency costs and information asymmetry (both typical of unionized 
firms) increase the need for lengthy and more thorough audit procedures, thus causing 
auditors to increase the billing rates. Chapter 4, in its place, shows that salient agency costs 
and ex-ante uncertainty of unionized contexts make investors skeptical and pessimistic about 
the performance prospects of a firm in which organized labor is present. Labor unions have a 
catalytic impact on investors’ low demand for an IPO. Chapter 3 supplements to the findings 
of the other two chapters, as suggests that corporations are more likely to adopt CSR 
reporting strategies in the presence of organized labor. Thus, emerges the use of CSR 
reporting as a medium to moderate information asymmetries between managers and unions, 
with further beneficial outcomes for the company such as negotiating more favorable terms 
with various important stakeholders, including unions. 
In the concluding chapter, Chapter 5, I give a summary overview of (1) the results of 
my investigation and the implications for managers, labor unions, and market participants, (2) 
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2.1 Introduction 
The organization of employees into unions constitutes an important aspect of the industrial 
relations architecture. Employing various theoretical perspectives (Gahan and Pekarek, 2013; 
Hyman, 1994; Kaufman, 2008; Schienstock, 1981), scholars have, inter alia, provided 
insights into: the emergence and institutionalization of unions (Kaminska and Visser, 2011); 
the changing role and transformations of unions (MacDonald, 2014; Milkman, 2013); and the 
impact of unions on core corporate matters, such as efficiency, productivity, performance, 
risk, and strategic decision making (Becker and Olson, 1989; Brandl and Ibsen, 2017; 
Mueller and Stegmaier, 2017). 
Unionization enables employees to advance their claims for better wages, better 
hours, and better working conditions and to extract rents (i.e., wage premiums) for members 
more effectively through collective bargaining, industrial action, and activism (Agrawal, 
2012; Chen, et al., 2011b; Chyz, et al., 2013; Connolly, et al., 1986; Faleye, et al., 2006; 
Freeman and Medoff, 1979). However, union priorities and actions may cause considerable 
adversity, known as “moral hazard,” which can harm the firm (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 
2009; Pohler and Luchak, 2015). Previous studies have illuminated an underlying antithesis 
between the role of the union and shareholder wealth (Chyz, et al., 2013; Leung, et al., 2009). 
Agency theory predicts that this antithesis, i.e., the degree of disparity between 
principal and employee interests, affects the complexity of contractual relations and thereby 
the level of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 1979). Previous studies have shed light 
on how unionization affects agency costs (Becker and Olson, 1989; Dinardo, et al., 1997; 
Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Huang, et al., 2017; Jensen and Murphy, 1990), but too little 
attention has been paid to one significant element of agency costs, namely monitoring costs, 
or more specifically, budget restrictions, operating rules, and auditing (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.323). Since monitoring is fundamental to firm value as well as to the operation and 
the development of the corporation, I investigate the role of unionization in monitoring costs. 
Following previous studies, I employ a widely accepted and well-specified proxy for 
monitoring costs: audit fees (Causholli, et al., 2010; Ghosh and Tang, 2015). 
My study focuses on a single country because I want to obtain a homogenous sample 
in terms of the underlying financial and economic development, the legal and social structure, 
the politics, the public infrastructure, and the relevant institutional characteristics. I opt for 
the U.S. because it remains a highly influential context and provides a useful halfway house 
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between countries where unionization is practically not institutionalized and countries where 
union presence in corporations is dominant. Unionization remains an active agenda in the 
U.S. context both for market participants and for politicians and rich datasets are available. I 
employ a sample of 2,910 U.S. firm-year observations for the estimation window of 
2003-2013. 
My findings suggest that auditors charge unionized firms a significant fee premium, 
to compensate for incremental business risk. Auditors’ risk assessments reflect the higher 
complexity of unionized contexts and the disparities between the principal’s interests and 
employees’ claims. In the presence of unions, auditors must devote additional time and must 
undertake more thorough audit procedures which increase billing rates. I find this fee 
premium to be persistent after employing different measures of firm-level unionization and 
simultaneously controlling for additional internal monitoring devices such as corporate 
governance and ownership structure. I also demonstrate that auditors consider political 
ideology which is supportive of labor unions to be a parameter which increases corporate 
complexities. I provide evidence suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in states which 
have not enacted Right-to-Work legislation and which are dominated by Democrats. I show 
that in unionized contexts, where employees participate in ownership and conflicts between 
the principal’s interests and employees’ claims are, to an extent, alleviated, auditors reduce 
billing rates because they assess these contexts as less risky. Overall, my findings prove to be 
robust to alternative definitions of unionization, specification issues related to variable 
omission, and selection bias. 
I contribute to existing literature on several fronts. First, by employing elements of 
agency theory, I contribute to industrial relations literature demonstrating that unionization 
inflates corporate contractual complexities and thereby increases monitoring costs. I draw 
attention to the complementary (rather than supplementary) role of unionization in relation to 
monitoring agents. Second, I draw attention to the impact of the political costs of labor 
unions to corporate contractual complexities. A dominant political ideology as well as legal 
environments which are supportive of labor increase monitoring costs in unionized firms. 
Third, I extend current understanding of the role of employee share ownership by showing 
that employee participation in ownership operates as an alignment mechanism which reduces 
the perceived conflict inherent to unionization and mitigates agency costs between labor and 
the principal. I stress that employee share ownership reduces monitoring costs in unionized 
corporations. 
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2.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Labor unions and agency costs 
According to the economic perspective, the “essence of firms” is their “contractual nature” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 310). In addition to the contractual arrangements between 
owners and management, contractual relations with employees are central (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The degree of complexity of the these relationships tends to increase 
agency costs, and in particular, monitoring costs, or more specifically, procedures such as 
budget restrictions and strict operating rules as well as monitoring mechanisms such as 
statutory audits intended to limit aberrant activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Contractual relations with labor are even more complex when employees are 
organized in unions (Chyz, et al., 2013) because in order to advance employee claims for 
better wages, better hours, and better working conditions and to extract rents (i.e., wage 
premiums) for members, unions use tactics such as collective bargaining, alternative “voice” 
mechanisms (e.g., participation in company boards and committees), lobbying, litigation, 
industrial action, and activism (Agrawal, 2012; Chen, et al., 2011b; Chyz, et al., 2013; 
Connolly, et al., 1986; Faleye, et al., 2006; Freeman and Medoff, 1979). 
A number of events demonstrate the influential role of unionization in corporate 
decision-making. Such decisions are often taken to the detriment of the principal’s and 
agent’s interests. For instance, in 2004, Walt Disney Company’s labor union persuaded 
shareholders to remove the chairman of the board of directors (Leung, et al., 2009). 
Organized labor is often found to be a more influential contractual partner than others. For 
instance, after General Motors’ reorganization in 2009, organized labor secured a 17.5% 
stake in the $20 billion owed labor unions by the firm, whereas bondholders managed to 
secure only a 10% stake in the $27 billion owed them (Leung, et al., 2009). There is, as well, 
robust academic evidence suggesting that organized labor has a catalytic impact on reducing 
CEO compensation (Huang, et al., 2017). 
Previous literature on financial economics has examined the conflict between union 
aims, on the one hand, and principals’ and agents’ interests, on the other (Chyz, et al., 2013; 
Leung, et al., 2009). Unions prefer long-term stability and are primarily concerned with 
whether employers are in a position to generate enough cash flow to cover wages and 
benefits (Chen, et al., 2012; Faleye, et al., 2006). Labor unions develop risk-averse attitudes 
and influence managers to adopt more conservative policies (Farber, et al., 2012; Leung, et 
18 
The impact of labor unionization on monitoring costs 
al., 2009). There is evidence to suggest that, in the presence of unions, corporations spend 
less on investments (i.e. capital expenditures or R&D spending), take fewer risks, and grow 
more slowly (Faleye, et al., 2006), while at the same time exhibit less operating flexibility 
and a higher cost of capital (Chen, et al., 2011a, 2012; Faleye, et al., 2006). 
Unlike unions, shareholders are residual claimants, and managers often have a 
significant proportion of their compensation tied to residual claims (e.g., stock options, stock 
appreciation rights, etc.) (Chyz, et al., 2013). Since their aim is to make economically-
optimal decisions and increase shareholder value as well as decrease the cost of capital, 
managers and shareholders are much riskier actors than labor (Faleye, et al., 2006; Fung, et 
al., 2015). 
The antithesis between labor’s aims, on the one hand, and principals’ and agents’ 
interests, on the other, creates incentives for management to impair organized labor’s 
bargaining power (Bova, et al., 2015; Cheng, 2017). Previous literature indicates that 
management may initially resort to enhancing (or maintaining high levels of) information 
asymmetry because disclosing information about the firm’s financial statements, forecasted 
sales, production costs, and capital investments may lead to significantly higher wages and 
benefits for production employees (Kleiner and Bouillon, 1988). Cheng (2017) demonstrates 
that firms with strong unions withhold public information because reducing this asymmetry 
can harm the firm. Managers are also highly likely to withhold good news (Chung, et al., 
2016) and miss analysts’ earnings estimates in order to signal a negative outlook to unions 
(Bova, 2013). 
Management in unionized firms may be more prone to the following: reporting larger 
losses (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991), adopting income-decreasing accounting methods for 
inventory valuation and asset depreciation (Bowen, et al., 1995; Matsa, 2010), recognizing 
swiftly the accumulated postretirement benefit obligation (D'Souza, et al., 2001), holding less 
cash than would otherwise have been normal (Klasa, et al., 2009), and issuing more debt 
(Marciukaityte, 2015; Matsa, 2010). When managers use certain accounting methods and 
make particular financial decisions in order to weaken union bargaining power, it becomes 
very likely that financial reporting will be opaque, and this, in turn, increases the need for 
more detailed monitoring procedures. 
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2.2.2 Labor unions and audit fees 
In adherence to the agency perspective, I consider audit pricing to be an ideal proxy for 
monitoring costs because: First, audit pricing is a product of the auditors’ monitoring role 
when the proprietary evaluation of risks and complexities is taken into consideration. This is 
accomplished by examining both information which is publicly available and inside 
information which is available only to the auditors through access to corporate files and 
regular discussions with corporate managers (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). Second, firm 
performance, highly correlated overall to agency costs, is not a big concern of auditors of 
large audit firms because these client firms tend to be profitable (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). 
Third, amongst other proxies of agency costs, audit pricing models are generally well 
specified and vulnerable to limited concerns regarding econometric specifications. For 
example, the R-squares of audit pricing models are more than 70%, so problems of correlated 
omitted variables are limited (Causholli, et al., 2010). Additionally, reverse causality 
problems are very unlikely because at the corporate level, employees do not normally 
consider elements of audit pricing more than the election of a labor union (Blanchflower, 
2007). 
I draw upon Simunic (1980), who shows that audit fees consist of a resource cost 
component and an expected loss component. Previous studies have demonstrated how the 
broader client context is an influence in both the resource and the expected loss components 
in the audit pricing model (Jha and Chen, 2015). Accepting a client with a high business risk 
means that the auditor is very likely to increase the amount of audit work (i.e., higher 
resource component) or the billing rate (i.e., higher expected loss component), or both 
(Brumfield, et al., 1983). Audit fees will most likely increase because of the greater audit 
effort (Francis and Krishnan, 1999) and/or because of the assignment of the task to the most 
experienced personnel on the engagement team (Bell, et al., 2001). It is also likely that, in 
higher business-risk contexts, auditors may merely increase the billing rate in order to 
compensate for potential litigation costs in the future, without necessarily increasing effort or 
assigning experienced personnel to the audit (Bell, et al., 2001). 
In assessing audit risk (AICPA, 1997; PCAOB, 2006, AU Section 312), auditors 
consider the complexity of the corporate context (Fung, et al., 2015). I expect that the 
presence of labor unions is considered by auditors to be a parameter which increases the 
complexity of corporate contractual relationships and therefore inflates the audit risk factor. 
These effects to audit risk are explained by negative signaling, financial reporting opacity, 
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and litigation risk/exposure to litigation, which may result in severe reputational damages, 
adverse publicity, and potential regulatory sanctions (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). 
It is to be expected that, in unionized contexts, a re-planning of the nature and the 
timing and the extent of audit procedures takes place (Bell, et al., 2001). Auditors must 
devote additional time and undertake more thorough audit procedures because a higher 
resource component is associated with unionized firms. Additionally, or alternatively, audit 
firms may select more experienced auditors and more skilled individuals in order to deal with 
the complexities with which the presence of unions is normally associated. Higher salary 
rates and higher audit pricing levels are the result. It may be expected that the loss component 
is higher because auditors are very likely to increase the billing rate to compensate for 
potential litigation processes stemming from the presence of unions. Against this background, 
my hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H: Ceteris paribus, labor unionization is positively associated with audit fees  
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Data 
Similarly to other studies, I focus on the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era (Leventis, et al., in press) 
because cleaner datasets are available from that point onwards (Francis and Yu, 2009). I start 
with the entire universe of U.S. publicly-listed firms in Audit Analytics database, with 
common support across Compustat and Thomson Reuters EIKON databases, from which I 
obtain, respectively, accounting and ownership structure data for the period 2003-2013. I 
begin with 6,043 firms, and using each firm’s historical business address as extracted from its 
filings (as previous studies, e.g., Marciukaityte, 2015), I exclude 603 firms with headquarters 
in foreign countries or outlying U.S. territories (e.g., Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and 
Guam).1 My data requirements for control, ownership structure, corporate governance 
variables, and unionization proxy estimation at industry-level (see in Hilary, 2006) 
necessitate a further drop of 4,674 firms because of missing data. Similarly to other studies 
(e.g., Hanlon, et al., 2012), I exclude financial institutions (two-digit SIC codes 60–69) and 
1 I obtain each firm’s historical business address through each company's filings, as databases tend to backfill 
business addresses (Marciukaityte, 2015). First, I download company filings, as available through the Securities 
Exchange Commission FTP server, employed by Audit Analytics for the extraction of audit fee data. Next, I 
develop a PERL script that parses state code, state name, city, and zip code. 
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utilities (two-digit SIC code 49), thus eliminating 85 firms because of their different 
regulatory rules. Next, I exclude another 1,425 firm-years because union-recognition data are 
unavailable through company filings. I exclude these 1,425 observations in order to avoid 
companies which are arbitrarily defined as non-unionized. All observations remaining in the 
final sample correspond to firms clearly disclosing the existence or absence of a union 
representing employees in their 10-K filings. I further remove 8 firms audited by non-BIG4 
audit firms, as they represent less than 1.7% of the extracted sample and their removal further 
improves my sample homogeneity (see Behn, et al., 2008). Thus, I am left with a final sample 
comprising 516 companies, or 2,910 firm-years. The stages of sample selection are reported 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 Sample selection. 
Sample selection stages Number of firms 
Number of 
firm years 
Firms with common support across Audit Analytics, Compustat and 
Thomson Reuters EIKON databases (2003 - 2013). 6,043 49,386 
Delete: Observations of foreign firms. 603 5,099 
Delete: Observations with lack of audit fee control variables for my main 
model (1) and employee figures. 1,910 19,625 
Delete: Firms without ownership structure and corporate governance data 
in Thomson Reuters Eikon. 2,764 19,772 
Delete: Firms belonging to utilities (two-digit SIC 49) and financial 
(two-digit SIC 60-69) sectors. 85 505 
Delete: Observations with lack of union-related expressions in 10-K 
variant filings. 157 1,425 
Companies with union-related expressions in 10-K variant filings. 524 2,960 
Delete: Observations of firms audited by non-BIG4 audit firms. 8 50 
Final sample. 516 2,910 
 
2.3.2 Measuring labor unionization 
I operationalize a firm-level unionization measure to indicate the existence of organized labor 
(Agrawal, 2012; Cheng, 2017), but I conduct further sensitivity tests for alternative 
definitions (see section 2.6.1). I focus on firm-level unionization because the measurement 
error is lower (Cheng, 2017).2 I determine whether company employees are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement drawing on Item 1 (Business) of 10-K company filings. I 
download the company filings, available from the Securities Exchange Commission FTP 
2 Industry-level data relies on data available through the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD) 
which is compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is a monthly household survey which suffers 
from some limitations: a) a uniform unionization pattern across companies in the same industry is assumed. 
However, recent evidence suggests great variations within an industry regarding unionization rates, implying 
that a non-uniform pattern exists among companies within the same industry (Cheng, 2017). b) CPS data 
include both public- and private-sector unionization rates. So there is inherent noise in the calculations of 
public-sector unionization. 
22 
                                                 
The impact of labor unionization on monitoring costs 
server, and develop a PERL Script, as Cheng (2017), to parse sentences related to union 
coverage. As Cheng (2017), I employ keyword combinations such as: bargaining 
agreement(s), bargaining unit(s), collective agreement(s), collective bargain(ing), labo(u)r 
agreement(s), labo(u)r organization(s), labo(u)r union(s), organized labo(u)r, organiz(s)ed 
employee(s)/staff/personnel/workforce, work council(s), trade union(s), trade-union(s), 
union(’s) activity(ies), union(’s) agreement(s), union contract(s); union organization(s), 
unioniz(s)ed, and union(s). After parsing sentences related to union coverage, I manually 
verify and identify 1,755 observations of companies disclosing union representation 
(D_UNION) and 1,155 observations of companies that report no union representation. This 
last is my control group. Apart from the unionization indicator, I trace 2,402 instances where 
the exact percentage of unionized employees (PCT_UNION) is available, but since 
observations are missing, I only include this variable as an alternative proxy for unionization 
(see section 2.6.1). I provide examples of the scoring process of 10-K filings, both for 
employees covered by bargaining agreements and for union-related risk through item 1A 
Risk Factors, respectively, in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
In order to align my findings with previous literature and additionally to examine 
whether measurement errors between firm- and industry-level data provide serious 
impediments to empirical findings, I estimate two unionization proxies by employing 
industry-level data. I draw on the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD). 
Similarly to previous studies, I estimate my first proxy (UNION_IND) by multiplying the 
percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining in a firm’s primary Census 
Industry Classification (CIC) industry by the number of company employees over total assets 
(see, for example, Chen, et al., 2011a, 2012; Chyz, et al., 2013; Hilary, 2006). Since UMCD 
data are available in CIC codes, I use a crosswalk list retrieved through the U.S. Census 
Bureau, and convert CIC to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
(https://www.census.gov/people/io/methodology/). I estimate my second proxy 
(D_UNION_IND) to be a dummy which takes the value 1 if a company has union rates higher 
than the two-digit SIC and year median and the value 0 otherwise (Chyz, et al., 2013). 
2.3.3 Empirical models 
I develop the model for the impact of labor unionization on audit pricing in section 2.3.3.1. I 
further investigate this outcome by developing models to ascertain the association between 
labor unionization and litigation risk (section 2.3.3.2), and between unionization and audit 
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reporting lag (section 2.3.3.3). In all models, I regard as unlikely reverse causality (i.e., levels 
of audit fees, audit lag, or lawsuits do not determine the election of a labor union at corporate 
level). However, I carefully consider issues related to omitted variables (section 2.6.2) and 
selection bias (section 2.6.3) in the sensitivity testing section. 
2.3.3.1 Audit fees and labor unions 
Following Simunic (1980) and the previous literature on audit pricing (Causholli, et al., 
2010), I estimate my main model by considering client, auditor, and engagement attributes 
(Hay, et al., 2006). I control for geography and demographics. I measure audit fees by the 
natural logarithm (e.g., Hay, et al., 2006). Since audit fees are sticky over time, I cluster 
standard errors at firm level for this and for all subsequent models (Srinidhi, et al., 2014). The 
functional form of the model is specified as follows: 
LAF = β0 + β1Union + β2LAT + β3FOREIGN + β4OPSEG + β5GEOSEG + β6MERGER +
β7MB + β8AGE + β9LIT + β10ARIN_TA + β11GROWTH + β12LOSS + β13ROA + β14LEV +
β15CR + β16GINDEX + β17CONC_OWN + β17LEAD_SIC + β19AUD_CH + β20COMP_AF +
β21AUD_LAG + β22DEC + β23D_RES + β24SOC_CAP + β25DIST_SEC + β26POP +
β27LITERACY + ∑YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY + ε  
(1) 
The vector Union represents the union-related variables employed to capture the 
impact of unionization on audit fees. I include firm- (D_UNION) and industry-level 
unionization proxies (UNION_IND and D_UNION_IND) as discussed in section 2.3.2. Since 
there are analytical explanations of control variables available in the relevant literature 
(Causholli, et al., 2010; Hay, et al., 2006), I provide here only a brief account of their 
importance in relation to audit fee levels and operationalization. 
Client attributes refer to size, complexity, inherent risk, profitability, leverage, 
governance, and ownership form. I measure firm size (LAT) by the natural logarithm of total 
assets. I capture complexity through MERGER, FOREIGN, OPSEG, GEOSEG and MB. 
MERGER and FOREIGN are dummy variables which signify, respectively, merger or 
acquisition and foreign operations (Blankley, et al., 2012). Indicators of the operational and 
geographical dispersion of the client, OPSEG and GEOSEG represent, respectively, the 
number of operating and geographic segments, both expressed as natural logarithms 
(Eshleman and Guo, 2014). MB is the market to book ratio (Hay, et al., 2006). 
I control for inherent risk by considering LIT, ARIN_TA, GROWTH and AGE. The 
dichotomous LIT indicates the existence/non-existence of a legal proceeding involving the 
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client in the current year (Leventis, et al., in press). Dechow, et al. (2011) classify account 
receivables and inventory among the accounts most frequently associated with earnings 
management, and thus the ratio of accounts receivables and inventory over total assets 
(ARIN_TA) is included in my analysis. Since high-growth firms have a greater demand for 
audit services compared to low-growth firms (Choi and Wong, 2007), I account for the 
percentage change in firm sales from the previous year (GROWTH). Younger firms are less 
experienced with accounting controls and more prone to fail (Hope and Langli, 2010), so I 
include firm age (AGE), measured by the natural logarithm of years the firm appears in 
Compustat. I further control for profitability and leverage by including LOSS, which indicates 
the existence of negative net income in the previous year, and ROA, which is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items over total assets. I consider the ratio of total debt over total 
assets (LEV) and the ratio of current assets over current liabilities (CR) (Causholli, et al., 
2010). 
I control for ownership structure and corporate governance attributes because 
previous literature suggests that this warrants consideration (Hay, et al., 2006). I include as a 
monitoring device which impacts negatively on audit fees the existence of shareholders with 
at least a 20% stake of total firm shares (CONC_OWN) (Desender, et al., 2013). I also focus 
on: the proportion of nonexecutive board members over the total board size (BOD_IND), the 
average number of other corporate affiliations held by board members (BOD_AFF), the 
number of board meeting held (BOD_MEET), audit committee expertise (AC_EXP) 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009), and CEO duality (DUAL) (Gul and Leung, 2004) because 
previous studies suggest that all are important determinants of audit fees (Carcello, et al., 
2002; Srinidhi, et al., 2014). I follow Srinidhi, et al. (2014) and calculate the board’s 
governance (GINDEX) strength by aggregating BOD_IND, BOD_MEET, AC_EXP, 
BOD_AFF and subtracting DUAL.3 
I control for auditor attributes. I include auditor specialization (LEAD_SIC). I define 
as specialists the audit offices with the highest total revenues in an industry per year, and I 
identify industries using the two-digit SIC (Reichelt and Wang, 2010). I sensitivity test the 
operationalization and cutoff points of this proxy (see section 2.6.2). I consider auditor 
3 Similar to Srinidhi, et al. (2014), I standardize each continuous variable to fall within the range [0, 1]. I scale 
BOD_MEET and BOD_AFF using the maximum value in my sample. The only component of the index that 
differs from Srinidhi, et al. (2014) is AC_EXP. Although in the original form represents the percentage of 
financial experts in the audit committee, I take its extreme values and measure it in a binary fashion. 
25 
                                                 
School of Economics, Business Administration and Legal Studies 
switching, measured as auditor change compared to the previous year (AUD_CH), and I 
control for audit market competition (COMP_AF) (Jha and Chen, 2015), calculated according 
to the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (i.e., defined as the sum of the square 
fractions of the audit fees an auditor generates in a two-digit SIC-county combination). In 
order to control for engagement attributes, I consider the following: the time elapsed from the 
year-end until the signature date of the auditor (AUD_LAG), fiscal year-end in December 
(DEC), and the existence of a financial restatement (D_RES) (Huang, et al., 2009). 
Finally, I control for the geographic and demographic attributes of client headquarters 
by regarding corporate headquarters as the main place of managerial decision-making (Coval 
and Moskowitz, 2001). I follow recent studies and incorporate the social capital of firm 
headquarters (SOC_CAP) (Jha and Chen, 2015) and the distance from the nearest SEC office4 
(DIST_SEC) (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). Measured at the county level, I also include the 
population of firm headquarters (POP) (Hay, et al., 2006) and the percentage of adults who 
have completed completed four years of college or higher (LITERACY) (Jha and Chen, 2015) 
because these factors influence audit pricing. All definitions for this and subsequent models 
are presented in the Appendix A. 
2.3.3.2 Auditor litigation risk and labor unions 
I investigate the litigation-based explanation of audit fees by building a model for auditor 
litigation risk, based upon previous literature (Ghosh and Tang, 2015; Kaplan and Williams, 
2013; Lys and Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000). I specify the following probit model: 
LIT_AUDITOR =  β0 + β1Union + β2GINDEX + β3CONC_OWN + β4LAT + β5KMJRDA +
β6GROWTH + β7ZSCORE + β8OPCF + β9INVENTORY + β10REC_TA + β11LOSS +
β12RET + β13RETVOL + β14AUD_LAG + β15UNQOP + β16STENURE + β17TECH +
β18SOC_CAP + β19DIST_SEC + β20POP + β21LITERACY + ∑YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY + ε  
(2) 
I approximate auditor litigation using the data available in the Audit Analytics 
litigation dataset. After examining the records of Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse, I find 
that there are no lawsuits against auditors in my sample. I create a dummy variable equal to 1 
4 I obtain the latitude and longitude data for each firm’s headquarters using the US Census Bureau’s Gazetteer 
city-state files (www.census.gov/geo). Next, I compute the distance between corporate headquarters (point a) 
and urban areas (point b), using the following formula: 𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠[𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑎1)𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑎2)𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑏1)𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑏2) +
𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑎1)𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑎2)𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑏1)𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑏2) + 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑎1)𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑏1) ]𝑟. Where: a1 and b1, respectively, are the latitudes and 
longitudes of the two points (expressed in radians) and r denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 6,378 
statutory kilometers). 
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if the audit firm is named as a defendant in a lawsuit and equal to 0 otherwise 
(LIT_AUDITOR), thus measuring the direct exposure of an auditor to litigation risk (Ghosh 
and Tang, 2015). 
 The control variables which I include in the audit risk model are the following: client 
size (LAT), since larger clients have greater exposure to market scrutiny; cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets (OPCF) as a performance measure (Kaplan and Williams, 
2013); abnormal accruals (KMJRDA), based on the cross-sectional modified version of the 
Jones model adjusted for performance (Kothari, et al., 2005), as a measure for earnings 
quality; corporate financial condition (ZSCORE), since managers' incentives to mislead 
increase when the firm is in financial distress (Lys and Watts, 1994); and GROWTH, since 
high-growth firms have greater difficulty in establishing and enforcing internal controls (Lys 
and Watts, 1994). As an auditor’s propensity to face a lawsuit increases with the levels of 
inventory and accounts receivable (Lys and Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000), I consider the ratio of 
inventory (INVENTORY) and accounts receivables (REC_TA) scaled by total assets. Since 
both losses reporting and unqualified opinion issuance increase the probability of lawsuits 
(Shu, 2000), I include LOSS and UNQOP in my model. I also account for the following: audit 
effort (AUD_LAG), auditor-client relationship being of less than three years (STENURE), 
firm’s stock returns over the fiscal year (RET) as a measurement of investor losses, and the 
variance of abnormal stock returns (RETVOL) (Kaplan and Williams, 2013). I include client’s 
membership in a high-tech industry (TECH) (Ghosh and Tang, 2015) and the geographic and 
demographic characteristics firm headquarters (as presented in section 2.3.3.1: POP, 
LITERACY, DIST_SEC and SOC_CAP). 
2.3.3.3 Audit report lag and labor unions 
Audit report lag can proxy for audit investment and complexities (Bamber, et al., 1993), and 
unions can affect audit report lag, as discussed in section 2.2.2. Following previous literature 
(Bamber, et al., 1993; Ghosh and Tang, 2015; Knechel and Payne, 2001), I specify the 
following model: 
AUD_LAG =  β0 + β1Union + β2GINDEX + β3CONC_OWN + β4LAT + β5KMJRDA +
β6UNQOP + β7ROA + β8MB + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11FOREIGN + β12MERGER +
β13AUD_CH + β14DEC + β15SOC_CAP + β16DIST_SEC + β17POP + β18LITERACY +
∑YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY + ε  
(3) 
27 
School of Economics, Business Administration and Legal Studies 
I control internal firm-monitoring strength by including corporate governance 
(GINDEX) (Niemi, 2005) and concentrated ownership (CONC_OWN) (Leventis, et al., 
2005). Larger firms (LAT) not only have the incentives, but also the capability to reduce audit 
lags, through increased monitoring and advanced technologies (Knechel and Payne, 2001). I 
consider KMJRDA in order to control for the influence of aggressive accounting (Blankley, et 
al., 2014). I also control for the following: unqualified audit opinion (UNQOP), profitability 
(ROA), risks associated with growth opportunities (MB) (Knechel and Sharma, 2012), 
financial condition (LEV), and corporate age (AGE) (Lee, et al., 1999). Complexities which 
might delay the audit are included by considering FOREIGN, MERGER, DEC and AUD_CH. 
I conclude the model specification with the specific demographic characteristics of firm 
headquarters, i.e., POP, LITERACY, DIST_SEC and SOC_CAP. 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Univariate analysis 
In Table 2, I present the descriptive statistics of the entire sample, both unionized and 
non-unionized companies, and a comparison of means as well as the corresponding statistical 
significance obtaining between the unionized and non-unionized firms. Although the two 
groups share similar characteristics for ownership structure, auditor, and engagement 
attributes, they differ in terms of size, growth, profitability, cash holdings, asset mix, and 
leverage. These findings contribute to the evidence from previous research that firms facing 
union bargaining positions have volatile cash flows (Chen, et al., 2011c) and lower 
profitability (Lee and Mas, 2012) and also that such firms strategically hold less cash (Klasa, 
et al., 2009), more inventory (Matsa, 2010), and more debt (Matsa, 2010). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate any effects from outliers. I 
find that, compared to non-unionized companies, unionized companies are charged higher 
audit fees, as the mean (median) values of LAF are, respectively, 15.284 (15.259) and 14.489 
(14.473) with the difference being statistically significant at 1%. 
As to other control variables in the audit fee model, the mean (median) value of 
GINDEX is 1.549 (1.372) is slightly greater than the values reported in Srinidhi, et al. (2014). 
The mean AGE of my sample companies is 3.191 (identical to Leventis, et al., in press), 
while the mean values of CR, ROA, and LEV are, respectively, 2.152, 5.867%, and 24.191%, 
thus indicating that my sample firms are not particularly liquid, profitable, or leveraged. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of unionized and non-unionized firms. 
Variable 
Entire sample 
(N = 2,910) 
Unionized firms 
(N = 1,755) 
Non-Unionized firms  
(N = 1,155) Mean diff. 
25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 
AF '000s 1706.46 4905.172 3136.15 5559 5500.796 2465 6228.481 4237.1 7028 6116.023 1080.5 2894.43 1930 3383 3565.436  LAF 14.35 14.968 14.959 15.53 0.92 14.72 15.284 15.259 15.77 0.832 13.89 14.489 14.473 15.03 0.836 -0.795*** 
D_UNION 0 0.603 1 1 0.489 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
D_UNION_IND 0 0.547 1 1 0.498 0 0.619 1 1 0.486 0 0.438 0 1 0.496 -0.181*** 
UNION_IND 0 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.005 0 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.002*** 
GINDEX 1.179 1.549 1.372 2.08 0.559 1.188 1.521 1.348 2.036 0.541 1.169 1.593 1.44 2.121 0.582 0.072*** 
CONC_OWN 0 0.069 0 0 0.254 0 0.076 0 0 0.265 0 0.059 0 0 0.235 -0.017* 
LAT 7.766 8.581 8.443 9.257 1.144 8.147 8.928 8.763 9.622 1.052 7.371 8.055 7.864 8.69 1.077 -0.873*** 
FOREIGN 1 0.793 1 1 0.405 1 0.821 1 1 0.383 1 0.751 1 1 0.433 -0.070*** 
OPSEG 0 0.481 0 1.099 0.691 0 0.581 0 1.386 0.734 0 0.33 0 0.693 0.588 -0.250*** 
GEOSEG 0 0.61 0 1.386 0.683 0 0.605 0 1.386 0.693 0 0.618 0 1.386 0.666 0.013 
MERGER 0 0.223 0 0 0.416 0 0.236 0 0 0.425 0 0.203 0 0 0.402 -0.033** 
MB 1.707 3.365 2.723 4.371 6.538 1.618 3.039 2.469 3.829 5.683 1.976 3.86 3.252 5.241 7.631 0.821*** 
AGE 2.708 3.191 3.135 3.85 0.672 2.833 3.359 3.584 3.989 0.689 2.565 2.935 2.89 3.296 0.554 -0.424*** 
LIT 0 0.349 0 1 0.477 0 0.337 0 1 0.473 0 0.368 0 1 0.482 0.031* 
ARIN_TA 0.112 0.218 0.201 0.306 0.132 0.134 0.232 0.229 0.317 0.126 0.089 0.196 0.152 0.282 0.139 -0.036*** 
GROWTH -0.127 -0.055 -0.063 0.002 0.166 -0.116 -0.042 -0.052 0.013 0.162 -0.147 -0.075 -0.079 -0.016 0.17 -0.033*** 
LOSS 0 0.12 0 0 0.325 0 0.108 0 0 0.31 0 0.139 0 0 0.347 0.032** 
ROA 3.111 5.867 6.285 9.967 8.695 2.873 5.213 5.469 8.475 6.729 3.734 6.861 8.137 12.54 10.961 1.648*** 
LEV 11.38 24.191 22.299 33.16 18.396 16.41 27.444 25.052 35.32 16.846 1.556 19.248 15.334 29.9 19.525 -8.196*** 
CR 1.255 2.152 1.769 2.562 1.405 1.194 1.829 1.614 2.231 0.928 1.426 2.643 2.07 3.315 1.809 0.813*** 
LEAD_SIC 0 0.339 0 1 0.474 0 0.351 0 1 0.477 0 0.321 0 1 0.467 -0.03* 
AUD_CH 0 0.023 0 0 0.149 0 0.022 0 0 0.146 0 0.024 0 0 0.154 0.003 
COMP_AF 0.93 1.497 1 1.72 1.271 0.938 1.275 1 1.293 0.853 0.921 1.834 1 2.164 1.666 0.558*** 
AUD_LAG 50 54.269 56 59 10.497 50 54.503 56 59 10.067 51 53.915 56 59 11.113 -0.587 
DEC 0 0.666 1 1 0.472 0 0.748 1 1 0.434 0 0.54 1 1 0.499 -0.208*** 
D_RES 0 0.066 0 0 0.249 0 0.071 0 0 0.256 0 0.06 0 0 0.237 -0.011 
SOC_CAP -1.196 -0.593 -0.495 -0.016 0.808 -0.92 -0.464 -0.364 0.106 0.818 -1.401 -0.788 -0.787 -0.261 0.752 -0.324*** 
POP 13.18 13.688 13.749 14.32 1.052 13.1 13.583 13.726 14.27 1.1 13.38 13.847 13.96 14.38 0.952 0.264*** 
LITERACY 0.285 0.369 0.362 0.446 0.103 0.28 0.359 0.339 0.44 0.108 0.306 0.384 0.396 0.454 0.093 0.026*** 
LIT_AUDITOR 0 0.007 0 0 0.083 0 0.008 0 0 0.089 0 0.005 0 0 0.072 -0.003 
ZSCORE 1.824 2.82 2.655 3.739 1.702 1.761 2.552 2.439 3.245 1.249 1.988 3.227 3.241 4.592 2.157 0.675*** 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Variable 
Entire sample 
(N = 2,910) 
Unionized firms 
(N = 1,755) 
Non-Unionized firms  
(N = 1,155) Mean diff. 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 
OPCF 0.069 0.1 0.102 0.142 0.088 0.065 0.091 0.092 0.122 0.067 0.081 0.114 0.124 0.172 0.111 0.024*** 
INVENTORY 0.019 0.103 0.079 0.157 0.101 0.035 0.109 0.095 0.162 0.09 0.004 0.094 0.047 0.14 0.116 -0.015*** 
REC_TA 0.057 0.114 0.104 0.161 0.074 0.069 0.122 0.114 0.168 0.07 0.041 0.101 0.084 0.145 0.079 -0.021*** 
RET -0.064 0.202 0.157 0.393 0.485 -0.051 0.209 0.166 0.391 0.489 -0.09 0.193 0.139 0.394 0.479 -0.016 
RETVOL 0.036 0.115 0.069 0.138 0.153 0.032 0.112 0.062 0.131 0.17 0.044 0.118 0.081 0.147 0.122 0.005 
UNQOP 0 0.595 1 1 0.491 0 0.562 1 1 0.496 0 0.644 1 1 0.479 0.082*** 
STENURE 0 0.169 0 0 0.375 0 0.177 0 0 0.382 0 0.158 0 0 0.365 -0.02 
TECH 0 0.087 0 0 0.282 0 0.023 0 0 0.151 0 0.184 0 0 0.387 0.160*** 
Splits the sample into unionized and non-unionized groups, based on D_UNION variable at firm-level. The last column compares the differences in mean values of each 
variable across groups and statistical significance of differences reported are based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for dummy variables. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. 
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to three decimal places. 
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Table 3 Pearson correlation matrix between LAF, unionization and control variables for audit fee model (N = 2,910). 
Variable LAF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. D_UNION 0.42*** 1.00              
2. GINDEX -0.02 -0.06*** 1.00             
3. CONC_OWN -0.02 0.03* -0.10*** 1.00            
4. LAT 0.71*** 0.37*** -0.08*** 0.02 1.00           
5. FOREIGN 0.33*** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.02 0.02 1.00          
6. OPSEG 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.16*** 1.00         
7. GEOSEG 0.08*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.00 -0.02 0.22*** 0.66*** 1.00        
8. MERGER 0.07*** 0.04** 0.09*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 1.00       
9. MB -0.03 -0.06*** 0.04** 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.08*** -0.03 0.00 1.00      
10. AGE 0.34*** 0.31*** -0.02 -0.14*** 0.33*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.00     
11. LIT 0.17*** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.23*** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.05*** 0.03* 0.02 1.00    
12. ARIN_TA 0.13*** 0.13*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.09*** 0.15*** 0.03* 0.03 -0.08*** 0.01 0.16*** -0.07*** 1.00   
13. GROWTH 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.03* -0.03* 0.10*** 0.04** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.06*** 1.00  
14. LOSS -0.05*** -0.05** 0.07*** 0.04** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.04** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.12*** 0.03* 1.00 
15. ROA -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.03 -0.05*** -0.03* 0.06*** -0.01 0.01 -0.05*** 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12*** -0.05** -0.67*** 
16. LEV 0.12*** 0.22*** -0.07*** 0.10*** 0.17*** -0.17*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 
17. CR -0.33*** -0.28*** 0.09*** -0.02 -0.41*** 0.13*** -0.05*** 0.11*** 0.02 0.01 -0.20*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.08*** 0.07*** 
18. LEAD_SIC 0.11*** 0.03* -0.02 -0.03 0.09*** 0.05** 0.04** 0.04** 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 
19. AUD_CH -0.05*** -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.02 0.04** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05** 0.04* 
20. COMP_AF -0.06*** -0.21*** 0.05*** 0.00 -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.10*** -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.14*** 0.04** -0.17*** -0.04* 0.17*** 
21. AUD_LAG -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.17*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.07*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.04** 0.04** -0.01 0.07*** 
22. DEC 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.04** -0.01 0.05*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04** -0.18*** 0.02 0.05*** 
23. D_RES 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06*** -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05*** 
24. SOC_CAP 0.02 0.20*** -0.08*** -0.03 0.07*** -0.03* 0.01 -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.16*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.02 -0.04** 
25. DIST_SEC -0.10*** 0.03 -0.04** -0.02 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.08*** 0.02 0.13*** -0.02 0.15*** -0.03 -0.07*** 
26. POP 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.02 0.01 0.04** 0.06*** -0.03* 0.02 -0.06*** 0.03 -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.11*** -0.02 0.03 
27. LITERACY 0.12*** -0.12*** 0.04** -0.06*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.05** 0.09*** 0.05** 0.04** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.00 0.03 
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(Table 3 continued)  
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27   
15. ROA 1.00               
16. LEV -0.19*** 1.00              
17. CR 0.06*** -0.27*** 1.00             
18. LEAD_SIC 0.00 -0.03 -0.06*** 1.00            
19. AUD_CH -0.04** -0.01 0.00 0.02 1.00           
20. COMP_AF -0.15*** -0.06*** 0.22*** -0.03 0.04** 1.00          
21. AUD_LAG -0.06*** 0.09*** -0.03* 0.01 0.06*** -0.02 1.00         
22. DEC -0.10*** 0.22*** -0.12*** -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03* 1.00        
23. D_RES -0.05*** 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.15*** -0.01 1.00       
24. SOC_CAP 0.02 0.03* -0.14*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.19*** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.01 1.00      
25. DIST_SEC 0.10*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.09*** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.00 0.01 1.00     
26. POP -0.03 -0.11*** 0.04** -0.09*** 0.01 0.23*** 0.03 -0.03* -0.01 -0.46*** -0.24*** 1.00    
27. LITERACY -0.02 -0.04** 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.22*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.02 0.25*** -0.43*** 0.26*** 1.00   
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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These findings are similar to previous studies (see Gul and Goodwin, 2010; Leventis, et al., 
in press). Additionally, 66.6% of my sample firms report financial year end on 31 December, 
exactly as found by Jha and Chen (2015), while approximately 34% are audited by industry 
specialists, which is lower than the percentage reported by Jha and Chen (2015). It is 
interesting to note that approximately 35% of my sample firms have been involved in a major 
litigation which is lower than the value reported by Jha and Chen (2015) in their 
industry-based litigation measure. County-level control variables (SOC_CAP, POP and 
LITERACY) are similar to those reported by Jha and Chen (2015). 
I present a Pearson’s correlation matrix in Table 3, where almost all variables are 
correlated significantly with LAF. LAT exhibits the highest coefficient: 0.71. Labor 
unionization is significantly correlated with LAF at 1%, and this remains strong and positive 
for all alternative operationalizations of labor unionization. OPSEG and GEOSEG are 
correlated at 0.66, and ROA and LOSS at -0.67, which is relatively high. I keep these 
variables in the main model in order to ease comparison with previous studies, while after the 
exclusion of these variable, I also sensitivity test my main inferences. I separately include 
each of these variables in my model and observe that the inferences for my main independent 
variable (D_UNION) remain unchanged. All other inferences make economic sense and 
suggest that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
2.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
2.4.2.1 Impact of unionization on audit fees 
The results of the audit fee model are presented in Table 4. All regression models are 
significant at 1%, with an explanatory power of approximately 79%. The coefficient of 
D_UNION is positive and statistically significant at 1% (column 1, β=0.164, t-stat=3.59). 
This finding supports my hypothesis because it demonstrates that audit firms demand and 
achieve audit premiums when auditing unionized firms. If a company becomes unionized it 
will pay an increase in audit fees of approximately 18% (e0.164 = 1.1782 - 1 = 0.1782), or in 
dollar amounts, an average increase of $882.9305 per year per firm, which is economically 
material in absolute terms. UNION_IND is significant at 5% (column 3, β=8.981, t-stat=2.00) 
and D_UNION_IND is significant at 1% (column 2, β=0.127, t-stat=4.46). No matter how 
unionization is measured, these findings indicate that audit firms charge unionized firms 
5 Estimated as 18% * 4,905.171 (4,905.171 is the average audit fee obtained from Table 2). 
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significantly more. My results also indicate that measurement errors related to industry-level 
data are not material,and so do not yield misleading results. I conclude that my findings here 
lend further credibility to evidence reported in previous literature. 
Table 4 The impact of unionization on audit fees (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) 
D_UNION ? 0.164***   
  (3.59)   
D_UNION_IND ?  0.127***  
   (4.46)  
UNION_IND ?   8.981** 
    (2.00) 
GINDEX + -0.017 -0.009 -0.012 
  (-0.72) (-0.37) (-0.49) 
CONC_OWN - -0.090 -0.075 -0.072 
  (-1.46) (-1.21) (-1.15) 
LAT + 0.536*** 0.564*** 0.556*** 
  (26.73) (28.46) (28.02) 
FOREIGN + 0.262*** 0.273*** 0.280*** 
  (4.79) (4.95) (5.04) 
OPSEG + 0.009 0.012 0.021 
  (0.39) (0.52) (0.87) 
GEOSEG + 0.050* 0.051* 0.047 
  (1.73) (1.76) (1.64) 
MERGER + 0.006 0.009 0.006 
  (0.20) (0.33) (0.21) 
MB + -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.29) 
AGE - 0.120*** 0.115*** 0.127*** 
  (4.11) (3.94) (4.31) 
LIT + 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
  (3.53) (2.98) (2.92) 
ARIN_TA + 1.405*** 1.348*** 1.451*** 
  (6.82) (6.32) (6.76) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.119** 0.098* 0.119** 
  (2.03) (1.71) (2.00) 
LOSS + 0.051 0.038 0.032 
  (1.10) (0.84) (0.70) 
ROA - -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* 
  (-1.30) (-1.70) (-1.68) 
LEV + 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.34) (0.61) (0.56) 
CR - -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.047*** 
  (-3.39) (-2.98) (-3.48) 
LEAD_SIC + 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.090** 
  (2.78) (2.63) (2.53) 
AUD_CH ?- -0.242** -0.255** -0.245** 
  (-2.43) (-2.51) (-2.42) 
AUD_LAG + 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (4.41) (4.73) (4.70) 
DEC + 0.091** 0.102** 0.099** 
  (2.22) (2.51) (2.39) 
D_RES + 0.089** 0.098** 0.092** 
  (2.26) (2.45) (2.34) 
SOC_CAP - -0.088*** -0.074** -0.075** 
  (-3.01) (-2.57) (-2.53) 
(continued on next page) 
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 (Table 4 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.027** -0.030*** -0.028** 
  (-2.48) (-2.76) (-2.55) 
POP + 0.005 0.009 0.010 
  (0.26) (0.41) (0.46) 
LITERACY + 0.878*** 0.836*** 0.814*** 
  (3.82) (3.66) (3.50) 
(intercept)  8.519*** 8.151*** 8.272*** 
  (24.66) (23.24) (23.42) 
        
Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Included 
R2  0.794 0.794 0.792 
Adj. R2  0.788 0.788 0.785 
Observations  2,910 2,910 2,910 
Mean VIF  1.519 1.499 1.492 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are 
rounded up to three decimal places. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
All coefficients across control variables (apart from GINDEX, MB, and AGE) have the 
predicted sign, with firm size (LAT) receiving the highest t-statistic. Overall, higher audit fees 
are paid by less-profitable and more-diversified firms as well as by firms operating with 
greater levels of inherent risk (LIT, ARIN_TA and GROWTH). More complex audits 
(AUD_LAG and DEC) demand premiums. LIT has a significant and positive sign, which 
suggests that litigation is an important component of the inherent risk that auditors consider 
when organizing and executing the audit (see Hay, et al., 2006). The negative coefficient of 
AUD_CH requires some further investigation to verify whether low-balling takes place 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Since LEAD_SIC is significant with a positive sign, suggesting that when 
audit firms dominate a market sector they achieve fee premiums (Francis, et al., 2005). I 
detect a fee discount when a firm is located away from the SEC radar, that is, in areas with 
high social capital or with a less educated population. In all models, the mean VIFs are less 
than 1.52, which implies no multicollinearity. Overall, my results support previous research 
in demonstrating that audit pricing is affected by definable characteristics of client, auditor, 
and audit-engagement, but my results also lead me to the conclusion that 
previously-developed audit fee models must pay better attention to the power of labor unions. 
2.4.2.2 Unionization and auditor litigation risk 
Since it has been shown that litigation risk determines audit fees (Choi, et al., 2009), I argue 
that when higher fees are charged unionized firms, that rate is quite possibly an effect of the 
enhanced litigation risk associated with organized labor. I examine whether unions entail a 
direct litigation risk for auditors and whether unions raise the risk of litigation. Within my 
35 
School of Economics, Business Administration and Legal Studies 
sample of 2,910 observations, I identify 20 cases of lawsuits filed against auditors because of 
a client’s financial reporting matters (see Table 5). An auditor may be subject to more than 
one lawsuit per case because multiple parties may file lawsuits against auditors. Following 
Ghosh and Tang (2015), I include one observation per client/auditor. The likelihood of an 
auditor being sued is approximately 0.69% (=20/2,910). Out of the 20 cases of lawsuits, 14 
are related to unionized companies, while the remaining 6 involve non-unionized companies, 
with the corresponding likelihoods being, respectively, 0.80% (=14/1,755) and 0.52% 
(=6/1,155). Despite the difference in incidence of a lawsuit, the difference in the likelihood of 
the two groups is not statistically significant. 
Table 5 Auditor litigation differences between unionized and non-unionized firms. 
Year Unionized Companies Non-Unionized Companies Difference t-value Auditor Lawsuits Obs % Auditor Lawsuits Obs % 
2003 0 60 0.00% 0 45 0.00% 0.00% - 
2004 2 85 2.35% 0 54 0.00% -2.35% (-1.13) 
2005 1 111 0.90% 0 64 0.00% -0.90% (-0.76) 
2006 4 121 3.31% 2 65 3.08% -0.23% (-0.84) 
2007 2 130 1.54% 0 73 0.00% -1.54% (-1.06) 
2008 1 153 0.65% 1 108 0.93% 0.27% (0.25) 
2009 1 199 0.50% 0 134 0.00% -0.50% (-0.82) 
2010 0 214 0.00% 1 154 0.65% 0.65% (1.18) 
2011 3 231 1.30% 1 158 0.63% -0.67% (0.64) 
2012 0 238 0.00% 0 162 0.00% 0.00% - 
2013 0 213 0.00% 1 138 0.72% 0.72% (1.24) 
Total 14 1,755 0.80% 6 1,155 0.52% -0.28% (-0.89) 
 
I further conduct a probit analysis using the LIT_AUDITOR dummy as dependent 
variable (see Table 6). I present three columns in which I gradually include year- and 
industry-fixed effects. This is done in order to maintain the same number of observations as 
other pooled tests because the inclusion of year and industry-fixed effects results in a loss of 
observations for those years and industries which have no lawsuits filed. The pseudo 
R-Square is approximately 36%, which is high when compared to relevant studies (Ghosh 
and Tang, 2015). The coefficient of D_UNION is -0.168 (see column 1 in Table 6) and 
non-significant (t-stat=-0.81). My findings suggest that fee premiums are not caused by a 
higher risk of litigation. 
As to the other coefficients, GINDEX and CONC_OWN exhibit positive and 
significant coefficients, and this indicates that the probability of an auditor facing a lawsuit 
increases in the presence of stronger governance and concentrated ownership. My findings 
are in line with previous studies because an increased probability of auditor lawsuits has been 
shown to correlate with larger clients with longer report lags (Kaplan and Williams, 2013) 
and higher levels of accounts receivables (Lys and Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000). On the other 
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hand, financially-healthier companies (ZSCORE) located in areas with higher social capital 
are associated with a lower probability of auditor lawsuits (Jha and Chen, 2015). 
Table 6 Auditor litigation as an explanation for variations in audit fees between unionized and 
non-unionized firms (Dependent variable = LIT_AUDITOR), probit analysis. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
D_UNION -0.168 -0.221 -0.232 
 (-0.81) (-1.04) (-0.95) 
GINDEX 0.274* 0.304* 0.372** 
 (1.81) (1.95) (2.48) 
CONC_OWN 0.639** 0.691*** 1.123** 
 (2.55) (2.65) (2.53) 
LAT 0.455*** 0.502*** 0.559*** 
 (4.29) (4.43) (4.23) 
KMJRDA 0.001 0.359 -1.927 
 (0.00) (0.18) (-0.72) 
GROWTH -0.311 -0.400 -0.168 
 (-0.57) (-0.71) (-0.28) 
ZSCORE -0.128*** -0.122*** -0.176*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.58) (-4.42) 
OPCF 2.669 1.853 1.416 
 (1.48) (1.13) (0.92) 
INVENTORY 0.071 0.163 3.918** 
 (0.07) (0.15) (2.41) 
REC_TA 4.279*** 4.378*** 7.757*** 
 (3.48) (3.30) (4.01) 
LOSS 0.022 -0.053 -0.207 
 (0.06) (-0.14) (-0.48) 
RET -0.164 -0.083 -0.002 
 (-0.82) (-0.44) (-0.01) 
RETVOL 0.585 0.919** 0.802* 
 (1.42) (2.03) (1.81) 
AUD_LAG 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (3.46) (2.93) (3.10) 
UNQOP -0.226 -0.020 0.277 
 (-1.43) (-0.11) (1.28) 
STENURE 0.404** 0.391* 0.492* 
 (2.13) (1.91) (1.84) 
TECH 0.066 0.112 1.105* 
 (0.19) (0.32) (1.77) 
SOC_CAP -0.064 -0.135 -0.331* 
 (-0.47) (-0.93) (-1.65) 
DIST_SEC 0.016 0.002 -0.015 
 (0.21) (0.02) (-0.20) 
POP -0.119 -0.161 -0.392*** 
 (-1.24) (-1.64) (-3.04) 
LITERACY 0.182 0.692 -0.385 
 (0.15) (0.58) (-0.28) 
(intercept) -7.124*** -7.550*** -4.970*** 
 (-4.21) (-4.39) (-2.79) 
       
Industry Effects   Included 
Year effects  Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.271 0.361 
Observations 2,910 2,405 1,196 
Mean VIF 1.354 1.358 1.392 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are 
rounded up to three decimal places. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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2.4.2.3 Unionization and audit report lag 
I examine whether auditors view labor unionization in audit engagements as a complexity 
which justifies higher fees because requiring additional audit effort. I proxy audit effort with 
AUD_LAG. The results in Table 7 indicate that D_UNION is 1.959 and significant at 1% 
(t-stat=2.75).6 The adjusted R-Square is 20.7, similar to previous studies (Leventis, et al., 
2005). As to the remaining coefficients in the model, larger and more profitable and 
financially-healthier companies seem to require less effort from the auditor, which is a 
finding similar to that in previous studies (Leventis, et al., 2005). 
Table 7 Audit report lag as an explanation for variations in audit fees between unionized and 






































(continued on next page) 
6 My inferences remain unchanged when I use the natural logarithm of audit report lag as the dependent 
variable, as D_UNION coefficient remains positive and statistically significant at 1%. 
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Industry & Year Effects Included 
R2 0.229 
Adj. R2 0.207 
Observations 2,910 
Mean VIF 1.232 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are 
rounded up to three decimal places. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
I conclude that the fee premium observed for organized labor is caused by audit 
complexity rather than by litigation costs. 
2.5 Extensions 
I extend my analysis by testing whether a prevailing political ideology conducive to labor 
unions’ power plays any role in audit pricing. First, I examine whether the impact of unions 
on audit fees is dissimilar between states which enact Right-to-Work legislation (RTW) and 
those which do not. Evidence suggests that laws of this type inhibit the organizing of union 
and decrease the power of unions (Cheng, 2017; Marciukaityte, 2015; Matsa, 2010). Second, 
I investigate whether the impact of unions is different in states dominated by the Democratic 
Party because the literature associates Democrats with an increase in the power of unions 
(Chen, et al., 2011a; Marciukaityte, 2015). Third, I test whether there is any impact on audit 
pricing because of employee share ownership, which has been suggested as a mechanism 
aligning the interests of employees and principals (Richter and Schrader, 2017; Richter and 
Schröder, 2008) and weakening employee commitment to trade unionism (Poole and Jenkins 
(1990). 
2.5.1 Labor unions and Right-to-Work laws 
RTW laws grant unionized employees the right to opt out of union membership (see Ellwood 
and Fine, 1987). There is convincing evidence which demonstrates that RTW laws are 
associated with loss of union power because this legislation constrains unions' financial 
resources, curtails their organizing activity, and ultimately impairs their effectiveness and 
strength (Ellwood and Fine, 1987; Matsa, 2010). I consider states which enact RTW 
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legislation to be less union-friendly. My study echoes the current hot debate over RTW laws 
after recent changes in the U.S. political landscape.7 
I test whether unionized companies located in states without RTW laws exhibit higher 
audit fees because of increased union power. I divide my sample into two groups (see Table 
8), based on the effective year of RTW laws at the state level as available through the 
National Right to Work Committee. I observe that the coefficient D_UNION is statistically 
significant both at 1% (column 2, β=0.151, t-stat=2.74) for states without RTW laws and at 
10% (column 1, β=0.144, t-stat=1.65) for states with RTW laws. My findings support the 
notion that unionized companies face audit fee premiums in states with greater union power. I 
also test for homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients (using a Wald test, column 3 
in Table 8). The difference in the D_UNION coefficients is statistically significant at 1% 
across RTW and non-RTW states. Thus, I demonstrate that auditors demand and achieve 
higher fees in non-RTW states. 
Table 8 Unionization and audit fees in states with/without Right-to-Work laws (Dependent variable = 
LAF), OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) RTW States Non-RTW States Diff coef 
D_UNION ? 0.144* 0.151*** -0.007*** 
  (1.65) (2.74) (10.908) 
GINDEX + -0.036 -0.024 -0.012 
  (-0.90) (-0.86) (0.067) 
CONC_OWN - 0.026 -0.061 0.087 
  (0.34) (-0.78) (0.733) 
LAT + 0.508*** 0.554*** -0.046 
  (13.22) (26.32) (1.211) 
FOREIGN + 0.116 0.327*** -0.211** 
  (1.62) (4.35) (4.679) 
OPSEG + 0.015 0.008 0.006 
  (0.39) (0.29) (0.022) 
GEOSEG + 0.048 0.033 0.015 
  (1.16) (0.92) (0.079) 
MERGER + 0.051 -0.026 0.077 
  (1.15) (-0.81) (2.243) 
MB + -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (-0.03) (-0.71) (0.073) 
AGE - 0.184*** 0.087** 0.097* 
  (4.08) (2.53) (3.198) 
(continued on next page) 
7 According to the National Right to Work Committee, four states voted for RTW laws since 2012. These are: 
Indiana (February 01, 2012), Michigan (March 08, 2013), Wisconsin (March 09, 2015), and West Virginia 
(February 12, 2016). Unions campaigned over making RTW laws unconstitutional (Shikha, 2012), with 11 
unions filed lawsuits against the passage of RTW legislation in West Virginia (Kabler, 2016), as of June 2016. 
Interestingly, Josh Sword, secretary treasurer of the West Virginia AFLCIO, stated that “first and foremost, it’s 
unconstitutional because it’s an illegal taking of property without due process”. The principal argument behind 
criticize this legislation as unconstitutional relies upon the Fifth Amendment’s provision that private property 
cannot be taken for public use unless just compensation is paid. 
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(Table 8 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) RTW States Non-RTW States Diff coef 
LIT + 0.085*** 0.074*** 0.011 
  (2.91) (3.09) (0.089) 
ARIN_TA + 1.161*** 1.485*** -0.324 
  (2.78) (7.13) (0.55) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.166* 0.093 0.073 
  (1.89) (1.30) (0.453) 
LOSS + 0.055 0.059 -0.004 
  (0.66) (1.11) (0.002) 
ROA - -0.003 -0.004 0.001 
  (-0.87) (-1.57) (0.052) 
LEV + 0.002 0.000 0.001 
  (0.88) (0.31) (0.268) 
CR - 0.006 -0.054*** 0.06** 
  (0.21) (-3.57) (4.202) 
LEAD_SIC + 0.096* 0.105*** -0.009 
  (1.68) (2.70) (0.018) 
AUD_CH ?- 0.168** -0.427*** 0.595*** 
  (2.01) (-3.23) (15.286) 
COMP_AF - 0.088* -0.028* 0.117** 
  (1.97) (-1.73) (6.562) 
AUD_LAG + 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.001 
  (3.71) (4.53) (0.291) 
DEC + 0.138* 0.040 0.097 
  (1.87) (0.87) (1.413) 
D_RES + -0.013 0.112** -0.125* 
  (-0.26) (2.33) (3.471) 
SOC_CAP - 0.014 -0.068** 0.082 
  (0.23) (-2.01) (1.624) 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.074*** -0.039*** -0.035 
  (-3.23) (-3.25) (1.984) 
POP + 0.009 0.036 -0.026 
  (0.29) (1.51) (0.446) 
LITERACY + 0.715* 0.763*** -0.048 
  (1.94) (3.11) (0.013) 
(intercept)  8.702*** 8.086*** 0.616 
  (17.19) (19.49) (1.249) 
        
Industry & Year Effects  Included Included  
R2  0.856 0.812  
Adj. R2  0.841 0.804  
Observations  888 2,022  
Mean VIF   1.605 1.553  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are 
rounded up to three decimal places. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare 
difference in coefficients between regression results. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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2.5.2 Labor unions and the Democratic Party 
Since the Roosevelt Administration of the 1930s, the Democratic Party has been considered 
supportive of labor, mainly because the party supports labor-friendly legislation and policies. 
As recently as 2008, unions were responsible for $75 million in political donations, 92% of 
which went to the Democratic Party (McGinty and Mullins, 2012). In 2009, the Democrats 
introduced in both houses of the Congress the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), a measure 
favorable toward labor unions.8 Strengthening workers’ rights continues to be a priority on 
the Democratic agenda. In 2015, Bernie Sanders, candidate for the leadership of the 
Democratic Party in 2016, introduced the Workplace Democracy Action in the U.S. Senate 
(http://www.sanders.senate.gov). The Republican Party, in contrast, takes a position against 
labor unionization. Indicatively, in a case that attracted massive media attention, Republican 
politicians and conservative lobby groups organized a very successful public campaign 
against unionization at Volkswagen in Chattanooga, Tennessee (Mueller and Stegmaier, 
2017). It can be argued that unions tend to have greater power in regions (states) influenced 
by Democrats (Marciukaityte, 2015). And it is not through legislation alone that politicians 
influence issues relating to labor. For instance, board members to the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), responsible for the investigation of unfair labor practices, must be 
confirmed by Congress. 
Table 9 Unionization and audit fees in states where Democrats (Republicans) won in recent presidential 
elections (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) Democrats - State Republicans - State Diff coef 
D_UNION ? 0.186*** 0.115 0.071*** 
  (3.55) (1.61) (13.826) 
GINDEX + -0.022 -0.004 -0.018 
  (-0.69) (-0.12) (0.186) 
CONC_OWN - -0.109 0.008 -0.118 
  (-1.45) (0.10) (1.352) 
LAT + 0.536*** 0.542*** -0.006 
  (24.15) (16.79) (0.031) 
FOREIGN + 0.265*** 0.212*** 0.054 
  (3.81) (3.37) (0.411) 
OPSEG + 0.051* -0.029 0.08 
  (1.76) (-0.65) (2.385) 
GEOSEG + 0.025 0.067 -0.042 
  (0.70) (1.38) (0.533) 
(continued on next page) 
8 The EFCA provided employees with the right to sign “union authorization cards”, instead of vote for or against 
union representation in a secret ballot. According to the The National Right to Work Committee (2009), the 
passage of the EFCA would give union officials the upper hand and in turn peril their incentives to ensure a 
speedy and mutually beneficial contract. However, Democrats could not get enough votes together to defeat a 
Republican filibuster. 
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(Table 9 continued)  (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) Democrats - State Republicans - State Diff coef 
MERGER + 0.000 0.026 -0.026 
  (0.01) (0.48) (0.187) 
MB + -0.002 -0.006 0.004 
  (-1.45) (-0.92) (0.355) 
AGE - 0.097*** 0.130*** -0.033 
  (2.79) (3.38) (0.598) 
LIT + 0.062** 0.109*** -0.047 
  (2.54) (3.65) (1.739) 
ARIN_TA + 1.514*** 0.943** 0.571 
  (7.32) (2.46) (2.147) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.083 0.167** -0.084 
  (1.05) (2.01) (0.622) 
LOSS + 0.050 0.014 0.036 
  (0.89) (0.20) (0.19) 
ROA - -0.004 0.000 -0.004 
  (-1.37) (0.01) (1.045) 
LEV + -0.001 0.004* -0.004** 
  (-0.44) (1.94) (4.445) 
CR - -0.012 -0.081*** 0.068*** 
  (-0.84) (-3.75) (8.878) 
LEAD_SIC + 0.074* 0.110** -0.036 
  (1.82) (2.22) (0.441) 
AUD_CH ?- -0.145 -0.508** 0.363 
  (-1.32) (-2.29) (2.279) 
COMP_AF - -0.018 -0.020 0.002 
  (-0.91) (-1.03) (0.007) 
AUD_LAG + 0.006*** 0.005*** 0 
  (3.10) (3.05) (0.041) 
DEC + 0.077* 0.059 0.018 
  (1.67) (1.02) (0.086) 
D_RES + 0.057 0.172*** -0.115 
  (1.25) (2.59) (2.127) 
SOC_CAP - -0.100*** -0.044 -0.057 
  (-2.94) (-0.95) (1.325) 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.026** -0.045** 0.019 
  (-2.05) (-2.56) (0.98) 
POP + 0.005 0.024 -0.019 
  (0.20) (0.86) (0.36) 
LITERACY + 0.955*** 0.883** 0.072 
  (3.89) (2.30) (0.034) 
(intercept)  8.616*** 8.412*** 0.204** 
  (20.66) (17.85) (3.99) 
         
Industry & Year Effects  Included Included   
R2  0.792 0.839   
Adj. R2  0.782 0.824   
Observations  1,906 1,004   
Mean VIF   1.533 1.627   
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are 
rounded up to three decimal places. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare 
difference in coefficients between regression results. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
In order to test whether unions do have greater power in Democrat-led states, I obtain 
data on the outcome of presidential elections at the state level and divide my sample into 
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states where Democrats (Republicans) won the most votes in recent presidential elections 
(http://uselectionatlas.org/). Table 9 presents the results of the multivariate analyses as well as 
the homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients across models (using a Wald test, 
column 3). The coefficient D_UNION is statistically significant at 1% across samples for 
Democrats winning the most presidential votes at the state level (column 1, β=0.186, 
t-stat=3.55), but the D_UNION is statistically insignificant in states controlled by the 
Republican Party. My results indicate that unionized companies are charged higher fees in 
states where the power of unions is greater. Testing for homogeneity in the pairwise 
estimated coefficients, I observe that the difference in the D_UNION coefficients is 
statistically significant at 1% across the subsamples of predominance by Democrats versus 
Republicans. 
2.5.3 Employee share ownership 
I expect employees’ participation in ownership to be the cause of an interest alignment 
between employees and other shareholders and a consequent reduction in information 
asymmetries, bargaining, and conflict costs (Richter and Schrader, 2017; Richter and 
Schröder, 2008). I also expect employees’ participation in ownership to weaken employee 
commitment to trade unionism (Poole and Jenkins, 1990). I predict, then, that auditors’ risk 
assessments will reflect the lower complexity and the concomitant reduced risk related to 
corporate structures where employees have an ownership stake. 
I derive information on employee stock ownership from Form 5500 files, which 
represent the annual report of employee benefit plans and are available through the 
Department of Labor’s research files (https://www.dol.gov/ebsa). I aggregate the market 
value of the equity holdings of each firm in a given year by using at least one of the following 
employee ownership vehicles: employee stock ownership plans (ESOP), 401(k) plans which 
allow an investment in employer stock as an option, deferred profit sharing plans in which 
part of the profit sharing contribution is invested in employer stock, and employer stock 
bonus plans (Bova, et al., 2015). Similarly to other studies (e.g., Richter and Schrader, 2017), 
I measure nonexecutive employee stock ownership (ESO) as the aforementioned aggregated 
equity holdings over total shares outstanding for the firm in a given year. 
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Table 10 Unionization, employee share ownership (ESO) and audit fees (Dependent variable = LAF), 
OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unionized Non-Unionized Full Sample Full Sample 
ESO ? -0.331** -0.081 -0.305** -0.290** 
  (-2.11) (-0.23) (-2.13) (-2.09) D_UNION ?    0.124** 
     (2.53) GINDEX + -0.022 0.026 -0.012 -0.013 
  (-0.69) (0.71) (-0.46) (-0.49) CONC_OWN - -0.135 0.063 -0.106 -0.120 
  (-1.45) (0.65) (-1.25) (-1.43) LAT + 0.588*** 0.481*** 0.542*** 0.532*** 
  (20.46) (16.54) (24.48) (24.36) FOREIGN + 0.182** 0.342*** 0.290*** 0.281*** 
  (2.25) (4.36) (4.58) (4.47) OPSEG + -0.001 0.005 0.011 0.004 
  (-0.04) (0.14) (0.42) (0.14) GEOSEG + 0.035 0.026 0.038 0.040 
  (0.75) (0.54) (1.17) (1.22) MERGER + -0.048 0.039 -0.005 -0.007 
  (-1.29) (1.01) (-0.16) (-0.24) MB + 0.001 -0.007* -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.43) (-1.80) (-0.93) (-0.89) AGE - 0.157*** 0.210*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 
  (3.41) (3.63) (5.31) (5.21) LIT + 0.053** 0.063* 0.049** 0.057*** 
  (2.12) (1.90) (2.18) (2.60) ARIN_TA + 1.395*** 1.581*** 1.456*** 1.391*** 
  (4.97) (6.78) (7.09) (7.15) GROWTH ?+ 0.171 0.168* 0.165** 0.160** 
  (1.60) (1.72) (2.38) (2.31) LOSS + 0.081 0.100 0.047 0.059 
  (1.35) (1.18) (0.96) (1.18) ROA - -0.005 -0.003 -0.005** -0.004* 
  (-1.45) (-1.04) (-2.09) (-1.84) LEV + -0.003* 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.84) (0.35) (-0.16) (-0.28) CR - -0.064** -0.037** -0.056*** -0.051*** 
  (-2.37) (-2.24) (-4.21) (-3.77) LEAD_SIC + 0.112** 0.045 0.098** 0.101*** 
  (2.28) (0.84) (2.57) (2.69) AUD_CH ?- -0.096 -0.307* -0.198 -0.197 
  (-0.53) (-1.71) (-1.55) (-1.55) COMP_AF - -0.022 -0.015 -0.034** -0.030* 
  (-0.89) (-0.69) (-2.06) (-1.83) AUD_LAG + 0.004** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (2.59) (4.25) (4.13) (3.94) DEC + 0.119* 0.100 0.122*** 0.113** 
  (1.95) (1.48) (2.74) (2.56) D_RES + 0.083 0.157** 0.097** 0.094* 
  (1.52) (2.06) (2.03) (1.96) SOC_CAP - -0.112*** -0.089* -0.074** -0.089*** 
  (-3.04) (-1.77) (-2.40) (-2.89) DIST_SEC ?- -0.032* -0.013 -0.025** -0.023* 
  (-1.92) (-0.68) (-1.98) (-1.83) POP + -0.013 0.027 0.005 0.002 
  (-0.46) (0.82) (0.21) (0.08) 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 10 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unionized Non-Unionized Full Sample Full Sample 
LITERACY + 1.101*** 0.368 0.686*** 0.770*** 
  (3.54) (0.90) (2.66) (3.02) (intercept)  8.393*** 7.702*** 8.165*** 8.183*** 
  (18.08) (15.42) (20.44) (20.97)          Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Included Included R2  0.796 0.797 0.804 0.806 Adj. R2  0.783 0.779 0.796 0.798 Observations  1,357 879 2,236 2,236 Mean VIF   1.566 1.509 1.505 1.521 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are 
rounded up to three decimal places. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
The results for the impact of ESO on audit fees are reported in Table 10, separated 
into unionized firms and non-unionized firms (columns 1 and 2 respectively) and full sample 
(see columns 3 and 4). Regression models are significant with explanatory powers close to 
80%. The coefficient of ESO is negative and statistically significant at 5% (column 1, 
β=-0.331, t-stat=-2.11), thus indicating a fee discount for unionized firms with employee 
ownership. The same result, however, is not evident for non-unionized firms because the ESO 
coefficient lacks statistical significance (see column 2). When I consider the full sample, I 
find that the ESO coefficient is negative and significant at 5% (column 3, β=-0.305, 
t-stat=-2.13). The same holds true when I control for D_UNION (column 4), which, it is 
interesting to note, drops to a significance level of 5%. The remaining coefficients have the 
predicted sign, while in all models the mean VIFs are less than 1.56, which implies no 
multicollinearity. Overall, the results indicate that employee ownership mitigates monitoring 
costs on account of an alignment between employee and shareholder interests, and the power 
of unionism on audit pricing is mitigated. 
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2.6 Sensitivity testing 
I conduct sensitivity tests for alternative definitions of unionization and verify that the audit 
fee premium is persistent (section 2.6.1). I further account for specification issues related to 
variable omission (section 2.6.2). I test my inferences using a propensity score matched 
approach in order to answer concerns that my results might be prone to selection bias (section 
2.6.3). 
2.6.1 Alternative definition of unionization 
I measure unionization based on the percentage of unionized employees (PCT_UNION) as 
derived from company filings which, however, is underreported when compared to 
D_UNION. I include the existence of a union-related risk indication in the company filings 
(UNION_RISK), which variable is available only from 2005 because of an SEC mandate to 
disclose Item 1A Risk Factors.9 Because of a material drop in observations, I sensitivity test 
both variables rather than use them as my main measures of unionization. I follow Cheng 
(2017) and estimate a comprehensive measure of the overall influence of organized labor 
(CB), calculated as the first principal component of the percentage of unionized employees 
(PCT_UNION), the coverage dummy (D_UNION), and the union-related risk dummy 
(UNION_RISK). Running the models again, I find that the magnitude of all coefficients of 
alternative unionization proxies is positive. CB and UNION_RISK are statistically significant 
at 1%, and PCT_UNION is statistically significant at 10%. 
2.6.2 Variable omission 
I test for sensitivity with a battery of variables which have been found or been suggested 
(explicitly or implicitly) to influence audit pricing, but which are not included in my full 
model for reasons of data and/or specification. I test the natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
(NAF) and the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEE) (Causholli, et al., 2010). NAF is 
significant with a positive sign, while FEE is significant with a negative sign. I also control 
for membership in the Fortune 500 index (D_FORRK) (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011) and 
research and development to turnover (RD) (Gul and Goodwin, 2010). D_FORRK is positive 
9 Similar to Cheng (2017), I parse union-risk related expressions included in Item 1A (Risk Factors), as firms 
report idiosyncratic factors (e.g., labor relations, labor union activity) under this item (Campbell, et al., 2013). 
UNION_RISK is set to if the company discloses risks related to: 1) union presence, 2) union organizing activity, 
3) expiry of bargaining agreements (either in current or next year), 4) work stoppages and 5) negative impact on 
firm performance and/or profitability. I identify 728 instances of union-related risk. 
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and significant at 10%, and RD is negative and insignificant. The incorporation of all the 
above variables does not change my inferences. 
I control for the auditor’s assessment of internal controls efficiency (Gul and 
Goodwin, 2010) and obtain from Audit Analytics a dummy indicating efficient/inefficient 
internal controls (ICE). I find that the inefficiency of internal controls significantly increases 
audit fees (at the 1% significance level), probably because the audit risk is higher and/or 
auditors must undertake extra relevant tasks. I further control for increased complexity in 
reporting (DISC) by using an indicator equal to 1 when a firm reports discontinued operations 
and extraordinary items and equal to 0 otherwise (Ghosh and Tang, 2015). The coefficient 
DISC is positive and significant at the 1% level, while D_UNION remains significant at 1%. 
I also test for additional demographic and geographical controls. I account for 
religiosity (REL), which I conceptualize as the degree of adherence to religious norms in the 
geographical area where a firm’s headquarters is located (Leventis, et al., in press) because 
high degrees of adherence to religious norms are found to be negatively associated with audit 
fees in the U.S. Taking a lead from recent studies, I control for state judicial quality because 
the quality and integrity of the judicial system may influence managerial and auditor 
decisions (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). I operationalize state judicial quality (JUD_QUAL) by 
using the overall state ranking as reported in the 2001 State Liabilities Rankings Study, 
conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2002) (see http://www.uschamber.com). 
Neither REL nor JUD_QUAL is statistically significant, and my inferences remain 
unchanged. 
I control for whether the states where corporate headquarters is located have 
implemented the educational requirement of the 150-hour rule (D_EDU150) because this 
requirement has been suggested to influence audit price determination (Allen and Woodland, 
2010). Indeed, D_EDU150 is positive and significant at the 1% level, while D_UNION 
remains significant at 1%. Drawing upon the Division of Labor Force Statistics (2014), I find 
that the propensity to become union member is a function of gender, race, and age. 
Accordingly, black male workers between the ages of 45 and 65 are more unionized when 
compared to white female workers of younger ages. I control, at the county level, for the 
percentage of the population who are black (BLACK); the percentage of the population who 
are men (MALE); and the percentage of the population between the ages of 45 and 64 
(POP45_64). Again, my inferences remain unchanged. 
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Previous studies associate an urban location of a company with audit fee premiums 
and a rural location of a company with audit fee discounts (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007). I 
regard corporate headquarters as the main place of managerial decision-making (see also 
Coval and Moskowitz, 2001) and create indicator variables for headquarters located in urban 
or urban agglomerate areas (URB) and rural areas (RUR). Following Francis, et al. (2016), I 
operationalize URB as a corporate location either in one of the ten largest Consolidated 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) of the United States10 according to the 2010 U.S. 
Census or in one of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) with at least 1 million residents. 
I operationalize RUR as a corporate location at least 250 km away from the nearest urban 
area.11 D_UNION remains significant at 1%, while the coefficients PUR and URB lack 
statistical significance. 
Following Srinidhi, et al. (2014), I substitute GINDEX in the model individually for 
all the components of this index and create a variable representing the first principal 
components (GOV_PCA) instead of adopting the index form. I change the cutoff point for 
concentrated ownership to 25% (CONC_OWN_25) (Desender, et al., 2013) and further 
distinguish between domestic-concentrated (DOM_CONC_OWN) and foreign-concentrated 
(FOR_CONC_OWN) ownership types, based on the shareholder’s country of 
origin/headquarters. My results indicate that concentrated ownership (CONC_OWN_25) and 
domestic-concentrated ownership (DOM_CONC_OWN_25) are both statistically significant 
and negatively associated with audit fees, while the coefficient D_UNION remains significant 
at 1%. 
Finally, similarly to previous studies (Reichelt and Wang, 2010), although I define 
auditor expertise as the audit firm with the largest audit fee market share in a two-digit SIC 
industry, I also sensitivity test for alternative definitions. I run the models again and include 
specialization, defined as whether an audit firm takes a fee market share of at least 25% 
(30%) in a two-digit SIC industry (e.g., Numan and Willekens, 2012). I augment my testing 
by creating indicators for city-level specialization, the one defined as whether an audit office 
10 I consider as CMSAs the following: New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Philadelphia, 
Washington, Miami, Atlanta, and Boston. 
11 I classify as “urban” any Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), as defined by the US Census, with at least 1 
million residents. Previous literature on urban economics provides ample evidence that the distance to urban 
centres significantly differentiates corporations (Duranton and Puga, 2004) and that the 250 km criterion is a 
valid measure of this differentiation in the U.S. (Francis, et al., 2016). Distances are calculated using the 
methodology described in footnote 4. 
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takes the largest audit fee market share in a combination of two-digit SIC industry and MSA 
(LEAD_MSA) (Reichelt and Wang, 2010) and the other defined as whether an audit office 
takes the largest audit fee market share in a two-digit SIC industry and county combination 
(LEAD_CNT). All measures of auditor specialization are highly significant and positively 
associated with audit fees, while the coefficient D_UNION remains unchanged. 
2.6.3 Propensity score matched approach 
In order to ensure that the results are hold against alternative matching methodologies, I also 
use a propensity score matching model to create an alternative matched sample. In the first 
step, a probit model is estimated to predict the probability that the firm is unionized, 
conditional on the observable firm characteristics (covariates). Closely following Cheng 
(2017), I employ in my probit model the following covariates: LAT, MB, and TANGIBILITY 
of the firm, expressed as net PPE scaled by total assets, LEV, ZSCORE, ROA, the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization (MKVAL), and the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(ABS_KMJRDA) (Kothari, et al., 2005). I also include: total cash and investment securities 
deflated by total assets (CASH), inventories to total assets (INVENTORY), and AGE because 
unionized firms strategically adjust reserves (Klasa, et al., 2009) and inventory levels (Matsa, 
2010), while union density is higher in older firms (Hirsch, 2004). I account for MALE, 
BLACK, and POP45_64, all at the county level, as described in section 2.6.2. 
In the next step, I employ a nearest-neighbor matching approach without replacement 
and a caliper constraint (δ=0.1) (Shipman, et al., 2017) in order to match firms that are 
unionized and non-unionized, based on closeness to the predicted value from the first step, 
but with the restriction that matching pairs belong to the same year and to the same two-digit 
SIC industry. In untabulated results, I perform my analysis on the sample subsequent to 
propensity score matching, where the coefficient D_UNION is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%. 
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2.7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this study, I examine the effects of unionization on monitoring costs which constitute 
important elements of corporate operations and firm value. My study fills a significant gap in 
industrial relations literature because although the literature has provided rich insights into 
the impact of labor unions on core corporate matters (including efficiency, productivity, 
performance, risk, and strategic decision-making), too little emphasis has been placed on 
examining the relationship between unionization and monitoring costs. 
I bring to the fore the conflicting nature of the interests of labor unions, on the one 
hand, and those of principals and agents, on the other. Unions are primarily concerned with 
promoting claims for better wages, better hours, and better working conditions. Such claims 
stand in opposition to the interests of shareholders and managers, who aim to increase 
shareholder value and reduce the cost of capital. This structural antithesis increases the 
complexities of contractual relations and information asymmetry, while also making 
unionized contexts financially more opaque. As a result, monitoring costs significantly 
increase since unionized contexts are more risky, so additional time and effort are devoted to 
monitoring purposes. 
I also show that in states where RTW legislation has not been enacted and where the 
Democratic Party predominates, monitoring costs are significantly higher. I consider 
legislation and dominant political ideologies supportive of unionization to be factors which 
facilitate the role of the unions, exacerbating contradictions and corporate contractual 
complexities. Thus, in geographical areas where legislation and dominant political ideologies 
are supportive of unionization, monitoring costs increase. 
I further demonstrate that in unionized contexts which are characterized by inherently 
conflicting features, employee participation in corporate ownership operates as an alignment 
mechanism which, to an extent, alleviates disparities between employee claims and other 
shareholder interests. The perceived conflict inherent to unionization is hereby reduced. 
Employee participation in ownership also reduces contractual relationship complexities, 
information asymmetry, and financial opacity because employees start to develop investing 
attitudes. I regard unionized contexts where employees participate in ownership to be less 
risky, and so less time and effort are needed for monitoring purposes. 
The implications of my results are important to employees, unions, shareholders, and 
managers. By providing insights into the positive association between organized labor and 
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monitoring costs, I inform labor unions that their role incurs additional costs for firms 
because the mere presence of unions necessitates more thorough and consequently, more 
costly monitoring activities. Shareholders and managers can learn from my study that when 
employees participate in ownership, the firm benefits in the following ways: (1) the 
underlying contradictions inherent to unionization are alleviated, (2) the significant cost of 
unionization to the corporation is reduced, and (3) firm value is enhanced. Investors and 
analysts should factor into their analysis the fact that monitoring costs are significantly higher 
in unionized contexts and particularly in unionized corporations located in areas where 
legislation and dominant political ideologies are in favor of unions. 
My study opens up new paths for industrial relations research. I note that my study is 
restricted to the U.S., so my findings are limited to specific geographical borders. I 
recommend that researchers study the relationship between unionization and monitoring costs 
in other geographical, preferably non-Western contexts which are characterized by different 
institutional and industrial settings and which have different cultures and histories of 
unionization (see Hui and Chan, 2015). Such future research will help provide conclusions 
which are stable and widely applicable. The tests and models introduced here in my study 
might be adopted to great advantage in cross-country samples in order to facilitate the 
generalizability of results. 
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2.8 Appendix A - Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Audit fees model 
Dependent variable: 
LAF Natural logarithm of audit fees. (Source: Audit Analytics). 
Unionization status: 
D_UNION 1 if the company's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, as 
reported in company filings, and 0 otherwise. 
UNION_IND Industry level unionization, calculated as the product of the percentage of unionized 
employees, from Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD), in the industry 
with the number of company’s employees, over lagged total assets, as in Hilary (2006). 
D_UNION_IND 1 if a company's UNION_IND value is greater than the two-digit SIC & year median, 0 
otherwise. 
Client Attributes: 
LAT Natural logarithm of total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
FOREIGN 1 if the company reports income taxes from foreign operations. (Source: Compustat). 
OPSEG Natural logarithm of the number of geographic segments of the company. (Source: 
Compustat). 
GEOSEG Natural logarithm of the number of operating segments of the company. (Source: 
Compustat). 
MERGER 1 if the company reports any impact of a merger or acquisition on net income. (Source: 
Compustat). 
MB Market to book value of equity. (Source: Compustat). 
AGE Age of the company, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years the 
company has been in Compustat. 
LIT 1 if the company is named as a defendant in a lawsuit, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
ARIN_TA Sum of accounts receivables and inventory, over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
GROWTH Change in company’s sales from previous year over sales of the previous year, expressed 
as percentage. (Source: Compustat). 
LOSS 1 if the company's net income is negative, 0 otherwise. (Source: Compustat). 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items over total 
assets, multiplied by 100. (Source: Compustat). 
LEV Leverage ratio, measured as total debt over total assets, multiplied by 100. (Source: 
Compustat). 
CR Current ratio, measured as current assets over current liabilities. (Source: Compustat). 
GINDEX Board’s governance strength, as in Srinidhi, et al. (2014). The index is calculated as the 
proportion of nonexecutive board members, plus the average number of other corporate 
affiliations of board members, plus an indicator for the existence of audit committee with 
financial expertise, plus the number of board meetings during the year, minus an indicator 
for CEO serving as chair of the board. Values exceeding 1 are standardized using samples 
max value. (Source: Thomson Reuters EIKON). 
CONC_OWN 1 if an investor has at least a 20% stake of total firm shares, 0 otherwise. (Source: Thomson 
Reuters EIKON). 
Auditor Attributes: 
LEAD_SIC 1 if the auditor is a market leader, in terms of generating the highest total revenues in an 
industry (two-digit SIC), 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit Analytics). 
AUD_CH 1 if the company changed its auditor in current year, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
COMP_AF Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index per audit market (based on auditor's revenue in 
the form of fees), where market is proxied using two-digit SIC-county combinations. 
(Source: Audit Analytics). 
Engagement Attributes: 
AUD_LAG Time elapsed from the year-end until the signature date of the auditor. (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
DEC 1 if fiscal year end is December, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit Analytics). 
D_RES 1 if there is a financial statement restatement, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit Analytics). 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table continued) 
Variable Definition 
Demographic & Geographic Attributes: 
SOC_CAP Social capital at the county level (for a description see Jha and Chen, 2015). (Source: 
Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development - Pennsylvania State University). 
DIST_SEC Natural logarithm of the distance between corporate headquarters and SEC office with 
jurisdiction in the area, in kilometers. 
POP Natural logarithm of total county population. (Source: U.S. Census Bureau). 
LITERACY Percentage of adults completing four years of college or higher in the county. (Source: U.S. 
Census Bureau). 
Panel B: Other independent variables for litigation risk model only 
Dependent variable: 
LIT_AUDITOR 1 if the auditor is named as a defendant in a lawsuit, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
Control variables: 
KMJRDA Abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model, adjusted for performance (Kothari, et 
al., 2005). (Source: Compustat). 
OPCF Operating cash flow over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
ZSCORE Financial distress measurement (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006), calculated as [0.717 
*(working capital / total assets) + 0.847 *(retained earnings / total assets) + 3.107 
*(earnings before interest and taxes / total assets) + 0.42 *(book value of equity / total 
liabilities) + 0.998 *(sales / total assets)]. (Source: Compustat). 
INVENTORY Level of inventories over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
REC_TA Total trade accounts receivable over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
RET Company’s 12-month stock returns for the fiscal year. (Source: Compustat). 
RETVOL Variance of the company’s abnormal returns during a 12-months period prior to the fiscal 
year end. (Source: Compustat). 
UNQOP 1 if the auditor issues an unqualified opinion without any additional language, 
0 otherwise. (Source: Compustat). 
 
STENURE 1 if the auditor-client relationship holds for three years or less, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
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2.9 Appendix B - Examples of union scoring (Item 1 of 10-K filings) 
I provide examples of sentences parsed from company filings and relevant scoring for 
collective bargaining representation (in bold). 
1. WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
Form 10-K (for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006) 
Item 1. Business 
Employees 
At December 31, 2006, we had 5,317 fulltime employees, approximately 41% of whom were 
unionized. A majority of the employees subject to collective bargaining agreements are 
within North America and these agreements generally extend through 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
We consider our relations with our employees and union representatives to be good, but 
cannot assure that future contract negotiations will be favorable to us. 
2. TESLA MOTORS, INC. 
Form 10-K (for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2010) 
Item 1. Business 
Employees 
As of December 31, 2010, we had 899 fulltime employees consisting of 213 in manufacturing, 
212 in powertrain research and development, 121 in sales and marketing, 170 in vehicle 
design and engineering, 79 in service and 104 in general and administration. Of all of our 
employees, 648 are located in our Northern California offices, 106 are located at our Los 
Angeles facility and 51 are located at our United Kingdom offices. The other employees are 
located in other international locations. None of our employees are currently represented by 
labour unions or are covered by a collective bargaining agreement with respect to their 
employment. To date, we have not experienced any work stoppages, and we consider our 
relationship with our employees to be good. 
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2.10 Appendix C - Examples of union risk scoring (Item 1A of 10-K filings) 
I provide examples of sentences parsed from company filings and relevant scoring for union-
related risk (underline). 
1. WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
Form 10-K (for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006) 
Item 1A. Risk Factors 
Labor disputes may have a material adverse effect on our operations and profitability. 
We collectively bargain with labor unions that represent approximately 41% of our 
employees. Our current collective bargaining agreements generally extend through 2007, 
2008, and 2009. Failure to reach an agreement could result in strikes or other labor protests 
which could disrupt our operations. If we were to experience a strike or work stoppage, it 
would be difficult for us to find a sufficient number of employees with the necessary skills to 
replace these employees. We cannot assure you that we will reach any such agreement or 
that we will not encounter strikes or other types of conflicts with the labor unions of our 
personnel. Such labor disputes could have an adverse effect on our business, financial 
condition or results of operations, could cause us to lose revenues and customers and might 
have permanent effects on our business. 
2. TESLA MOTORS, INC 
Form 10-K (for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2010) 
Item 1A. Risk Factors 
Our business may be adversely affected by union activities. 
Although none of our employees are currently represented by a labor union, it is common 
throughout the automobile industry generally for many employees at automobile companies 
to belong to a union, which can result in higher employee costs and increased risk of work 
stoppages. As we expand our business to include full inhouse manufacturing of our vehicles, 
as is planned for the Model S, there can be no assurances that our employees will not join or 
form a labor union or that we will not be required to become a union signatory. We recently 
purchased an existing automobile production facility in Fremont, California from NUMMI. 
Prior employees of NUMMI were union members and our future work force at this facility 
may be inclined to vote in favor of forming a labor union. We are also directly or indirectly 
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dependent upon companies with unionized work forces, such as parts suppliers and trucking 
and freight companies, and work stoppages or strikes organized by such unions could have a 
material adverse impact on our business, financial condition or operating results. For 
example, certain employees at the sea freight companies through which we ship our Tesla 
Roadster gliders to the United States after assembly in England may be represented by 
unions, as may be employees at certain of our suppliers. If a work stoppage occurs, it could 
delay the manufacture and sale of our performance electric vehicles and have a material 
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3.1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting constitutes a discretionary business practice 
which communicates corporate actions that arguably improve societal well-being (Korschun, 
et al., 2014). Responding to employees’ and other salient stakeholders’ (e.g., local 
communities, investors, regulators) pressure on corporations to behave in a socially 
responsible way (Mishra and Modi, 2016), an increasing number of firms embrace CSR 
reporting as a key component of their overall strategy (Kotler and Lee, 2005). Interestingly, 
in the last decades, voluntary CSR reporting has gained great momentum. According to 
CorporateRegister.com, a private company specializing in tracking CSR reports, the number 
of standalone CSR reports in the U.S. boomed from 170 in 2002 to more than 1,000 in 2015. 
This corporate tendency to resort to CSR reporting raises questions among researchers about, 
inter alia, the strategic objectives corporations aim to serve (Grougiou, et al., 2016). 
Employing various theoretical perspectives, researchers have examined CSR mainly 
at the organizational and individual levels (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). In this study, I 
examine CSR at the organizational level. Here, the stakeholder perspective constitutes a main 
theoretical framework adopted by researchers to make sense of CSR (Garriga and Melé, 
2004; Melé, 2009), and in this context, CSR reporting is viewed as a strategic management 
tool intended to publicly promote organizations’ institutional congruence and adherence to 
broadly endorsed social and environmental values and, thereby, address salient pressure by 
stakeholders (Grougiou, et al., 2016). 
According to this framework, it is acknowledged that labor is a prominent stakeholder 
(Mitchell, et al., 1997, p. 876) that is often regarded as the most valuable corporate asset 
(Coff, 1997; Flammer and Luo, 2017). The role of labor becomes more dominant when 
employees are organized in unions. Unions are important since they directly affect and are 
directly affected by developments in organizations’ strategies and practices (Sobczak and 
Havard, 2015). Also, unions are institutionalized to give a stronger voice to workers within 
the employee-management relationship (Mitchell, et al., 1997; Pendleton and Gospel, 2013; 
Preuss, 2008). However, despite the salience of labor and the increasing complexity of the 
employee-management relationship in the presence of unions, it is surprising how little we 
know about how the increasing pressures exerted by organized labor affect CSR practices in 
general and CSR reporting in specific (Sobczak and Havard, 2015). This limited knowledge 
is possibly anchored to the narrow, fragmented, ad-hoc, and disjointed research attention to 
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the nexus of CSR as well as human resource management on a wider scale (Brammer, 2011; 
Voegtlin and Greenwood, 2016). 
Against this background, I examine the propensity of managers to resort to CSR 
reporting in relation to the increasing pressure exerted by labor in unionized contexts. I focus 
on the globally influential U.S. context of industrial relations and employ a sample of 2,526 
U.S. firm-year observations for the estimation window of 2002-2015. My findings suggest 
that, in the presence of unions, managers more intensively engage into CSR reporting. I 
employ stakeholder theory as my overarching theory to interpret my results. I argue that CSR 
disclosures are an integral part of a broader strategy intended to respond to pressure exerted 
by stakeholders as well as to stakeholder expectations. Specifically, CSR disclosures are 
mechanisms put in place to control the increasing complexities emanating from the 
employee-management relationship in the presence of unions. 
My results also illustrate how managers’ propensity to CSR reporting increases when 
firms operate in contexts where the predominant political ideology, legislation, and corporate 
spatial clustering are supportive of the role of labor unions and congruent with their values. 
Hence, managers’ propensity to CSR reporting significantly increases in states in which the 
Democratic Party predominates, in which Right-to-Work legislation has not been enacted, 
and in which high concentrations of unionized citizens live. Overall, my findings prove to be 
robust to alternative definitions of unionization and specification issues related to variable 
omission. 
I contribute to existing literature on several fronts. First, by showing that labor 
unionization impacts CSR reporting activity, I make an important contribution to CSR 
literature. I demonstrate that the structure of corporate industrial relations affects the 
corporate “voice” in CSR, and this is a new way of viewing the determinants of CSR 
disclosures because I emphasize the role of an important stakeholder: organized labor. 
Second, I provide initial evidence on the role of the dominant political ideology, legislative 
backgrounds, and corporate spatial clustering in regions where unionized employees 
predominate. Thus, I draw attention to the differential impact of labor unionization on 
corporate matters because of the enhanced or condensed institutional power of unions in 
social and political environments. Finally and more broadly, I contribute to a dominant strand 
in CSR literature that documents the influential role of dominant stakeholders on managerial 
decisions. I show that, when organized, labor significantly impacts CSR managerial choices 
and voluntary reporting practices, such as CSR disclosures. I raise the possibility that other 
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CSR practices and corporate voluntary actions might be affected by the dominant role of 
labor unions. 
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Theory 
According to stakeholder theory the relationship between the firm and various stakeholders, 
definable as any “group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organizations objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46), constitutes a main concern for managers. 
Corporate stakeholders are viewed as nonhomogenous groups and/or as individuals 
characterized by distinctive incentives, motivations, goals, and risk preferences (Chyz, et al., 
2013; Doh and Guay, 2006; Preuss, 2008). Seeking to secure their vested interests in an 
organization, stakeholders often exert conflicting pressure on managers (Collier, 2008; 
Freeman, 1984; Gray, et al., 1995; Mitchell, et al., 1997). Hence, managers ceaselessly seek 
to prioritize stakeholder interests and to reconcile potential difficulties with stakeholders 
proactively (Mitchell, et al., 1997). 
According to prior scholars, the stakeholder perspective constitutes a management 
theory which relates to business ethics because managers are put under pressure by various 
organizations, activists, communities, governments, media, and other institutional forces to 
act in a socially and environmentally responsible manner (Garriga and Melé, 2004; Melé, 
2009). In line with broadly endorsed values, managers develop corporate responses in order 
to address social and environmental demands by establishing a dialogue with a wide 
spectrum of stakeholders (Garriga and Melé, 2004; Melé, 2009). Such a dialogue “not only 
enhances a company's sensitivity to its environment, but also increases the environment’s 
understanding of the dilemmas facing the organization” (Kaptein and Van Tulder, 2003, p. 
208). 
CSR practices are considered to be a manifestation of congruence and integration of 
social and environmental challenges in companies’ strategies and management practices, as 
well as an expression of corporate obligations beyond that prescribed by law (Doh and Guay, 
2006; Sobczak and Havard, 2015). Responsible corporations engage with their stakeholders 
on CSR issues and regularly communicate to concerned stakeholders their CSR programmes, 
products, and impacts (Basu and Palazzo, 2008; Crane and Glozer, 2016; Doh and Guay, 
2006; Du, et al., 2010). By engaging in CSR, organizations invent and implement more 
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responsible strategies, business models, management practices, and rules of governance 
(Melé, 2009; Sobczak and Havard, 2015). In this sense, it is argued that CSR contributes to 
the creation of economic, social, and ecological corporate value as well as to adherence to 
societal values and expectations (Freeman and Velamuri, 2006). 
3.2.2 Labor unions and CSR reporting 
Labor is a salient stakeholder (Dawkins, 2010; Mitchell, et al., 1997) with important 
contributions to corporate functions and operations (Chyz, et al., 2013; Pendleton and 
Gospel, 2013). Labor is often considered to be a firm’s most valuable asset and a key source 
of competitive advantage (Coff, 1997; Flammer and Luo, 2017). Acknowledging the 
importance of labor, management encourages participation in company boards, consultative 
committees work councils, and ownership in order to allow workers some “say” in how their 
organizations are run (Kaufman and Taras, 2010; Marchington, 2008; Pendleton and Gospel, 
2013). 
In the presence of unions, labor becomes a more dominant stakeholder than 
unorganized individual employees (Mitchell, et al., 1997; Pendleton and Gospel, 2013; 
Preuss, 2008) because unions are institutionalized collective bodies which give a stronger 
voice to workers within the management-employment relationship. Unionism is associated 
with collective bargaining, lobbying, industrial action and activism, and more dynamic ways 
of advancing employees’ claims (Agrawal, 2012; Chen, et al., 2011b; Chyz, et al., 2013; 
Connolly, et al., 1986; Faleye, et al., 2006; Freeman and Medoff, 1979). Labor unions can 
threaten work stoppages or strikes, and management is, in order to prevent such, mobilized 
towards increasing disclosure and strategically disclosing financial information during 
periods of heightened pressure (Waterhouse, et al., 1993). Work stoppages and strikes can 
impose on managers additional burdens which may also involve deliberately inefficient 
production, loss of reputation in the labor market, and negative publicity among other 
stakeholders including investors and other capital market participants (Fung, et al., 2015). 
I argue that pressure exerted by unions cause managers to intensify their efforts to 
initiate a dialogue and establish communication channels within the organization both by 
referring to their CSR activity (Crane and Glozer, 2016; Flammer and Luo, 2017; Gray, et al., 
1995) and by reporting such practices publicly12. Issuing voluntary CSR reports is considered 
12 For the importance of CSR reporting see inter alia Grougiou, et al. (2016) and Grougiou, et al. (2014). 
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crucial for unionized firms whose labor representatives negotiate on behalf of the 
membership for a number of reasons (Fairbrother, 2014). Unions are not only employee 
representatives, but also economic and political actors (Streeck and Hassel, 2003). Managers 
acknowledge that CSR generates a strong positive attitude among unions’ members with 
regard to the organization (Glavas and Kelley, 2014; Rodrigo and Arenas, 2008). 
Voluntary CSR reports are an effort to reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and unions. Additional information disclosed in CSR reports enables unions to 
obtain a deeper understanding of the organization’s broader attitudes, motives, strategies, and 
policies (Flammer and Luo, 2017). This process facilitates the exchange of information and 
the identification of mutual interests (McKersie, et al., 2008; Wilkinson and Dundon, 2010), 
thus paving the way for an alignment between unions’ goals and organizational interests. In 
particular, employees’ perceptions of their companies’ CSR practices are positively 
associated with organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work meaningfulness, and 
organizational support (Glavas and Kelley, 2014; Rodrigo and Arenas, 2008). CSR 
announcements can be used as an internal controlling tool that ties employees’ identities and 
ethical considerations to the company’s legitimacy and standing in society (Colombo, et al., 
in press; Jung and Kim, 2016; Preuss, 2008). 
Reduced information asymmetry through CSR reporting also assists unionized 
corporations in negotiating favorable terms with various important stakeholders. Previous 
finance literature, for example, has demonstrated that investors and bankers associate unions 
with increased contractual complexity and agency costs (Chyz, et al., 2013), which result in 
less operating flexibility and enhanced cost of capital (Chen, et al., 2011a, 2012; Faleye, et 
al., 2006). CSR literature demonstrates that CSR reports bring about the opposite financial 
effects (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011) because the reports aim at securing broader stakeholder 
support (Hillenbrand, et al., 2013). CSR reporting may be initiated as a strategic response to 
multiple opportunities, demands, or challenges in firms where unions play a dominant role. 
Unions advocate CSR activities in order to garner positive company response, in 
particular, to issues surrounding working conditions and safety, the environment, and social 
discrimination (Colombo, et al., in press; Robinson and Smallman, 2006). Thus, in unionized 
contexts, managers are likely to resort to CSR reports in order to increase a union’s 
awareness of the firm’s adherence to social and environmental demands and in order to 
broadcast important signals of respect towards institutional and local, social, and political 
values that enhance competitiveness and secure working contracts (Durand, et al., 2013; 
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Grougiou, et al., 2016; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; 
Leventis, et al., 2013; Sobczak and Havard, 2015). 
Unions, specifically, have often been reported to be critical, skeptical, or antagonistic 
to CSR reporting. Unions criticize the voluntary nature of CSR reporting by demanding 
compulsory CSR reports (Kazmi, 2013) which would eventually increase the number of CSR 
reports and the corporate social audit (Preuss, 2008). Unions are skeptical because they often 
view CSR reporting as a marketing tool that companies use to avoid drastic but necessary 
management changes (Sobczak and Havard, 2015). Finally, some unionists perceive 
voluntary CSR announcements a way of undermining the stature, role, and power of unions 
since these announcements put a multi-stakeholder dialogue where a union’s perspective is 
just one among many others in place of the traditional bilateral communication between 
organizations and the union’s representatives (Kazmi, 2013; Sobczak and Havard, 2015). 
Hence, unions perceive CSR reporting as a challenge to their power in the social dialogue 
with other stakeholders and in legitimacy with respect to other stakeholders (Preuss, et al., 
2014). 
Against a background where organized labor is a more dominant stakeholder than 
unorganized employees, I expect managers to be more prone to disclosing voluntary CSR 
reports for the following (non-mutually exclusive) reasons: (1) managers respond to unions’ 
pressures by communicating a more employee-considerable corporate environment; (2) 
managers reduce information asymmetries in the aim of attracting unions’ and other 
important stakeholders’ support; and (3) managers proactively reduce potential union risks 
through more aggressive marketing toward employees’ perceptions of their in-between 
corporate “social contract”. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H: Ceteris paribus, unionized firms are more likely to engage in CSR reporting. 
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3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Data 
In order to test my predictions, I focus on a single country so as to obtain a homogenous 
sample in terms of the underlying financial and economic development, the legal and social 
structure, the politics, the public infrastructure, and the relevant institutional characteristics. I 
opt for the U.S. because it attracts great international attention in CSR practices, and 
additionally, because it provides a useful halfway house between countries where 
unionization is practically not institutionalized and countries where union presence in 
corporations is dominant. I treat the period from 2002 and onwards because of data 
restrictions on CSR reporting activity through Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. I 
construct my sample for the period 2002-2015, using the entire universe of firms in the 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database with common support across Compustat and 
Thomson Reuters EIKON databases, from which, respectively, I obtain accounting and 
ownership structure data. 
Table 1 Sample selection. 
Sample selection stages Number of firms 
Number of 
firm years 
Firms with common support across KLD, Compustat and Thomson Reuters EIKON 
databases (2002 - 2015). 3,399 26,903 
Delete: Observations without CIK available. 18 57 
Delete: Observations with lack of control variables for my main model (1) and 
employee figures. 860 8,492 
Delete: Firms without ownership structure data in Thomson Reuters Eikon database. 29 282 
Delete: Observations of foreign firms. 172 772 
Delete: Observations with lack of union-related expressions in 10-K filings. 505 5,895 
Final sample, prior to propensity score matching. 1,815 11,405 
Final sample, subsequent to propensity score matching (1263 matched pairs). 747 2,526 
 
I begin with 3,399 firms and then drop 18 firms with missing Central Index Key 
(CIK) because this is a prerequisite field to download a firm’s 10-K report and identify its 
unionization status (see section 3.3.2 for a description). My data requirements on control 
variables for my main model (1) drop a further 860 firms because of missing data as well as 
29 firms because of missing ownership structure data. I further eliminate 172 firms with 
headquarters in foreign countries or outlying U.S. territories (e.g., Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, and Guam), using each firm’s historical business address as extracted from its filings 
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(as previous studies, e.g., Marciukaityte, 2015).13 Next, I exclude 505 firms because union-
related expressions in their 10-K filings are lacking (see section 3.3.2 for a description); I 
want to avoid considering companies arbitrarily defined as non-unionized. My sample, so far, 
comprises 1,815 firms, which translates into 11,405 firm-years, for which I retrieve CSR 
reporting activity from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, CorporateRegister.com and CSRwire 
databases. 
In reference to studies which have argued that a firm’s CSR orientation can be 
endogenously determined (i.e., Gao, et al., 2014), I employ a propensity score matched 
(PSM) approach and create matching pairs of firms with and without CSR reporting activity, 
as described in section 3.4.2. The necessity to engage a PSM sample stems from my 
observation that significant variations exist between CSR reporting firms and non-CSR 
reporting firms (see section 3.4.1). My final sample for analysis comprises 747 firms, which 
translates into 2,526 firm-years (or 1,263 matched pairs). Stages of sample selection are 
reported in Table 1. 
3.3.2 Measuring labor unionization 
I operationalize a firm-level unionization measure to indicate the existence of organized labor 
(e.g., Agrawal, 2012; Cheng, 2017). I further sensitivity test for alternative definitions (see 
section 3.6.1). I focus on firm-level due to lower measurement error (Cheng, 2017).14 In 
order to determine whether company employees are organized (i.e., covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement), I draw upon Item 1 (Business) of 10-K company filings. First, I 
download company filings, available from the Securities Exchange Commission FTP server, 
and develop a PERL Script, similar to Cheng (2017), that allows me to parse sentences 
related to union coverage. I employ a battery of keyword combinations in my code, such as: 
bargaining agreement(s), bargaining unit(s), collective agreement(s), collective bargain(ing), 
labo(u)r agreement(s), labo(u)r organization(s), labo(u)r union(s), organized labo(u)r, 
13 I obtain each firm’s historical business address through 10-K filings, as databases tend to backfill business 
addresses (Marciukaityte, 2015). I download company filings, as available through the Securities Exchange 
Commission FTP server, and develop a PERL script that parses state code, state name, city, and zip code. 
14 Industry-level data relies on data available through the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD) 
which is compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is a monthly household survey which suffers 
from some limitations: a) a uniform unionization pattern across companies in the same industry is assumed. 
However, recent evidence suggests great variations within an industry regarding unionization rates, implying 
that a non-uniform pattern exists among companies within the same industry (Cheng, 2017). b) CPS data 
include both public- and private-sector unionization rates. So there is inherent noise in the calculations of 
public-sector unionization. 
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organiz(s)ed employee(s)/staff/personnel/workforce, work council(s), trade union(s), 
trade-union(s), union(’s) activity(ies), union(’s) agreement(s), union contract(s); union 
organization(s), unioniz(s)ed, and union(s), much as Cheng (2017). Once my code parses all 
union related sentences, I manually verify and identify observations of companies disclosing 
the percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements (PCT_UNION) 
and, for a control group, observations of companies that firmly report no union 
representation. 
In order to align my findings with previous literature and additionally to examine 
whether measurement errors between firm- and industry-level data admit serious 
impediments to empirical findings, I estimate a unionization proxy by employing 
industry-level data. Using data from the Union Membership and Coverage Database 
(UMCD), I estimate UNION_IND by multiplying the percentage of employees covered by 
collective bargaining in a firm’s primary Census Industry Classification (CIC) industry with 
the number of company employees over lagged total assets (see, for example, Chen, et al., 
2011a, 2012; Chyz, et al., 2013; Hilary, 2006). Since UMCD data are available in CIC codes, 
I use a crosswalk list retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau and convert CIC to Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (https://www.census.gov/people/io/methodology/). 
3.3.3 Empirical model 
I employ a logistic regression in order to examine the association between unionization in a 
company and the probability of that company issuing standalone CSR reports. In order to 
address concerns about potential self-selection issues related to CSR and unionization, I use a 
lead-lag approach and build my model specification similarly to Dhaliwal, et al. (2011): 
log�prob(DCSRt)/�1 − prob(DCSRt)�� = β0 + β1Uniont−1 + β2PERFt−1 + β3GOVt−1 +
β4INS_OWNt−1 + β5INST_OWNt−1 + β6LMVALt−1 + β7AGEt−1 + β8TOBINQt−1 +
β9ROAt−1 + β10LEVt−1 + β11LITt−1 + β12FINt−1 + β13COMPt−1 + β14GLOBALt−1 +
β15LIQUIDITYt−1 + ∑ YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY + ε  
(1) 
The independent variable (DSCR) in my model incorporates data from three sources 
(namely, Thomson Reuters ASSET4, CorporateRegister.com, and CSRwire databases) and 
measures in binary fashion whether a firm discloses a standalone CSR report in year t or not. 
The main variables of interest are captured by the vector Union, which represents the 
union-related variables employed to capture the impact of unionization on CSR reporting. I 
include firm- (PCT_UNION) and industry-level unionization proxies (UNION_IND), as 
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discussed in section 3.3.2. CSR performance (PERF) is included in the model as found to 
positively associate with CSR reporting (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011; Grougiou, et al., 2016). 
Following Grougiou, et al. (2016), I construct a CSR index by totaling the positive 
(strengths) and negative (concerns) indicators of six KLD categories (i.e., community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product), while I exclude the 
category for corporate governance since it is regulated. I rely on relevant literature and 
include influential indicators to CSR reporting (see Appendix for variable definitions). 
I include corporate governance activity (GOV), using KLD ratings (similar to 
Grougiou, et al., 2016) in my model because CSR disclosures are positively associated with 
strong corporate governance mechanisms (Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Khan, et al., 2013). I control 
for ownership structure measured as the percentage of shares owned by both insider 
(INS_OWN) and institutional investors (INST_OWN) (Grougiou, et al., 2016). 
Larger and older firms are relatively more visible to the public and face greater 
pressure from a wide group of stakeholders, which fact incentivizes such firms towards 
behaving in a socially responsible way (Brammer, et al., 2009). Therefore, I include firm 
size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity (LMVAL) 
(Dhaliwal, et al., 2011), and company age, expressed as the natural logarithm of years the 
firm appears in Compustat (AGE) (Khan, et al., 2013). Stable firms with lower risk are more 
prone to CSR activities (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). Future growth opportunities are 
operationalized using TOBINQ, defined as [(the market value of common equity + the book 
value of preferred stock + the book value of long-term debt + current liabilities) / the book 
value of total assets] (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011). I also incorporate measures of financial 
performance (ROA) and leverage (LEV), computed, respectively, as income before 
extraordinary items over total assets and total debt over total assets, because firms with better 
financial performance are more likely to have resources to practice CSR activities and to 
produce CSR reports (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011), while debt servicing plays a monitoring role 
and increases the overall demand for greater disclosure initiatives as a strategy to mitigate 
potential litigation risk (Skinner, 1997). I operationalize litigation risk (LIT) as a dichotomous 
variable indicating the existence/non-existence of a legal proceeding against the firm under 
SEC regulation S-K §229.103 (Grougiou, et al., 2016). 
Voluntary disclosure may occur as a strategy to attract investors when raising capital 
in the public market (Frankel, et al., 1995). I consider a firm’s financing activity (FIN) 
calculated as [(sale of common and preferred shares - the purchase of common and preferred 
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shares) + (the long-term debt issuance - the long-term debt reduction) over total assets] 
(Dhaliwal, et al., 2011). Proprietary costs arising from product market competition have a 
negative impact on disclosure incentives (Dye, 1985), for which reason I employ a product 
market competition proxy measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (COMP), calculated 
as the sum of squared fractions of sales in an industry (industries being defined according to 
the two-digit SIC codes), multiplied by minus one (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011). This proxy is 
suggested to capture, additionally, corporate visibility and public pressure over CSR activity 
(Dhaliwal, et al., 2012). 
Intrigued by studies reporting a positive relationship between corporate disclosure and 
a firm’s global orientation (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011), I construct an indicator variable for 
foreign income reporting (GLOBAL). Liquidity has also been found to be influential in CSR 
disclosures (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). I measure LIQUIDITY by relating the number of 
shares traded in the year to the total shares outstanding at the year-end (Dhaliwal, et al., 
2011). Finally, I consider industry and year fixed effects (Griffin and Mahon, 1997), while I 
cluster standard errors at firm-level similarly to Jo and Harjoto (2011). 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Univariate analysis 
In Table 2, I provide the descriptive statistics of the entire sample, of CSR reporting firms, 
and of non-CSR reporting firms, where CSR reporting firms (DCSRREPORTER) are those 
disclosing at least one CSR report within the 14-year analysis window, and 0 otherwise. I 
also compare means and the corresponding statistical significance between the two groups. 
The CSR reporting firms and the non-CSR reporting firms significantly differ across all 
control variables, strengthening the notion that a firm’s CSR orientation can be endogenously 
determined (i.e., Gao, et al., 2014). All continuous variables are winsorized in the 1st and 
99th percentile to mitigate any effects from outliers. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of CSR reporting firms and non-CSR reporting firms prior to propensity score matching. 
Variable 
Entire Sample 
(N = 11,405) 
CSR reporting firms 
(N = 3,372) 
Non-CSR reporting firms  





diff. 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 
DCSR 0 0.14 0 0 0.347 0 0.472 0 1 0.499 0 0 0 0 0 133.700 -0.472*** 
PCT_UNIONt-1 0 0.099 0 0.103 0.189 0 0.2 0.099 0.359 0.235 0 0.057 0 0.003 0.148 72.600 -0.142*** 
UNION_INDt-1 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.009 9.600 -0.001*** 
PERFt-1 -1 -0.219 0 1 2.137 -1 0.488 0 2 3.046 -2 -0.516 -1 0 1.514 41.700 -1.004*** 
GOVt-1 -1 -0.223 0 0 0.672 -1 -0.307 0 0 0.751 -1 -0.187 0 0 0.632 -17.300 0.120*** 
INS_OWNt-1 0 0.006 0 0 0.036 0 0.003 0 0 0.023 0 0.007 0 0 0.04 -11.900 0.004*** 
INST_OWNt-1 0.683 0.788 0.847 0.943 0.194 0.715 0.808 0.853 0.935 0.165 0.668 0.78 0.843 0.946 0.204 14.800 -0.027*** 
LMVALt-1 6.152 7.154 7.049 8.041 1.416 7.459 8.333 8.316 9.221 1.321 5.878 6.659 6.628 7.41 1.134 136.000 -1.674*** 
AGEt-1 2.398 2.928 2.89 3.434 0.67 2.708 3.228 3.219 3.932 0.707 2.398 2.802 2.773 3.178 0.611 64.400 -0.426*** 
TOBINQt-1 1.106 2.019 1.545 2.401 1.422 1.012 1.768 1.397 2.11 1.16 1.15 2.124 1.612 2.535 1.506 -26.500 0.356*** 
ROAt-1 0.009 0.023 0.045 0.085 0.152 0.024 0.05 0.048 0.085 0.075 -0.002 0.012 0.044 0.085 0.173 28.300 -0.038*** 
LEVt-1 0.008 0.216 0.185 0.342 0.21 0.135 0.259 0.255 0.368 0.171 0 0.198 0.137 0.321 0.222 30.800 -0.061*** 
LITt-1 0 0.205 0 0 0.403 0 0.304 0 1 0.46 0 0.163 0 0 0.369 33.700 -0.141*** 
FINt-1 -0.039 0.018 0 0.034 0.139 -0.043 -0.001 -0.006 0.025 0.093 -0.038 0.026 0 0.039 0.154 -21.400 0.027*** 
COMPt-1 -0.075 -0.067 -0.043 -0.032 0.064 -0.086 -0.073 -0.044 -0.031 0.071 -0.072 -0.065 -0.041 -0.032 0.06 -12.400 0.008*** 
GLOBALt-1 0 0.385 0 1 0.487 0 0.413 0 1 0.493 0 0.372 0 1 0.483 8.400 -0.041*** 
LIQUIDITYt-1 1.245 2.551 2.026 3.239 1.939 1.386 2.729 2.134 3.428 2.034 1.185 2.476 1.982 3.184 1.893 12.900 -0.253*** 
Splits the sample into CSR reporting and non-CSR reporting groups. The last column compares the differences in mean values of each variable across groups and statistical 
significance of differences reported are based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for dummy variables. See Appendix for variable definitions. The 
standardized difference in percent is 100(x�gr1 − x�gr0/��sgr12 − sgr02 �/2, where x�gr1 and x�gr0 �sgr12 − sgr02 � are the sample mean (variance) in the CSR reporting and 
non-CSR reporting groups. 
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. 
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As indicated, CSR reporting firms are more unionized (20.0%) than non-CSR 
reporting firms (5.7%), with the corresponding difference being statistically significant at 1%. 
With respect to other control variables, the mean values of all control variables (except ROA 
and LEV) are similar with those reported in Dhaliwal, et al. (2011). CSR reporting firms are 
larger in size and older than their counterparts, whereas they exhibit a significantly lower 
level of financing (FIN); are more levered (LEV) and liquid (LIQUIDITY); and exhibit higher 
levels of global operations (GLOBAL), much as Dhaliwal, et al. (2011). Lastly, 
approximately 20% of my sample firms are involved in a major litigation, with CSR 
reporting firms exhibiting a higher litigation probability, thus providing confirmation of the 
findings of Dhaliwal, et al. (2011) for their industry-based litigation measure. 
3.4.2 Endogeneity of CSR and propensity score matching 
Descriptive statistics illuminate significant differences between CSR reporting firms and 
non-CSR reporting firms, which raises concerns of potential endogeneity because of 
self-selection. This is because standardized differences lie outside the threshold of ±20 (see 
Table 2), suggesting large differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). While I rely on a 
lead-lag approach to mitigate potential reverse causality (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011), I further 
follow Gao, et al. (2014) to accommodate self-selection issues related to CSR. I orchestrate a 
propensity score matched (PSM) technique to moderate problems related to differences 
between groups. I build my first-stage logistic model for CSR reporting firms following 
previous studies (e.g., Gao, et al., 2014; Lys, et al., 2015) as follows: 
Prob(DCSRREPORTERt = 1) = logit( β0 + β1PERFt−1 + β2GOVt−1 + β3INS_OWNt−1 +
β4INST_OWNt−1 + β5LMVALt−1 + β6AGEt−1 + β7TOBINQt−1 + β8ROAt−1 + β9LEVt−1 +
β10LITt−1 + β11FINt−1 + β12COMPt−1 + β13GLOBALt−1 + β14LIQUIDITYt−1 +
β15FRCFt−1 + β16SALESt−1 + β17PMt−1 + ∑ YEAR + ∑ INDUSTRY + ε)  
(2) 
The dependent variable of my model is, as previously defined, DCSRREPORTER. I 
include all control variables in model (1), apart from unionization proxies, augmented for free 
cash flow (FRCF), calculated as the difference between cash flow from operations and cash 
flow used in investing activities, since firms with freer cash flow have more resources to 
invest in CSR (Lys, et al., 2015). Following Gao, et al. (2014), I add SALES and PM, defined 
as sales revenue over total assets and income before extraordinary items over sales revenue, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 Results of the first-stage logistic regression to model CSR reporting propensity (Dependent 






















































 (-10.74)     
 Industry & Year Effects Included 
Wald χ2 2,852.169 
Pseudo R2 0.433 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 11.745 
Area under the ROC curve 0.902 
Mean VIF 1.369 
Observations 11,405 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
First, I fit a logit model (see Table 3) in which the dependent variable is 
DCSRREPORTER over the aforementioned covariates, estimated for 11,405 firm-year 
observations with data available for model (2), 3,372 of which are classified as CSR reporting 
firms. The overall model is significant (as Wald χ2=2,852.169, p<.001) and adequately fits 
the data (Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2=11.745, p=0.163 and the area under the ROC curve being 
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0.902). The estimation results indicate that 11 out of the 17 covariates are significant, while 
the pseudo R2 is 43.3%. My results support the notion of larger and older firms, with better 
CSR performance and global orientation, being more likely to be CSR reporters. 
Next, I calculate the propensity scores using predicted probabilities from the logistic 
regression and match each CSR reporter firm-year to a control firm-year with the closest 
propensity score, under a nearest-neighbour matching approach without replacement and a 
caliper constraint (δ=0.1) (similar to Gao, et al., 2014). I ensure that all matched pairs belong 
in the same year and two-digit SIC industry, since CSR reporting patterns vary across 
industries (Reverte, 2009). This process yields 1,263 matching pairs (37.45% of the CSR 
reporting firm-year observations being matched). I tabulate differences in means and 
standardized biases of the sample both before and after propensity score matching in Table 4. 
None of the differences in means is significant, nor do the standardized differences exceed 
the threshold of ±20 for the sample subsequent to propensity score matching, which is a clear 
indication that the matching was successful in achieving balance across all covariates. 
Finally, I report a Pearson’s correlation matrix in Table 5, where almost all variables 
are significantly correlated with DCSR. AGE and PERF exhibit the highest coefficients, 
respectively, of 0.12 and of 0.11. Firm-level labor unionization is significantly correlated 
with DCSR at 1%, while industry-level unionization is not. Other inferences suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
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Table 4 Covariate balance of CSR reporting firms and non-CSR reporting firms, prior and subsequent to propensity score matching. 
Variable 
Prior to propensity score matching Subsequent to propensity score matching 
CSR reporter  
(N = 3,372) 
Non-CSR reporter  
(N = 8,033) Std diffs (%) Mean diff. 
CSR reporter  
(N = 1,263) 
Non-CSR reporter  
(N = 1,263) Std diffs (%) 
Mean 
diff. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
DCSR 0.472 0 0 0 133.700 -0.472*** 0.352 0 0 0 104.300 -0.352*** 
PERFt-1 0.488 0 -0.516 -1 41.700 -1.004*** -0.267 0 -0.181 0 -4.300 0.086 
GOVt-1 -0.307 0 -0.187 0 -17.300 0.120*** -0.323 0 -0.321 0 -0.200 0.002 
INS_OWNt-1 0.003 0 0.007 0 -11.900 0.004*** 0.006 0 0.005 0 4.800 -0.001 
INST_OWNt-1 0.808 0.853 0.78 0.843 14.800 -0.027*** 0.814 0.875 0.817 0.873 -2.100 0.004 
LMVALt-1 8.333 8.316 6.659 6.628 136.000 -1.674*** 7.477 7.523 7.482 7.483 -0.500 0.005 
AGEt-1 3.228 3.219 2.802 2.773 64.400 -0.426*** 3 2.944 2.999 2.944 0.100 -0.001 
TOBINQt-1 1.768 1.397 2.124 1.612 -26.500 0.356*** 1.936 1.437 1.947 1.554 -0.800 0.011 
ROAt-1 0.05 0.048 0.012 0.044 28.300 -0.038*** 0.041 0.045 0.041 0.05 -0.600 0.001 
LEVt-1 0.259 0.255 0.198 0.137 30.800 -0.061*** 0.229 0.221 0.234 0.221 -2.600 0.005 
LITt-1 0.304 0 0.163 0 33.700 -0.141*** 0.199 0 0.205 0 -1.600 0.006 
FINt-1 -0.001 -0.006 0.026 0 -21.400 0.027*** 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.100 0 
COMPt-1 -0.073 -0.044 -0.065 -0.041 -12.400 0.008*** -0.059 -0.042 -0.06 -0.041 0.600 0 
GLOBALt-1 0.413 0 0.372 0 8.400 -0.041*** 0.425 0 0.426 0 -0.200 0.001 
LIQUIDITYt-1 2.729 2.134 2.476 1.982 12.900 -0.253*** 2.776 2.2 2.769 2.147 0.400 -0.008 
FRCF t-1 1202.18 461.034 129.95 56.115 70.800 -1072.228*** 255.734 161.134 301.6 176.279 -8.800 45.860* 
SALESt-1 0.986 0.812 1.052 0.864 -9.000 0.065*** 1.021 0.894 1.042 0.865 -3.100 0.021 
PMt-1 0.118 0.117 -0.085 0.084 26.500 -0.203*** 0.086 0.103 0.082 0.106 1.100 -0.004 
Splits the sample into CSR reporting and non-CSR reporting groups. The differences in mean values of each variable across groups and statistical significance of differences 
reported are based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for dummy variables. See Appendix for variable definitions. The standardized difference in percent 
is 100(x�gr1 − x�gr0/��sgr12 − sgr02 �/2, where x�gr1 and x�gr0 �sgr12 − sgr02 � are the sample mean (variance) in the CSR reporting and non-CSR reporting groups. 
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. 
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Table 5 Pearson correlation matrix (N = 2,526). 
Variable DCSR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. PCT_UNIONt-1 0.09*** 1.00               
2. UNION_INDt-1 -0.02 0.10*** 1.00              
3. PERFt-1 0.11*** -0.17*** -0.14*** 1.00             
4. GOVt-1 0.03* 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 1.00            
5. INS_OWNt-1 0.00 -0.02 0.08*** -0.01 0.04** 1.00           
6. INST_OWNt-1 0.04* -0.18*** 0.00 0.00 -0.19*** -0.13*** 1.00          
7. LMVALt-1 0.09*** -0.07*** -0.12*** 0.15*** -0.20*** -0.04** 0.31*** 1.00         
8. AGEt-1 0.12*** 0.30*** 0.12*** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.03* -0.07*** 0.04** 1.00        
9. TOBINQt-1 -0.08*** -0.32*** -0.08*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.04** 0.12*** 0.36*** -0.29*** 1.00       
10. ROAt-1 -0.02 -0.05** 0.06*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.03* 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.07*** 0.22*** 1.00      
11. LEVt-1 0.03 0.27*** -0.04* -0.08*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.01 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.23*** -0.12*** 1.00     
12. LITt-1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.16*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.11*** -0.04** 0.00 -0.06*** 0.00 1.00    
13. FINt-1 -0.05** 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.10*** 0.02 -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.14*** 0.00 -0.24*** 0.15*** -0.05** 1.00   
14. COMPt-1 -0.05** 0.15*** -0.16*** -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.05** 0.06*** -0.01 0.10*** 1.00  
15. GLOBALt-1 0.16*** -0.12*** -0.15*** 0.09*** -0.06*** 0.00 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.06*** -0.04* -0.04** 0.02 1.00 
16. LIQUIDITYt-1 0.00 -0.11*** -0.08*** 0.05*** -0.23*** 0.01 0.28*** 0.14*** -0.16*** 0.13*** -0.10*** -0.07*** 0.19*** 0.01 -0.04** 0.14*** 
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to second decimal place. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 6 The impact of unionization on CSR reporting (Dependent variable = DCSR), logit analysis. 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) 
PCT_UNIONt-1 ? 1.862***  
  
(3.41)  UNION_INDt-1 ?  13.950 
   
(1.23) 
PERFt-1 + 0.104** 0.093* 
  
(2.12) (1.90) 
GOVt-1 + 0.115 0.119 
  
(0.91) (0.93) 
INS_OWNt-1 ?- 1.104 0.919 
  
(0.49) (0.42) 
INST_OWNt-1 + -0.114 -0.257 
  
(-0.19) (-0.43) 
LMVALt-1 + 0.258** 0.284** 
  
(2.22) (2.48) 
AGEt-1 + 0.267 0.311* 
  
(1.61) (1.84) 
TOBINQt-1 ? -0.223** -0.272*** 
  
(-2.17) (-2.58) 
ROAt-1 + -0.868** -0.880** 
  
(-2.03) (-2.13) 
LEVt-1 + -0.444 -0.262 
  
(-0.84) (-0.51) 
LITt-1 + 0.137 0.114 
  
(0.84) (0.70) 
FINt-1 + -1.811*** -1.772*** 
  
(-2.86) (-2.81) 
COMPt-1 - -2.754 -2.636 
  
(-0.93) (-0.91) 
GLOBALt-1 + -0.104 -0.109 
  
(-0.42) (-0.43) 
LIQUIDITYt-1 - 0.010 0.029 
  
(0.24) (0.61) 
(intercept)  -4.628*** -4.901*** 
  (-3.76) (-4.07)        Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Wald χ2  262.245 268.882 Pseudo R2  0.188 0.178 Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  6.662 6.083 Area under the ROC curve  0.799 0.792 Mean VIF  1.212 1.190 Observations  2,526 2,526 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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3.4.3 Multivariate analysis 
The results of the main model are presented in Table 6. Both models, using firm- and 
industry-level unionization proxies (columns 1 and 2, respectively) are significant (as Wald 
χ2 p<.001) and adequately fit the data (Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2=6.662 (6.083), p=0.57 (0.63) 
and the area under the ROC curve being 0.799 (0.792) for models 1 and (2), respectively). 
Firm-level unionization is significant at 1%, while industry-level unionization is insignificant, 
with explanatory powers of my models being approximately 18%. The coefficient of 
PCT_UNION is positive and statistically significant at 1% (column 1, β=1.862, z-stat=3.41), 
lending support for my hypothesis. Thus, the possibility of a firm issuing a CSR report 
increases, ceteris paribus, with unionization of its employees. UNION_IND is also positive 
but insignificant (column 2, β=13.950, z-stat=1.23), and this implies a potential measurement 
error of unionization using the industry- rather than firm-level data. 
Most coefficients across control variables have the predicted sign (except ROA and 
FIN). PERF is positive and significant at 5%, suggesting that superior CSR performance 
motivates companies to issue CSR reports voluntarily (Grougiou, et al., 2016). Firms larger 
in size, exhibiting lower profitability and raising less capital in the previous year (LMVAL, 
ROA and FIN), are more likely to engage in CSR reporting. In all models, mean VIFs have 
values close to 1.2, thus implying no multicollinearity. Overall, the results support previous 
literature by demonstrating that unionization encourages CSR reporting activity. 
3.5 Extensions 
On the basis of stakeholder theory promulgations and initial findings, I extend my 
investigations and examine whether institutional factors empowering unions cause managers 
to intensify their efforts to issue CSR reports. I initially test whether legislation and 
prevailing political ideology supportive of labor unions play any role in CSR reporting. First, 
based on evidence suggesting that Right-to-Work (RTW) laws inhibit the organization of 
unions and decrease the power of unions (Cheng, 2017; Marciukaityte, 2015; Matsa, 2010), I 
examine whether differences between legislation at the state level impact CSR reporting. 
Second, since the dominance of the Democratic Party is associated with increased union 
power (Chen, et al., 2011a; Marciukaityte, 2015), I examine whether the impact of 
unionization is different in states where the Democratic Party predominates. Then I account 
for differentiations across states in union influence, which is measureable in the numbers of 
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union members resident there. Large union membership contributes to union power and may 
impact a firm’s CSR reporting activity. 
3.5.1 Labor unions and Right-to-Work laws 
Previous literature associates the existence of RTW laws with loss of union power because 
the legislation provides unionized employees the right to opt out of union membership, thus 
curtailing the financial resources, effectiveness, and strength of unions (Ellwood and Fine, 
1987). I consider states which enact RTW legislation to be less union-friendly. My 
investigation echoes the hot debate over RTW laws because of recent changes in the U.S. 
political landscape.15 
In order to analyze the effect of unionization on CSR reporting, I divide my sample 
into companies located in states with/without RTW laws (see Table 7), based on effective 
year of RTW laws in action at the state level, as available through the National Right to Work 
Committee. Both models are significant (as Wald χ2 p<.001) and adequately fit the data 
(Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2=9.051 (8.237), p=0.34 (0.41) and the area under the ROC curve being 
0.809 (0.807) for models 1 and (2), respectively). In accordance with my expectations, the 
coefficient of PCT_UNION is statistically significant at 1% (column 2, β=2.269, z-stat=3.30) 
and insignificant for states without and with RTW laws respectively, supporting the notion 
that unionized companies more actively engage in CSR reporting in states with greater union 
power. I further test for homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients (using a Wald 
test, column 3 in Table 7). The difference in coefficients of PCT_UNION is statistically 
significant at 1% across RTW and non-RTW states. 
15 According to the National Right to Work Committee, four states voted for RTW laws since 2012. These are: 
Indiana (February 01, 2012), Michigan (March 08, 2013), Wisconsin (March 09, 2015), and West Virginia 
(February 12, 2016). Unions campaigned over making RTW laws unconstitutional (Shikha, 2012), with 11 
unions filed lawsuits against the passage of RTW legislation in West Virginia (Kabler, 2016), as of June 2016. 
Interestingly, Josh Sword, secretary treasurer of the West Virginia AFLCIO, stated that “first and foremost, it’s 
unconstitutional because it’s an illegal taking of property without due process”. The principal argument behind 
criticize this legislation as unconstitutional relies upon the Fifth Amendment’s provision that private property 
cannot be taken for public use unless just compensation is paid. 
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Table 7 Unionization and CSR reporting in states with/without Right-to-Work laws (Dependent variable 
= DCSR), logit analysis. 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) 
RTW States Non-RTW States Diff coef 
PCT_UNIONt-1 ? 0.400 2.269*** -1.869*** 
  
(0.41) (3.30) (11.083) 
PERFt-1 + 0.237*** 0.059 0.178* 
  
(2.92) (0.94) (3.086) 
GOVt-1 + 0.028 0.090 -0.062 
  
(0.13) (0.60) (0.051) 
INS_OWNt-1 ?- -3.801 2.758 -6.559 
  
(-0.79) (1.00) (1.398) 
INST_OWNt-1 + -0.314 0.618 -0.932 
  
(-0.28) (0.80) (0.472) 
LMVALt-1 + 0.576*** 0.137 0.439* 
  
(3.03) (0.95) (3.443) 
AGEt-1 + 0.202 0.278 -0.076 
  
(0.80) (1.26) (0.053) 
TOBINQt-1 ? -0.223 -0.193 -0.03 
  
(-0.93) (-1.63) (0.012) 
ROAt-1 + -7.681*** -0.268 -7.413*** 
  
(-3.97) (-0.61) (13.975) 
LEVt-1 + -1.135 -0.570 -0.565 
  
(-1.12) (-0.86) (0.22) 
LITt-1 + 0.376 0.025 0.351 
  
(1.16) (0.12) (0.849) 
FINt-1 + -2.679* -1.746** -0.933 
  
(-1.96) (-2.24) (0.351) 
COMPt-1 - -45.968*** -1.685 -44.284*** 
  
(-3.30) (-0.51) (9.602) 
GLOBALt-1 + -0.541 0.217 -0.757 
  
(-1.31) (0.62) (1.987) 
LIQUIDITYt-1 - 0.096 -0.014 0.11 
  
(1.06) (-0.26) (1.087) 
(intercept)  -8.804*** -2.513 -11.317** 
  (-4.01) (-1.26) (4.528)         Industry & Year Effects  Included Included  Wald χ2  107.916 245.477  Pseudo R2  0.224 0.205  Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  9.051 8.237  Area under the ROC curve 0.809 0.807  Mean VIF  1.247 1.272  Observations  559 1,666  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare the difference 
in coefficients between regression results. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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3.5.2 Labor unions and the Democratic Party 
The notion that the Democratic Party is friendly to labor dates back to 1930s when Franklin 
Roosevelt passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) in 1935 and extended 
collective bargaining to public workers in 1937. Today, the strengthening of workers’ rights 
remains an imperative policy point on the Democrat agenda, as can be seen in such recent 
legal reforms as the Workplace Democracy Action of 2016 and the Employee Free Choice 
Act (EFCA)16 of 2009. Democrats continue to have close ties to union leadership, as in 2008 
unions were responsible, notably, for $75 million in political donations, with 92% going to 
Democrats (McGinty and Mullins, 2012). On the other hand, Republicans openly oppose 
labor unionization. Indicatively, in a case that attracted massive media attention, Republican 
politicians and conservative lobby groups organized a very successful public campaign 
against unionization at Volkswagen in Chattanooga (Tennessee) (Mueller and Stegmaier, 
2017). I argue that unions have increased power in regions (states) influenced by Democrats 
(Marciukaityte, 2015) and I test whether this impacts the CSR reporting choices made by 
unionized firms. 
I empirically test my inferences and divide my sample into states where Democrats 
(Republicans) won in recent presidential elections (http://www.uselectionatlas.org). Results 
of the multivariate analyses are presented in Table 8, along with a test for homogeneity in the 
pairwise estimated coefficients across models (using a Wald test in column 3). Both models 
are significant (as Wald χ2 p<.001) and adequately fit the data (Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2=10.590 
(11.061), p=0.23 (0.20) and the area under the ROC curve being 0.789 (0.840) for models 1 
and (2), respectively). The coefficient PCT_UNION is statistically significant at 1%, for 
companies located in states where Democrats won the most recent presidential election 
(column 1, β=2.673, z-stat=3.61), while there is no statistical significance for companies 
located in states where Republicans won the most recent presidential election. My results 
indicate that unionized companies are more likely to issue CSR reports in states with greater 
union power. Testing for homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients, I observe that 
the difference in the PCT_UNION coefficients is statistically significant at 1% across the 
subsamples of dominance by Democrats versus by Republicans at the state level. 
16 The EFCA provided employees with the right to sign “union authorization cards”, instead of vote for or 
against union representation in a secret ballot. According to the The National Right to Work Committee (2009), 
the passage of the EFCA would give union officials the upper hand and in turn peril their incentives to ensure a 
speedy and mutually beneficial contract. However, Democrats could not get enough votes together to defeat a 
Republican filibuster. 
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Table 8 Unionization and CSR reporting in states where Democrats (Republicans) won in recent 
presidential elections (Dependent variable = DCSR), logit analysis. 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) Democrats - State Republicans - State Diff coef 
PCT_UNIONt-1 ? 2.673*** 0.482 2.191*** 
  
(3.61) (0.58) (13.329) 
PERFt-1 + 0.102* 0.128* -0.025 
  
(1.80) (1.72) (0.095) 
GOVt-1 + 0.189 0.011 0.178 
  
(1.16) (0.05) (0.401) 
INS_OWNt-1 ?- 2.249 2.355 -0.105 
  
(0.83) (0.42) (0) 
INST_OWNt-1 + 0.060 -0.127 0.188 
  
(0.08) (-0.11) (0.022) 
LMVALt-1 + 0.268* 0.262 0.006 
  
(1.88) (1.38) (0.001) 
AGEt-1 + -0.002 0.773*** -0.775** 
  
(-0.01) (2.96) (6.203) 
TOBINQt-1 ? -0.218* -0.288** 0.07 
  
(-1.81) (-1.97) (0.145) 
ROAt-1 + -1.052 -0.861* -0.19 
  
(-1.27) (-1.70) (0.039) 
LEVt-1 + -0.458 -0.397 -0.06 
  
(-0.69) (-0.42) (0.003) 
LITt-1 + 0.190 -0.079 0.269 
  
(0.91) (-0.31) (0.646) 
FINt-1 + -2.258** -2.445** 0.187 
  
(-2.52) (-2.21) (0.018) 
COMPt-1 - -3.152 -6.781 3.629 
  
(-0.95) (-0.56) (0.078) 
GLOBALt-1 + 0.346 -0.544 0.891 
  
(0.93) (-1.26) (2.453) 
LIQUIDITYt-1 - -0.037 0.030 -0.067 
  
(-0.64) (0.51) (0.72) 
(intercept)  -2.090 -6.711*** -8.801* 
  (-1.17) (-3.23) (2.942)         Industry & Year Effects  Included Included  Wald χ2  186.812 160.400  Pseudo R2  0.19 0.247  Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  10.590 11.061  Area under the ROC curve 0.789 0.840  Mean VIF  1.273 1.215  Observations  1,329 982  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare the difference 
in coefficients between regression results. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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3.5.3 Labor unions and union concentrated states  
In this section, I examine whether CSR reporting is influenced by the corporate spatial 
clustering in regions where unionists have a dominant presence. According to the annual 
Union Members Summary, issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
(http://www.bls.gov/), approximately half of the total unionized labor force across the U.S. 
resides in seven states (during the period of my estimation window). These states are, in rank 
order, California, New York, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey, with 
the last two switching rankings during the period 2006-2009.17 Notably, California and New 
York together account for approximately 4.5 million out of the 15.5 million union members 
(on average) across the U.S. within my 14-year window. I propose that when a firm shares 
the location of strong unions, that firm can be subject to mimetic isomorphism through 
knowledge spillovers and social and institutional pressures for legitimacy (Husted, et al., 
2016). Driven by social congruence, knowledge spillover, and/or legitimacy pressures as 
these forces seem to reinforce one another (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009), firms geographically 
close to strong unions will likely be instigated to increase their CSR reporting activity. 
I present the multivariate analysis in Table 9, where I divide my sample into states in 
which more than half of total union members (not living) living across the U.S. (see Table 9, 
columns 1 and 2, respectively). Both models are significant (as Wald χ2 p<.001) and 
adequately fit the data (Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2=8.032 (7.500), p=0.43 (0.48) and the area 
under the ROC curve being 0.852 (0.792) for models 1 and (2), respectively). The coefficient 
PCT_UNION is statistically significant at 1%, for companies located in states with more than 
half of total union members across the U.S. (column 1, β=3.518, z-stat=3.93), while there is 
no statistical significance for companies located in the remaining states. My results support 
that the geographical concentration of organized labor adds to union influence, which in turn, 
significantly impacts the propensity to CSR reporting activity. I also test for the homogeneity 
in the pairwise estimated coefficients across models (using a Wald test in column 3), where I 
observe that the difference in the PCT_UNION coefficients is statistically significant at 1% 
across subsamples. 
17 Recourse to the annual Union Members Summary (issued by the BLS), New Jersey displaced Ohio in the 
ranking of states where more than half of total union members living, during 2006, 2007, and 2009. 
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Table 9 Unionization and CSR reporting in states which more than half of total union members (not 
living) living across the U.S. (Dependent variable = DCSR), logit analysis. 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) 
Largest number of 
union members 
Other than largest 
number of union members Diff coef 
PCT_UNIONt-1 ? 3.518*** 0.954 2.564*** 
  
(3.93) (1.37) (16.937) 
PERFt-1 + 0.171** 0.037 0.134 
  
(1.98) (0.62) (1.568) 
GOVt-1 + -0.100 0.172 -0.272 
  
(-0.49) (1.05) (0.876) 
INS_OWNt-1 ?- 2.419 -0.232 2.651 
  
(0.73) (-0.05) (0.215) 
INST_OWNt-1 + 0.361 -0.352 0.713 
  
(0.32) (-0.49) (0.286) 
LMVALt-1 + 0.426** 0.228 0.198 
  
(2.53) (1.53) (1.946) 
AGEt-1 + 0.451 0.225 0.226 
  
(1.52) (1.08) (0.559) 
TOBINQt-1 ? -0.265* -0.223 -0.042 
  
(-1.66) (-1.63) (0.106) 
ROAt-1 + -1.052 -0.848 -0.204 
  
(-1.24) (-1.59) (0.184) 
LEVt-1 + 0.350 -0.733 1.083 
  
(0.44) (-1.07) (0.889) 
LITt-1 + 0.054 0.129 -0.075 
  
(0.18) (0.63) (0.061) 
FINt-1 + -3.618*** -0.961 -2.657** 
  
(-3.15) (-1.35) (3.997) 
COMPt-1 - -11.316** -4.520 -6.796 
  
(-2.38) (-1.06) (1.741) 
GLOBALt-1 + -0.093 -0.225 0.132 
  
(-0.22) (-0.74) (0.045) 
LIQUIDITYt-1 - 0.042 0.026 0.016 
  
(0.56) (0.48) (0.016) 
(intercept)  -7.115*** -4.222*** -2.893 
  (-3.71) (-2.76) (0.642)         Industry & Year Effects  Included Included  Wald χ2  188.179 180.827  Pseudo R2  0.293 0.183  Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  8.032 7.500  Area under the ROC curve 0.852 0.792  Mean VIF  1.292 1.205  Observations  942 1,493  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare the difference in 
coefficients between regression results. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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3.6 Sensitivity testing 
I sensitivity tests my findings for alternative definitions of unionization (section 3.6.1), CSR 
reporting (section 3.6.2), and CSR performance (section 3.6.3). I verify that they are all 
persistent, while I further account for specification issues related to variable omission 
(section 3.6.4). 
3.6.1 Alternative definition of unionization 
I substitute my main unionization proxy, namely, the percentage of unionized employees 
(PCT_UNION), with three alternative specifications. First, I employ an indicator variable 
signaling the existence of collective bargaining coverage (D_UNION). Second, I include a 
dichotomous variable indicating the existence of union-related risk in company filings 
(UNION_RISK). This variable is available for the years 2005 and onwards because an SEC 
mandate to disclose Item 1A Risk Factors.18 Third, following Cheng (2017), I estimate a 
comprehensive measure of the overall influence of organized labor measures (CB), calculated 
as the first principal component of the following: the percentage of unionized employees 
(PCT_UNION), the coverage dummy (D_UNION), and the union-related risk dummy 
(UNION_RISK). Running the models again, the magnitude of all coefficients of alternative 
unionization proxies is positive and statistically significant at 5% for D_UNION and 
UNION_RISK and at 1% for CB. 
3.6.2 Alternative measures of CSR reporting 
On top of my CSR disclosure proxy (DCSR), as well as for the sake of completeness, I 
employ two alternative specifications to test my hypothesis. First, I create an indicator 
variable which captures first-time CSR reporters (DCSR_FIRST) (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011). 
Second, I approximate CSR disclosure by using the actual number of CSR reports 
(NR_DCSR) issued by the company in year t. I perform a logistic regression using 
DCSR_FIRST as the dependent variable and an ordered logistic regression using NR_DCSR. I 
obtain results qualitatively similar to those based on DCSR. 
18 Similar to Cheng (2017), I parse union-risk related expressions included in Item 1A (Risk Factors), as firms 
report idiosyncratic factors (e.g., labor relations, labor union activity) under this item (Campbell, et al., 2013). 
UNION_RISK is set to if the company discloses risks related to: 1) union presence, 2) union organizing activity, 
3) expiry of bargaining agreements (either in current or next year), 4) work stoppages and 5) negative impact on 
firm performance and/or profitability. I identify 728 instances of union-related risk. 
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3.6.3 Alternative measures of CSR performance 
I test for CSR performance by using only “strengths” (PERFS) or only “concerns” (PERFC), 
similar to Grougiou, et al. (2016). I further substitute the PERF and GOV variables with CSR 
data from ASSET4 database (see Cheng, et al., 2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) and 
create, respectively, PERF4 and PERF_CG. I also test for alternative definitions of CSR 
performance, as presented in Dhaliwal, et al. (2011). I create an indicator CRO that equals 1 
if a firm was on the “100 Best Corporate Citizens” list (by Corporate Responsibility Officer) 
in year t and equals 0 otherwise (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011). I also measure CSR performance by 
using an indicator variable (DJSI) that signals for membership in the Dow Jones World 
Sustainability Index in year t. When I run the regressions again employing these proxies, my 
inferences remain unchanged. 
3.6.4 Variable omission 
I sensitivity test for a battery of variables that have been found to be or suggested to be 
influential in CSR reporting but are not included in my full model because of data and/or 
specification reasons. First, I employ alternative measures of firm size such as: (1) total assets 
(Khan, et al., 2013), (2) sales (Grougiou, et al., 2016), and (3) number of employees (Lau, et 
al., 2016), all transformed into natural logarithms. All different measures of firm size remain 
positive and statistically significant. Second, I account for enhanced CSR activity which is 
attributable to company diversification (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), and I include the 
natural logarithm of the number of business segments the company operates (OPSEG) that 
positively loads to CSR reporting but lacks statistical significance. Despite the majority of 
previous studies approximate firm performance using ROA, other studies control for 
performance using the ratio of income before extraordinary items over net assets (ROE) (i.e., 
Cowen, et al., 1987; Grougiou, et al., 2016). Including ROE in my model does not affect my 
results, while its coefficient remains statistically significant and in the same direction with 
ROA. I also incorporate an alternative approximation of growth opportunities (different to 
Tobin’s Q), the market-to-book ratio (MB) (Grougiou, et al., 2016), that lacks statistical 
significance. The incorporation of all the above variables does not change my inferences. 
Liquidity, share performance, and market risk have also been suggested as influential 
to CSR disclosures (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). I augment my model with current ratio 
(CR), measured as current assets to current liabilities (Leventis and Weetman, 2004) and 
share return (SHR), estimated as [(market price year end + dividends per share + quarterly 
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special dividends) / (previous year's market price year-end - 1)] *100 (Grougiou, et al., 2016) 
and the daily stock return volatility over the fiscal year (VOL) (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). 
None of these proxies is statistically significant, nor do the direction and magnitude of the 
PCT_UNION coefficient change. Considering previous literature (e.g., Brammer, et al., 2009; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2000, 2001), I control for advertising (ADV) and research and 
development (RD) intensities, both scaled by net sales (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001)19, but I 
do not observe any statistical significance in these proxies though they do positively load to 
CSR reporting. Since CSR disclosures can be correlated with the overall corporate financial 
transparency and quality (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011), I control for financial disclosure quality 
using the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_JDA), based on Dechow, et al. (1995). 
Again, the coefficient PCT_UNION remains positive and statistically significant. 
I examine alternative specifications of ownership structure. Jain and Jamali (2016) 
argue that block ownership (BLOCK_OWN, measured as the percentage owned by investors 
with at least a 5% stake (Jo and Harjoto, 2011)) tend to discourage proactive CSR. Khan, et 
al. (2013) report a positive association between the percentage owned by foreign investors 
(FOR_OWN) and CSR disclosure. My inferences remain unchanged after controlling for 
these proxies. 
Finally, I test for additional demographic controls. Recourse to the annual Union 
Members Summary (issued by the BLS, http://www.bls.gov/) for the period 2002-2015 
demonstrates how the propensity to unionize relates to gender, race, and age. Previous studies 
emphasize that education is influential in unionization propensity (Eren, 2009). Thus, I 
control for the percentage of male (MALE) and black workers (BLACK); the percentage of the 
population between the ages 45 and 64 (EMP45_64); and the percentage of employees who 
have completed four years of college or higher (COLLEGE), all measured at the industry 
level.20 Once again, my inferences remain similar. 
  
19 Given the high number of missing values for these variables, I use industry averages as a proxy for missing 
observations (e.g., Marano and Kostova, 2016). 
20 The data source is the NBER CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups File, available on the NBER website 
(http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/). 
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3.7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this study, I examine the impact of labor unionization on CSR reporting. I hypothesize 
that, in unionized contexts, the increasing pressure exercised by labor increases the 
propensity of managers to disclose standalone CSR reports. Specifically, I develop models to 
investigate whether managers in unionized firms are more active in initiating CSR reports 
than their counterparts in non-unionized firms. I then examine whether institutional 
characteristics such as political ideology supportive of labor, legislation, and corporate spatial 
clustering in unionized locations cause managers in unionized firms to disclose discretionary 
CSR reports more intensively. I employ a sample of 2,526 U.S. firm-year observations for the 
estimation window of 2002-2015. My findings document that, in the presence of unions, 
managers tend to incorporate CSR reporting into their strategies more intensively. I also show 
that managers’ propensity to CSR reporting increases significantly in states which (1) have 
not enacted Right-to-Work legislation, (2) are controlled by the Democratic Party, and (3) 
exhibit high concentrations of unionized citizens. 
I make sense of my findings by using the overarching stakeholder theory, which 
prescribes that CSR disclosures serve as an essential mechanism for managing pressure 
exerted by stakeholders. According to this perspective, organized labor is theorized as a more 
salient stakeholder than unorganized employees because unions are institutionalized in the 
aim of giving a stronger voice to workers by deploying dynamic ways of advancing labor’s 
claims. Unionization is, therefore, understood as a parameter which increases the 
complexities characterizing the employee-management relationship. I show that managers are 
more prone to engaging in voluntary CSR reports for the following reasons: (1) union 
membership positively discounts CSR activity; (2) unions adhere to the values of the social 
context and so interpret CSR disclosures as important signals of commitment to ethical 
organizational values; and (3) CSR disclosures facilitate the exchange of information as well 
as the recognition of mutual interests, a process which has the potential of aligning the 
interests of employees to those of the firm. Indeed, it is sound argument to claim that CSR 
can form the basis of an “ideological social contract” between the corporation and the 
employees (Voegtlin and Greenwood, 2016, p.187). Finally, since managers aim to achieve 
or maintain the support of unionists and other important stakeholders, such as investors, they 
can reduce information asymmetries with CSR reporting. 
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My work contributes to the existing literature on several fronts. First, I extend 
previous literature on the determinants of CSR reporting by focusing on a new dimension, the 
structure of industrial relations. Through my research, the driving role of organized labor 
becomes clear. Second, I further the current understanding of CSR reporting when I take in 
the broader institutional context of political ideology and legislative regimes, both of which 
empower the role of unions as significant drivers of CSR reporting. I enhance current 
knowledge in CSR literature and in spatial economics literature when I identify the role in 
augmenting CSR reporting which is played by corporate spatial clustering in regions where 
unionized employees predominate. Overall, I provide new evidence which suggests that 
managers are more likely both to acquiesce to union power and to show social awareness in 
union-related issues by enhancing CSR communication. Finally, and more broadly, I extend 
the CSR literature to the influential role of salient stakeholders in corporate decision making. 
I demonstrate that organized labor significantly impacts CSR managerial choices and 
voluntary reporting practices, such as CSR disclosures. 
The implications of my study are important for managers, union leaders, and market 
participants. Managers who operate under labor union pressure can benefit from my 
empirical analysis, which suggests that the initiation of CSR reports is a central, long-term 
strategic tactic through which unobserved CSR qualities are brought to light. Communication 
with unions and other salient stakeholders can, by such means, be facilitated. Reductions in 
information asymmetry between management and unionists has the potential to encourage 
investors and other market participants. Union leaders can also benefit from my findings 
considering that corporate managers strategically employ CSR reports, to various and 
potentially diverse ends, within the broader union-management negotiation context. While 
managers might employ CSR reports as an attempt to strengthen the “ideological 
psychological contract” between the company and its employees (Voegtlin and Greenwood, 
2016), I cannot rule out the possibility that CSR reports are employed as a medium to 
undermine the stature and power of the unions. Unionists should take particular care to relate 
CSR reports to the broader attitudes, strategies, policies, and overall ethical and legitimacy 
standing of the organization. Market participants such as business analysts, investors, and 
shareholders should be aware that standalone CSR reports are strategically employed to 
weaken tensions and divisions with organized labor (Voegtlin and Greenwood, 2016). This 
might reduce the agency costs of labor. Significant financial benefits, such as reduction of 
cost of capital, are the possible outcome, which interested parties should consider when in 
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unionized contexts, they factor CSR engagement into their financial decision-making 
analyses. 
Some limitations of my study may, however, point the way for future research. First, 
my data are on U.S., which limits the potential generalization of my results. Researchers 
could employ cross-country datasets in order to overcome this limitation. I add, however, the 
caveat that that institutional and cultural differences in relation to CSR and unionization be 
taken into consideration. Second, it would be important to know the benefits enjoyed by 
unionized companies that do issue CSR reports. Relevant areas for such an investigation 
might include cost of capital, union-negotiation outcomes, corporate image, and media 
exposure. Finally, the current understanding of CSR disclosure practices by unionized firms 
could be enriched by employing behavioral and/or organizational frameworks. 
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3.8 Appendix - Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: CSR determinants for main model 
Dependent variable: 
DCSR 1 if the company discloses a CSR report according to Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
CorporateRegister.com and CSRwire databases, and 0 otherwise. 
Unionization status: 
PCT_UNION Percentage of company's unionized employees, as extracted from company filings. 
UNION_IND Industry level unionization, calculated as the product of the percentage of unionized 
employees, from Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD), in the industry 
with the number of company’s employees, scaled by lagged total assets, as in Hilary 
(2006). 
Control variables: 
PERF CSR performance defined as the total positive (strengths) and negative (concerns) of six 
CSR rating categories (i.e., community, diversity, employee relations, environment, 
human rights and product). (Source: KLD). 
GOV Corporate governance performance defined as the total positive (strengths) and negative 
(concerns). (Source: KLD). 
INS_OWN Percentage of shares owned by insider investors. (Source: Thomson Reuters EIKON). 
INST_OWN Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. (Source: Thomson Reuters 
EIKON). 
LMVAL Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. (Source: Compustat). 
AGE Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been in 
Compustat. 
TOBINQ Tobin's Q defined as the sum of the market value of common equity plus the book value 
of preferred stock, book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, over the book 
value of total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items over total 
assets. (Source: Compustat). 
LEV Leverage ratio, measured as total debt over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
LIT 1 if the company named as a defendant in a lawsuit, 0 otherwise. (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
FIN The amount of debt or equity capital raised by the firm over total assets. It is measured as 
the issuance of common stock and preferred shares minus the purchase of common stock 
and preferred shares plus the long-term debt issuance minus the long-term debt reduction. 
(Source: Compustat). 
COMP Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) multiplied by -1. HHI is calculated by summing the 
squares of the market shares of all companies in an industry. I calculate a firm’s market 
share by dividing the sales of a firm by the total sales of all companies in an industry in 
that year, where industries are proxied using the two-digit SIC codes. (Source: 
Compustat). 
GLOBAL 1 if the firm reports non-zero foreign income, 0 otherwise. (Source: Compustat). 
LIQUIDITY Ratio of the number of shares traded in the year to the total shares outstanding at the end 
of the year. (Source: Compustat). 
Panel B: Additional covariates for PSM 
DCSRREPORTER 1 if a firm disclosed at least one CSR report according to Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
CorporateRegister.com, and CSRwire within our 14-year analysis window. 
FRCF Cash flow from operations minus cash flow used in investing activities. (Source: 
Compustat). 
SALES Sales revenue over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
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4.1 Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is a fundamental corporate decision because an IPO provides 
companies access to capital markets and allows owners wealth diversification (Santos, 2017). 
Significant IPO first-day share returns (also known as underpricing) are one of the most 
robust findings in corporate finance. At least since Ibbotson (1975), the main line of thought 
on IPO underpricing has been that positive IPO underpricing is caused primarily by 
information asymmetries and conflicts of interests. Previous studies have examined 
underpricing mainly as the interplay between corporate insiders, important stakeholders, and 
outside investors, but I consider it surprising that very limited academic attention has been 
placed on the impact which labor has on IPO valuation. I want to close this gap in the 
research by bringing to the fore the role of organized labor as a particularly important 
element of information asymmetry and agency costs. 
Both academic research (i.e., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the business press 
contend that organized labor influences the overall process of an IPO. One good example is 
the IPO of Overnite Transportation Co., during which the Teamsters organized a ten month 
long strike against in 2000 when the firm had organized its IPO. Considering the adversity of 
the strike, analysts readjusted their estimates on up to $300 million in proceeds, or $200 
million less than Overnite’s goal. Leo Suggs, Chairman of Overnite, had to announce that "I 
don't see an IPO or any given disposition in the foreseeable future” (Schulz, 2000; p. 24). 
Previous research has demonstrated that important market constituencies influence the 
IPO valuation, namely top executives (e.g., Higgins and Gulati, 2006) and board members 
(e.g., Bell, et al., 2014; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002), audit committees (e.g., Bédard, et al., 
2008) and auditors (e.g., Beatty, 1989), underwriters (e.g., Carter and Manaster, 1990) and 
venture capitalists (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004), regulators (e.g., Benveniste and 
Wilhelm, 1990; Chaplinsky, et al., 2017), and the media (e.g., Bajo and Raimondo, 2017). 
But although executive surveys (Welbourne and Andrews, 1996) and previous literature on 
equity valuation (Lee and Mas, 2012; Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984) both suggest that labor 
unionization might be influential to IPO valuation, there is as of yet no systematic empirical 
investigation into the idea. Important research into industrial relations and corporate finance 
is documenting the impact of labor unionization on core economic matters, and emphasizes 
the impact of unions on operating performance, and on equity values. Labor unions are 
associated with an adverse effect on corporate performance (i.e., Doucouliagos and Laroche, 
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2009; Hirsch, 2004) because they develop risk-averse attitudes (Faleye, et al., 2006), and 
such attitudes constrain managerial decision making (Chyz, et al., 2013) while delaying 
future investments (Fallick and Hassett, 1999). Robust academic evidence correlates 
successful union organization campaigns with a reduction in equity values (e.g., Lee and 
Mas, 2012). Xing, et al. (2017) demonstrate that unionized venture capital backed IPOs are 
less profitable and less likely to survive. 
Against this background, I examine the impact of unionization on IPO underpricing. I 
use a sample of 1,568 IPOs floated on U.S. stock exchanges during the estimation window of 
1997-2014. I focus on a single country in order to obtain a sample homogenous in following 
terms: underlying financial and economic development, legal and social structure, politics, 
public infrastructure, and relevant institutional characteristics. I opt for the U.S. for two 
reasons. First, the U.S. IPO market attracts great attention among researchers (Ljungqvist, 
2007) because it is a market which exerts great influence on global markets and which 
diffuses its financial instruments and working practices throughout the world (Ljungqvist, et 
al. (2003). Second, while it is true that my examination is provided with an ideal setting in 
the U.S. IPO market where first-day returns are typically large and where “underpricing 
discounts” have averaged at 20% over the last forty years (Santos, 2017), the U.S. market 
also provides a useful halfway house between countries where unionization is practically not 
institutionalized and countries where union presence in corporations is dominant. 
My findings reveal that labor unions have a significant negative effect on IPO 
underpricing, and the effect persists even when: (1) I control for a battery of variables 
commonly used to explain underpricing and (2) I employ various estimation methods in order 
to correct for self-selection bias and to mitigate endogeneity concerns. The evidence which I 
provide shows how unionization is a contributing factor to negative offer price revisions and 
lower aftermarket volatility, both of which are clear manifestations of investors’ modest 
demand for participation in the issue. I also demonstrate that the negative effect of 
unionization on IPOs is more prominent in states which indirectly grant labor unions more 
power by having not enacted Right-to-Work legislation. Overall, my findings hold even when 
I run different measures of unionization and underpricing and specify my sampling methods 
according to different standards. 
My study contributes to the research on several fronts. First, my focus on this new 
dimension, namely on labor unionization, is an important contribution to research both on the 
IPO and on corporate finance. When labor unionization becomes a factor in the investor’s 
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decision whether or not to participate in an IPO, then undoubtedly it is a vital extension of 
our understanding of the roles played by important stakeholders in IPO pricing to examine, as 
I do here, the effect of unions on the IPO. Second, I enhance research into the costs of labor 
unionization on equity capital (i.e., Abowd, 1989; Chen, et al., 2011a; Lee and Mas, 2012) 
because I am able to show that IPOs which are done in the presence of organized labor incur 
significant costs and that these costs vary according to the incremental power of unions. 
4.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
4.2.1 Labor unions and agency costs 
Viewed through the lens of agency theory, a firm is a nexus of contracts between principals 
and their agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Contractual relations are more complex in the 
IPO setting because the “conflicting voices” of various principal groups coexist and 
ultimately give rise to agency problems (Arthurs, et al., 2008). Indeed, the very decision to go 
public incurs significant organizational transitions because ownership devolves from current 
shareholders to outside institutional and retail investors (Allcock and Filatotchev, 2010). IPO 
firms must adapt to a set of contractual relationships between insiders, pre-IPO investors, 
public market investors, stakeholders, and underwriters. The potential for significant agency 
costs is great (Arthurs, et al., 2008; Bell, et al., 2014). 
Although the research emphasizes the contractual relations amongst a variety of 
actors in the IPO process, that indispensable group of the employees has been left out of the 
picture. Contractual relations with labor are central to corporate matters (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), and labor relations become even more complex when employees organize 
(Chyz, et al., 2013; Xing, et al., 2017) because labor unions play agents to members when 
they use tactics such as collective bargaining, industrial action, and activism in order to 
advance employee claims for better wages, better hours, and better working conditions 
(Agrawal, 2012; Chen, et al., 2011b; Chyz, et al., 2013; Faleye, et al., 2006). 
Previous research into the impact of unionization on operating performance and 
corporate decision making exhibits researcher attention to the salient contractual complexities 
arising from unionization. For example, Doucouliagos and Laroche (2009) and Hirsch (2004) 
demonstrate that labor unions adversely affect corporate performance. And it has been shown 
that labor unions develop risk-averse attitudes (Faleye, et al., 2006) and cause managers to 
adopt more conservative policies (Farber, et al., 2012; Leung, et al., 2009) while constraining 
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their managerial decision-making power (Chyz, et al., 2013). Faleye, et al. (2006) consider 
labor unions under the aspect of risk-aversion to find that firms in which organized labor is 
present are more likely to prioritize projects with sufficient cash flows and low risk over 
potentially higher NPV projects. Unionized firms are, then, more likely to avoid certain types 
of investments, such as capital expenditures or R&D spending (Chen, et al., 2012; Faleye, et 
al., 2006), to delay future investments (Fallick and Hassett, 1999), and to suppress 
technological innovation (Bradley, et al., 2017). Overall, the research implies that 
unionization greatly diminishes firm value. 
On top of the effect which labor has on firm performance, voluminous research 
provides evidence for how unions affect strategic corporate financial decisions. Firms 
strengthen their bargaining positions against union demands through the following strategies: 
the reporting of higher losses (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991), debt issuance (Marciukaityte, 
2015; Matsa, 2010), the curbing of cash balances (Klasa, et al., 2009), the missing of 
analysts’ earnings estimates (Bova, 2013), the adoption of income-decreasing accounting 
methods (Bowen, et al., 1995), and the enablement of smoother earning paths (Hamm, et al., 
in press). Collectively, these strategies indicate management’s intention to shelter corporate 
income from unions and to mitigate the rent-seeking capabilities of unions. Robust academic 
evidence show how unions also curtail CEO compensation (Huang, et al., 2017) and affect 
bondholders’ wealth, as unionization increases a firm’s credit risk and bond yield spreads 
(Chen, et al., 2011b). Overall, the research points up two basic things: (1) the antithesis 
between the aims of labor, on the one hand, and the interests of principals and agents, on the 
other and (2) the likelihood of incremental agency costs in unionized contexts. 
4.2.2 Labor unions and company valuation 
The primary goal of any union is to increase its members’ welfare and benefits (Chen, et al., 
2011a). This goal sometimes takes the form of transferring economic rents from other 
economic agents. In extreme cases, the striving of unions may divert resources away from 
positive-sum activities into zero- and even negative-sum efforts to capture transfers (Tollison, 
2012). Unions’ capability to extract rents is reflected both in the union wage premium, in the 
U.S. historically 15% (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002), and in the reduction of shareholders’ and 
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other economic agents’ wealth.21 This rent-seeking behavior sparkled researchers’ interest, in 
the fields of industrial relations and finance, on how firms respond to unionization. 
Previous studies suggest that managers try to weaken union bargaining power. From 
the perspective of corporate finance, two strategies are pursued by managers, both of which 
are not mutually exclusive. In the first, managers increase or maintain high levels of 
information asymmetry (Cheng, 2017; Hilary, 2006) because disclosing financial information 
and earnings forecasts may lead to significantly higher wages and benefits for production 
employees (Kleiner and Bouillon, 1988). Management may exert discretion on R&D 
expenditures in order to smooth firm earnings (Hamm, et al., in press) or may adopt 
income-decreasing accounting methods for inventory valuation and asset depreciation 
(Matsa, 2010). In the second strategy, managers practice disclosure management and 
withhold good news from unions (Chung, et al., 2016) while offering a negative outlook to 
unions by reporting on analysts’ earnings estimates being missed (Bova, 2013). In a nutshell, 
management has incentives to maintain high levels of information asymmetry when 
employees are unionized, and this, in turn, increases financial reporting opacity and raises 
concerns about the precision of corporate fundamentals. 
In their investigation into the factors influencing investors’ (both retail and 
institutional) selection of IPO target firms, Field and Lowry (2009) highlight, inter alia, the 
central role of firm fundamentals on assessing firm value. Since the unionized context entails 
salient levels of information asymmetry and financial reporting opacity, investors are likely 
to assess unionized firms with greater dubitation and form less favorable expectations. 
Besides firm fundamentals, investors also factor future performance into their investment 
decisions (Borochin and Yang, 2017). Investors may well become skeptical when organized 
labor is present in a corporate context because unionization on firm negatively impacts 
profitability (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009), stock returns (Lee and Mas, 2012), dividend 
payouts (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991), and investment cash flows (Chen and Chen, 2013). 
For example, there is evidence for the fact that successful union elections are followed by a 
subsequent decline, by almost 10%, of stock market value (Lee and Mas, 2012) as well as 
dividend payout ratios (He, et al., 2016). Unionization has also been shown to induce greater 
spreads in newly originated loans (Qiu and Shen, 2017) and to sharpen volatility of 
21 Abowd (1989) finds that an increase in union rents is associated with a dollar-for-dollar trade-off with 
shareholder wealth, while Huang, et al. (2017) observe organized labor curbs CEO compensation by 9.2%. 
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investment cash flows (Chen and Chen, 2013). In light of such evidence, I posit that investors 
become skeptical and form a negative sentiment on a firm’s performance prospects when 
organized labor is present. 
4.2.3 Hypothesis 
Determining the value of an IPO firm is a vexing problem for investors because they have 
limited knowledge about the issuing firm. In order to assess firm value, investors rely heavily 
on the prospectus prepared by the new issuer (Bédard, et al., 2008). The salient levels of 
information asymmetry of unionized issuers are likely to affect the credibility of information 
and cause skepticism among investors. The incremental agency costs in unionized contexts 
may further sharpen investors’ skepticism about the issuing firm. Indeed, union presence may 
directly affect investors’ investment intensity because unions increase operating inflexibility 
and cost of capital (Chen, et al., 2011a, 2012; Faleye, et al., 2006), both of which are crucial 
factors in their investment decisions (i.e., Venture Capitalists) (Lerner and Tåg, 2013). I 
argue that investors anticipate agency costs and ex-ante uncertainty in order to price-protect 
themselves by mean of a larger discount on IPO firm value (Roosenboom and Schramade, 
2006). 
Against this background, I anticipate that investors will become more hesitant to 
allocate their funds to unionized firms because valuation is less favorable and sentiment 
against unionized issuers is negative. Following Santos (2017), and because of the lack of 
publicly available data on IPO allocations, I approximate investors’ sentiment using IPO 
underpricing. I have two reasons for doing so. First, “underpricing is perfectly correlated 
with the level of retail demand” (Santos, 2017; p. 253), thus representing a solid reflection of 
investors’ demand. Second, Baker and Wurgler (2006; p.1656) see grounds for the 
conclusion that “[t]he IPO market is often viewed as sensitive to sentiment, and high-first day 
returns on IPOs may also be a measure of investor enthusiasm”. Against this background, my 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H: Ceteris paribus, labor unionization is negatively associated with IPO underpricing. 
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4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Data 
I collect from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database a sample of IPOs floated on U.S. 
stock exchanges from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2014. In accordance with previous 
studies (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2002), I clean my sample for the following: IPOs with a 
share price of less than $5, ADRs, reverse LBOs, and limited partnerships. I also exclude 
corporate spinoffs because these are part of larger businesses and thus entail less uncertainty 
(Gounopoulos, et al., 2017). Although I retain financial companies in my sample, I eliminate 
those with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes ranging from 6723 to 6999, or in 
other words, closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), royalty trusts, and 
special purpose investment vehicles (Gounopoulos, et al., 2017). I further exclude foreign 
issuers (i.e., Lowry and Murphy, 2007) by using the historical business address registered in 
10-K filings (as previous studies, e.g., Marciukaityte, 2015).22 Next, I require that my sample 
firms be covered in both the Compustat database and the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database, from which databases I obtain, respectively, accounting and 
aftermarket data. This entire process has a yield of 2,401 IPOs. I then eliminate 833 issuers 
which do not disclose union-related expressions in their 10-K filings (see section 3.3.2 for a 
description) in order to avoid inclusion of firms arbitrarily defined as non-unionized. All 
these interventions generate a sample comprising 1,568 IPOs, of which 208 are unionized. 
4.3.2 Measuring labor unionization 
I operationalize a firm-level unionization measure because this entails lower measurement 
error (Cheng, 2017). I sensitivity-test for alternative definitions (see section 4.6.1). I rely on 
Item 1 (Business) of 10-K company filings to determine whether employees are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. First, I download 10-K filings from the Securities Exchange 
Commission FTP server. Second, I develop a PERL Script, as Cheng (2017), which allows 
me to parse sentences related to union coverage. I employ a battery of keyword combinations 
in my code such as bargaining agreement(s), bargaining unit(s), collective agreement(s), 
collective bargain(ing), labo(u)r agreement(s), labo(u)r organization(s), labo(u)r union(s), 
organized labo(u)r, organiz(s)ed employee(s)/staff/personnel/workforce, work council(s), 
22 I obtain each firm’s historical business address through 10-K filings, as databases tend to backfill business 
addresses (Marciukaityte, 2015). I download company filings, as available through the Securities Exchange 
Commission FTP server, and develop a PERL script that parses state code, state name, city, and zip code. 
100 
                                                 
The impact of labor unionization on underpricing of U.S. IPOs 
trade union(s), trade-union(s), union(’s) activity(ies), union(’s) agreement(s), union 
contract(s); union organization(s), unioniz(s)ed, and union(s), much as Cheng (2017). Third, I 
manually verify and identify observations of firms disclosing that employees are covered 
under collective bargaining agreements (D_UNION) and, for a control group, observations of 
firms that unequivocally report no union representation. 
4.3.3 Research methods 
In order to determine the effect of unionization on IPO pricing I use a treatment effects 
model, where the dependent variable is 1 plus the natural logarithm of the first-day return 
(estimated as the difference between the first aftermarket price and the IPO offer price 
divided by the IPO offer price): 
Ln(1 + Underpircing) = α + βX + γD_UNION + ε  (1) 
, where X represents a vector of firm- and IPO-specific characteristics, as described in 
section 4.3.3.2; D_UNION is a dichotomous variable which signifies that company 
employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement; and ε stands for the error term. 
Initially, I conduct my analysis employing a multivariate OLS regression setting, but I 
cannot eliminate the possibility that this method will generate unbiased coefficients because 
the coefficient γ of my main independent variable may be influenced by feedback effects 
and/or be correlated with the error term. Arguably, endogeneity issues could affect the sign, 
magnitude, or statistical significance of my results because unions may self-select to organize 
in firms. Unobservable determinants of unionization may influence pricing. In my attempt to 
mitigate the concern that labor unions have been endogenously formed in firms (self-
selection), I employ a two-stage treatment effects model as developed by Heckman (1979). 
The functional form of the first-stage regression is as follows: 
D_UNION∗ = ωZ + η (2) 
, where D_UNION = �1, if D_UNION
∗ > 0
0, if D_UNION∗ ≤ 0
  
In equation (2), 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛∗ is a latent variable; Z represents a vector of determinants of 
D_UNION (see section 4.3.3.1 for description); and η stands for the error term. As 
determinants of unionization may influence pricing, these determinants enter into equations 
(1) and (2), respectively, as ε and η, while any correlation between the two error terms is 
affirmative of the existence of endogenous selection. I rewrite equations (1) and (2) to correct 
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for self-selection bias, and the models for unionized IPOs and non-unionized IPOs, 
respectively, take the forms (3) and (4): 






E[Ln(1 + Underpircing)|D_UNION = 0] = β′X + ρσε
−𝜑�𝜔′𝛧�
1−𝛷(𝜔′𝛧)
  (4) 
Subtracting equation (4) from (3), I derive the expected impact of unionization on IPO 
underpricing: 






, where 𝛷 and 𝜑 stand, respectively, for the cumulative and density distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. Now equation (5) reflects the effect of 
unionization on underpricing, under the coefficient γ which corresponds to the OLS estimate 
of equation (1). I am now in position to control for the likelihood of unions self-selecting to 
form in firms by including the Inverse Mills Ratio (λ), which is omitted from equation (1). 




 if D_UNION=1 and λ = φ�ω
′Ζ�
1−Φ(ω′Ζ)
 if D_UNION=0 (6) 
I apply further stress to my inferences by employing a maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE) approach and a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach. Under the MLE 
approach, I strengthen my inferences regarding the bivariate normality of the error terms ε 
and η, similarly to Gounopoulos, et al. (2017). The advantage of MLE resides in its ability to 
process simultaneously all available information, while equipping me with a Wald test for the 
independence of residuals. Conversely, the IV approach relaxes the assumptions of normality 
in the distribution of residuals. Specifically, the IV approach instruments for D_UNION in 
equation (1) via ω (Wooldridge, 2002) and treats the endogenous variable in the second stage 
as the fitted probabilities obtained from the first-stage, where the endogenous variable is 
regressed against all available instruments constitute vector 𝑍. Crucial to my analysis is the 
fact that these properties allow for flexibility in the selection of explanatory variables. 
Finally, applying the IV approach equips me with the ability to conduct a Hausman test for 
endogeneity. 
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4.3.3.1 Determinants of unionization 
Based on my previous discussion, the first-stage of my econometric models depends on the 
probability of a firm becoming unionized. Drawing upon previous studies, I model this 
probability as a function of unionized firms being likely to differ from non-unionized in terms 
of the following variables: size and cash reserves (Klasa, et al., 2009), inventory levels 
(Matsa, 2010), debt issuance (Marciukaityte, 2015; Matsa, 2010), profitability (Lee and Mas, 
2012), tangible and intangible assets (Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Faleye, et al., 2006), and 
age (Hirsch, 2004). In my first-stage model, I account for size, measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets (LAT); for total cash and investment securities over total assets 
(CASH); for inventories over total assets (INVENTORY); for return on assets (ROA); for 
TANGIBILITY of the firm, expressed as net property, plant and equipment over total assets; 
for the ratio of total liabilities over total assets (LEV); and for the natural logarithm of the 
number of years elapsed since the firm’s foundation at the time of the year of IPO (AGE). In 
my second-stage model, I maintain, as well, the variables LEV and AGE because previous 
studies indicate that these are important determinants of IPO underpricing (i.e., Carter, et al., 
1998; Gounopoulos, et al., 2017; Ritter, 1984, 1991). 
With the intent of satisfying the exclusion restriction, I follow Chino (2016) and use 
data from the NBER CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups File 
(http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/) in order to instrument D_UNION with the natural 
logarithm of the fraction of part-time workers in each industry (PTWORK).23 While it is 
unlikely that PTWORK affects underpricing, it does stand in inverse relation to unionization. 
Part-time employees, as compared to full-time employees, have fewer incentives to join 
unions because part-time employees work fewer hours and have shorter tenure at a workplace 
(see Hernández, 1995). 
4.3.3.2 Determinants of IPO underpricing 
I rely on the relevant literature and include as control variables in my second-stage 
regressions those key indicators (see Appendix A for variable definitions) which have been 
shown to account for much of the variability in underpricing. I operationalize firm size with 
23 The NBER CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups File data are available in Census Industry Classification 
(CIC) codes. I follow the methodology described in Chino (2016) and transform each firm’s primary CIC into 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, using a crosswalk list available through the U.S. Census Bureau 
(https://www.census.gov/people/io/methodology/). 
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the natural logarithm of the total amount of proceeds raised in the IPO (LNPROCEEDS) 
(Gounopoulos, et al., 2017), thus anticipating an inverse relation with underpricing on 
grounds that smaller offerings tend to be more speculative than larger ones (Beatty and Ritter, 
1986). 
FIRM_AGE enters in the model as a surrogate for risk (Carter, et al., 1998; Ritter, 
1984, 1991). Investors view older firms as safer investments because normally, older firms 
are resilient during market swings. Here I expect a negative coefficient. Intrigued by the 
riskier and harder to value nature of IPOs floated on NASDAQ (Lowry and Shu, 2002), I 
include an indicator variable for NASDAQ listings while I also control for excessive first-day 
returns related to INTERNET and TECHNOLOGY firms (e.g., Aggarwal, et al., 2002). 
VC represents a binary variable set to 1 for venture-capital backed IPOs and to 0 
otherwise. I do not form any strong expectation about the sign of this variable because of 
contradictory evidence in previous literature (see Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Loughran 
and Ritter (2004)). I augment the model with measures for underwriting (UNDERWRITER) 
and audit quality (BIG4), where UNDERWRITER and BIG4, respectively, indicate highest 
prestige ranking and Big-4 audit firm. Reputable underwriters act as positive signals for 
market participants because their engagement is associated with potential abnormal first-day 
returns (Carter and Manaster, 1990). In line with Beatty (1989), I argue that engagement of 
reputable audit firms increases the quality and the credibility of financial statements, and thus 
may reduce the money to be left on the table. 
I use the ratio of retained shares to issued shares (OVERHANG) (Bradley and Jordan, 
2002) in order to capture the equity dilution caused by the issuance. Lowry and Murphy 
(2007) show that greater levels of overhang escalate initial returns because the costs of 
underpricing are shared proportionately among investors, who retain ownership after the firm 
goes public. Because underpricing and dilution costs can be higher for firm owners 
liquidating their shares on the immediate IPO date (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001), I include an 
indicator signaling for the offering being exclusively primary (PRIMARY). 
I further control for the ratio of total liabilities over total assets (LEV) and include an 
indicator for positive earnings per share (DEPS), both measured during the period trailing the 
IPO (Gounopoulos, et al., 2017). High levels of debt financing can impose discipline on 
management (Jensen, 1986), whereas the existence of positive accounting returns alleviates 
uncertainty. I anticipate that both measures will have a negative loading with my dependent 
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variable. I also account for periods of turbulence. I control for the 2007-2008 period 
(CRUNCH), when financial markets faced turbulence from the subprime mortgage crisis, and 
the overheated period of 1999-2000 (DOTCOM) (described thoroughly in Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm Jr, 2003). Throughout my analysis, I control for industry and year fixed effects 
because potential IPO clustering could undermine the reliability of my findings (e.g., Cao and 
Shi, 2006). 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Univariate analysis and IPO characteristics 
Table 1 summarizes all relevant statistics as well as the composition of the entire sample of 
unionized and non-unionized IPOs. Panel A depicts the dispersion of IPOs across time, and 
Panel B the sample composition according to the divisions of the SIC code and firm-specific 
characteristics. Fluctuations in the number of IPOs reveal three peaks, namely before the 
“Dot.com” period (1997-2000), before the recent credit crunch (2007-2008), and during the 
2013-2014 period. Despite intensive listing activity during the pre-“Dot.com” period, which 
reached highest levels in March 2000 (Aggarwal, et al., 2002), the relative number of 
unionized IPOs is lower than non-unionized IPOs (especially for the years 1999 and 2000). 
One explanation for this is the “Internet craze” of 1999-2000 (Cao and Shi, 2006) and the 
relatively underrepresented figures of internet and technology IPOs in the unionized sample 
(lower part of Panel B in Table 1). The post-“Dot.com” period, including the burst bubble in 
early 2001, saw until 2003 an overall reduction of IPO figures, followed by an upward trend 
until the credit crunch of 2007-2008. There was only one unionized IPO during 2008, but the 
number of unionized IPOs gradually rises in subsequent years and until the end of my sample 
period. 
The right side of Panel A (Table 1) shows yearly fluctuations in two core SIC 
divisions which together account for more than half of the sample of unionized IPOs. This 
fact is clearly illustrated in Panel B (Table 1), where the majority of unionized IPOs belong to 
the divisions Manufacturing (44.23%) and Services (17.79%), while their non-unionized 
counterparts mainly operate in financial sectors (where white-collar employees predominate). 
Such findings reflect the trends in unionization across industries (e.g., Division of Labor 
Force Statistics, 2015). 
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Table 1 Summary statistics - sample distribution across time and IPO specific information 
Panel A: Distribution across time of unionized and non-unionized IPOs 




Unionized IPOs - 
Services 
 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1997 140 8.93 118 8.68 22 10.58 10 10.87 4 10.81 
1998 98 6.25 78 5.74 20 9.62 9 9.78 3 8.11 
1999 202 12.88 195 14.34 7 3.37 1 1.09 3 8.11 
2000 183 11.67 174 12.79 9 4.33 4 4.35 1 2.70 
2001 47 3.00 37 2.72 10 4.81 5 5.43 0 0.00 
2002 38 2.42 28 2.06 10 4.81 3 3.26 3 8.11 
2003 37 2.36 32 2.35 5 2.40 2 2.17 0 0.00 
2004 103 6.57 87 6.40 16 7.69 7 7.61 2 5.41 
2005 95 6.06 71 5.22 24 11.54 11 11.96 4 10.81 
2006 101 6.44 82 6.03 19 9.13 14 15.22 3 8.11 
2007 74 4.72 67 4.93 7 3.37 4 4.35 2 5.41 
2008 6 0.38 5 0.37 1 0.48 1 1.09 0 0.00 
2009 23 1.47 21 1.54 2 0.96 0 0.00 2 5.41 
2010 65 4.15 58 4.26 7 3.37 5 5.43 0 0.00 
2011 56 3.57 47 3.46 9 4.33 1 1.09 3 8.11 
2012 69 4.40 62 4.56 7 3.37 4 4.35 1 2.70 
2013 98 6.25 82 6.03 16 7.69 4 4.35 4 10.81 
2014 133 8.48 116 8.53 17 8.17 7 7.61 2 5.41 
Total 1,568 100.00 1,360 100.00 208 100.00 92 100.00 37 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of unionized and non-unionized IPOs as per SIC division and company specific 
information 
      Entire sample (N = 1,568) 
Unionized 
IPOs 
(N = 208) 
Non-Unionized 
IPOs 
(N = 1,360) 
SIC division No. % No. % No. % 
Agric., Forestry and Fishing (2-digit SIC 01-
09) 2 0.13 0 0.00 2 0.15 
Mining (2-digit SIC 10-14) 51 3.25 6 2.88 45 3.31 
Construction (2-digit SIC 15-17) 15 0.96 4 1.92 11 0.81 
Manufacturing (2-digit SIC 20-39) 542 34.57 92 44.23 450 33.09 
Transp., Commun. & Utilities (2-digit SIC 40-
49) 117 7.46 36 17.31 81 5.96 
Wholesale trade (2-digit SIC 50-51) 30 1.91 14 6.73 16 1.18 
Retail trade (2-digit SIC 52-59) 110 7.02 12 5.77 98 7.21 
Finance, Insur. & Real Est. (2-digit SIC 60-67) 144 9.18 7 3.37 137 10.07 
Services (2-digit SIC 70-89) 556 35.46 37 17.79 519 38.16 
Public Administration (2-digit SIC 91-99) 1 0.06 0 0.00 1      
          Company specifics No. % No. % No. % 
Internet IPOs 154 9.82 1 0.48 153 11.25 
Technology IPOs 599 38.20 15 7.21 584 42.94 
VC Backed IPOs 750 47.83 10 4.81 740 54.41 
NASDAQ IPOs 1,107 70.60 67 32.21 1,040 76.47 
 
Table 2 shows selected characteristics of unionized IPOs distinguished into IPOs with 
high percentages (Panel A) and low percentages (Panel B) of unionized employees. The vast 
majority of these unionized IPOs operates in the manufacturing sector, just under half having 
a century of operational experience. In addition, the majority of unionized IPOs exhibit lower 
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first-day returns, when compared to the annual averages24, which phenomenon is more 
prominent for the highly unionized IPOs (Panel A) than for low unionized IPOs (Panel B). 
Table 2 Selected characteristics of unionized IPOs distinguished into IPOs with high percentages (Panel 
A) and low percentages (Panel B) of unionized employees. 
Panel A: Top-15 unionized IPOs 
IPO 











07/14/2005 Orchids Paper Products Co Manufacturing 84.85% 30 6.25% 10.10% 
11/20/2006 Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Manufacturing 81.00% 56 11.54% 11.60% 
09/08/2007 Horsehead Holding Corp Manufacturing 79.00% 159 3.33% 14.50% 
05/26/2004 Republic Airways Holdings Inc 
Transp., Commun. & 
Utilities 78.13% 8 5.92% 12.30% 
05/16/2005 Xerium Technologies Inc Manufacturing 76.81% 105 0.00% 10.10% 
09/03/1998 Ladish Co Inc Manufacturing 76.55% 11 5.56% 21.40% 
08/01/2004 K-Sea Transp Partners LP Transp., Commun. & Utilities 76.00% 45 15.28% 12.30% 
10/14/2010 Tower International Inc Manufacturing 70.51% 18 0.00% 9.40% 
04/17/2002 ExpressJet Holdings Inc Transp., Commun. & Utilities 70.00% 6 0.00% 8.70% 
05/13/2010 Noranda Aluminum Holding Corp Manufacturing 70.00% 88 10.00% 9.40% 
06/04/2006 Sealy Corp Manufacturing 68.00% 125 9.38% 11.60% 
09/26/2005 Horizon Lines Inc Transp., Commun. & Utilities 67.73% 49 7.50% 10.10% 
01/31/2006 Koppers Holdings Inc Manufacturing 67.00% 94 12.50% 11.60% 
07/21/2004 Dex Media Inc Manufacturing 67.00% 100 2.63% 12.30% 
11/20/1997 Dan River Inc Manufacturing 66.04% 115 15.00% 13.80% 
Panel B: Bottom-15 unionized IPOs 
09/06/1998 School Specialty Inc Wholesale trade 2.05% 38 2.42% 21.40% 
12/18/2013 AMC Entertainment Holdings Services 2.00% 93 5.00% 21.00% 
09/24/2014 Smart & Final Stores Inc Retail trade 1.84% 143 0.08% 14.30% 
10/08/2005 CF Industries Holdings Inc Manufacturing 1.73% 59 1.25% 10.10% 
11/04/2012 MRC Global Inc Wholesale trade 1.67% 31 0.19% 18.10% 
06/14/2010 CBOE Holdings Inc Finance, Insur. & Real Est. 1.38% 37 12.03% 9.40% 
09/5/2007 AECOM Technology Corp Services 1.03% 27 5.50% 14.50% 
02/13/2014 Installed Building Products Construction 1.00% 37 16.36% 14.30% 
06/27/2013 HD Supply Holdings Inc Wholesale trade 1.00% 80 3.67% 21.00% 
09/22/2004 Beacon Roofing Supply Inc Wholesale trade 0.83% 76 23.00% 12.30% 
04/06/2002 Veridian Corp Manufacturing 0.79% 54 13.44% 8.70% 
10/20/2005 NCI Inc Services 0.64% 16 15.90% 10.10% 
03/02/2005 American Reprographics Co Services 0.53% 45 6.15% 10.10% 
11/06/1997 Polo Ralph Lauren Corp Manufacturing 0.52% 29 21.15% 13.80% 
07/11/2002 WellChoice Inc Finance, Insur. & Real Est. 0.44% 68 8.80% 8.70% 
Note: The Annual average of first-day returns obtained through Jay Ritter's website 
(http://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/). 
 
24 The Annual average of first-day returns obtained through Jay Ritter's website 
(http://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/). 
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for each subsample (Panel A) as well as for the 
entire sample. Univariate analysis lends support to my hypothesis. First, unionized IPOs 
exhibit inferior first-day returns than non-unionized IPOs because the mean (median) value of 
FIRST-DAY RET is, respectively, 13.594 (7.5) and 38.671 (16.855). The difference in means 
is statistically significant at 1%. Second, subsamples differ in the pattern of price revisions 
because unionized IPOs are, on average, associated with downward revisions, significant at 
the 5% level. As I have adhered the prediction made in Jain and Kini (1999) that modest offer 
price signals little demand, little value, or both, Table 3 showing a modest offer price for 
unionized IPOs supports my inference that investor demand would be lower. 
The IPO characteristics in Panel A lead me to the observation that unionized IPOs are 
considerably larger. An average of $372 million in proceeds are raised, in contrast to $114 
million for their non-unionized counterparts. The average unionized IPO is almost 28 years 
older and operates with higher levels of leverage than its average counterpart. My findings 
contribute to evidence from previous research that unionization is more pronounced in older 
firms (Hirsch, 2004) and also that firms facing union bargaining positions strategically amass 
more debt (Matsa, 2010). When I compare the quality image of the two groups, I find that 
unionized IPOs are more likely to engage big-4 auditors and top-ranked underwriters but less 
likely to rely on venture capital financing. When I consider internet firms or member firms of 
the broader technology sector, I notice significant differences of up to 1% between the 
subgroups, which I interpret as a partial explanation for why unionized IPOs are absent from 
NASDAQ, technology issuers' favorite listing platform. During an IPO, retained equity 
signals post-issue performance and future prospects of a firm (Engelen, et al., 2013). The 
percentage of retained ownership (OVERHANG) is significantly lower, at 10%, for unionized 
IPOs and thus may partially explain investors’ reluctance to participate in unionized IPOs as 
well as the concomitant lower demand. Ultimately, the Pearson pairwise correlations of 
variables used in my tests (see Table 4) indicate that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an 
influence on my results. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of unionized and non-unionized IPOs 
Variable 
Entire sample 
(N = 1,568) 
Unionized IPOs 
(N = 208) 
Non-Unionized IPOs 
(N = 1,360) Mean  
diff. 
25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 
FIRST-DAY RET (%) 3.53 35.344 15 37.38 58.594 0.865 13.594 7.5 15.59 22.643 4.62 38.671 16.855 42.22 61.621 25.077*** 
REVISIONS -0.059 0.019 0.024 0.1 0.136 -0.071 -0.006 0 0.067 0.119 -0.059 0.023 0.031 0.105 0.138 0.029** 
D_UNION 0 0.133 0 0 0.339 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
PROCEEDS (mil $) 41.42 148.57 76.935 136.5 460.499 79.66 372.08 160.395 370 1170.92 40 114.38 72 120 163.899 -257.697*** 
FIRM_AGE 5 18.7 9 19 25.781 10 43.75 31 73.5 40.08 5 14.869 8 15 20.273 -28.881*** 
NASDAQ 0 0.706 1 1 0.456 0 0.322 0 1 0.468 1 0.765 1 1 0.424 0.443*** 
INTERNET 0 0.098 0 0 0.298 0 0.005 0 0 0.069 0 0.113 0 0 0.316 0.108*** 
TECHNOLOGY 0 0.382 0 1 0.486 0 0.072 0 0 0.259 0 0.429 0 1 0.495 0.357*** 
VC 0 0.478 0 1 0.5 0 0.048 0 0 0.214 0 0.544 1 1 0.498 0.496*** 
UNDERWRITER 0 0.508 1 1 0.5 0 0.688 1 1 0.465 0 0.48 0 1 0.5 -0.207*** 
BIG4 1 0.786 1 1 0.41 1 0.846 1 1 0.362 1 0.777 1 1 0.416 -0.069* 
OVERHANG 1.9 5.385 3.005 4.79 10 1.4 3.843 2.445 4.185 6.385 1.98 5.62 3.07 4.92 10.425 1.778* 
PRIMARY 0 0.666 1 1 0.472 0 0.615 1 1 0.488 0 0.674 1 1 0.469 0.059 
DOTCOM 0 0.246 0 0 0.431 0 0.077 0 0 0.267 0 0.271 0 1 0.445 0.194*** 
CRUNCH 0 0.051 0 0 0.22 0 0.038 0 0 0.193 0 0.053 0 0 0.224 0.014 
LEV 0.101 0.561 0.424 0.793 0.672 0.361 0.588 0.585 0.794 0.328 0.082 0.557 0.377 0.793 0.71 -0.031 
DEPS 0 0.327 0 1 0.469 0 0.495 0 1 0.501 0 0.301 0 1 0.459 -0.194*** 
Splits the sample into unionized and non-unionized groups, based on D_UNION variable at firm-level. The last column compares the differences in mean values of each 
variable across groups and statistical significance of differences reported are based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for dummy variables. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. 
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. 
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Table 4 Pearson correlation matrix (N = 1,568). 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. D_UNION 1.00              
2. LNPROCEEDS 0.26*** 1.00             
3. AGE 0.30*** 0.24*** 1.00            
4. NASDAQ -0.33*** -0.39*** -0.20*** 1.00           
5. INTERNET -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.21*** 0.10*** 1.00          
6. TECHNOLOGY -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.21*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 1.00         
7. VC -0.34*** -0.24*** -0.31*** 0.33*** 0.17*** 0.36*** 1.00        
8. UNDERWRITER 0.14*** 0.41*** 0.05* -0.27*** 0.01 0.03 0.02 1.00       
9. BIG4 0.06** 0.21*** 0.04* -0.07*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.21*** 1.00      
10. OVERHANG -0.06** -0.26*** -0.07*** 0.04* 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.03 1.00     
11. PRIMARY -0.04* -0.25*** -0.23*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.02 0.13*** -0.11*** -0.05* 0.08*** 1.00    
12. LEV 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04* -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 1.00   
13. DEPS 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.28*** -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.31*** 0.04 0.03 -0.09*** -0.29*** -0.08*** 1.00  
14. DOTCOM -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.25*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.26*** -0.05** 0.02 0.25*** 0.23*** -0.06** -0.20*** 1.00 
15. CRUNCH -0.02 0.11*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.06** -0.09*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.13*** 
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to second decimal place.  
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4.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 5 reports my empirical findings for the effect of unionization on underpricing. I 
tabulate the resulting coefficients of all estimation methods as follows; the OLS regression in 
column 1, the Heckman two-stage procedure in column 2, the MLE two-equation treatment 
model in column 3, and the instrumental variables method in column 4. I include OLS 
estimates in order to facilitate benchmarking. My results show that, across all estimation 
methods, unionization strongly reduces first-day returns. The D_UNION coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, and the coefficient magnitudes are consistent with one another 
and sharply contrast with the OLS benchmark. Multicollinearity (VIF=1.29) is unlikely to be 
an influence on my results. Overall, the results support my hypothesis. 
As to the remaining control variables, my results are generally consistent with 
previous research, except for my prediction on the relation between underpricing and 
LNPROCEEDS. Although I have anticipated here a negative coefficient, a few previous 
studies do argue and empirically demonstrate a positive coefficient (see Daily, et al., 2003).25 
INTERNET and TECHNOLOGY IPOs (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr, 2003) also cause 
underpricing to rise, as does the engagement of reputable underwriters and venture capital 
financing (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). The positive and statistically 
significant OVERHANG coefficient corroborates Bradley and Jordan (2002) because lower 
dilution costs (meaning greater overhang) results in escalated immediate aftermarket 
performance. The positive and highly significant coefficient DOTCOM verifies the excessive 
funds that were left on the table during the 1999-2000 period, but the credit crunch period 
2007-2008 does not affect underpricing. 
I examine my concern for the endogenous nature of unionization for each estimation 
method separately. First, the high statistical significance of 1% for the inverse Mills ratio 
supports the idea that unions self-select in companies. Second, the Wald test of the MLE 
shows how the error terms correlate significantly at 1% between the outcome equation and 
the selection equation. Third, the Hausman test from the instrumental variables framework 
indicates feedback effects of 1%. All in all, I am unable to reject the hypothesis of no 
endogeneity. 
25 The positive coefficient LNPROCEEDS corroborates to the meta-analyses of Daily, et al. (2003), as authors 
evidence a positive and significant relationship between underpricing and gross proceeds. 
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Table 5 The impact of unionization on IPO underpricing (Dependent variable = LNUNDERPRICING). 
Variables Exp Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS Heckman MLE IV 
D_UNION - -0.369*** -1.270*** -1.363*** -2.452*** 
  
(-2.64) (-3.67) (-4.47) (-4.05) 
LNPROCEEDS - 0.155*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.240*** 
  
(3.16) (3.68) (3.58) (4.27) 
AGE - -0.016 0.044 0.051 0.103* 
  
(-0.35) (0.93) (1.06) (1.86) 
NASDAQ + 0.109 0.009 -0.002 -0.119 
  
(1.18) (0.09) (-0.02) (-0.99) 
INTERNET + 0.231* 0.231* 0.237* 0.224* 
  
(1.74) (1.78) (1.84) (1.72) 
TECHNOLOGY + 0.499*** 0.447*** 0.438*** 0.346** 
  
(3.45) (3.48) (3.07) (2.21) 
VC ? 0.475*** 0.388*** 0.376*** 0.265** 
  
(4.89) (4.04) (3.71) (2.40) 
UNDERWRITER + 0.350*** 0.390*** 0.394*** 0.401*** 
  
(4.07) (4.66) (4.64) (4.51) 
BIG4 - -0.098 -0.057 -0.054 -0.049 
  
(-0.97) (-0.62) (-0.54) (-0.47) 
OVERHANG + 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  
(4.16) (3.80) (4.16) (4.23) 
PRIMARY + -0.155* -0.122 -0.121 -0.089 
  
(-1.90) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.00) 
LEV - -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -0.028 
  
(-0.12) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.50) 
DEPS - -0.065 -0.073 -0.072 -0.112 
  
(-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-1.22) 
DOTCOM + 0.578*** 0.598*** 0.602*** 0.501*** 
  
(3.29) (3.66) (3.54) (2.74) 
CRUNCH ? 0.478 0.401 0.427 0.163 
  
(0.93) (0.72) (0.81) (0.22) 
(intercept)  0.474 0.312 0.267 0.197 
  
(1.50) (0.23) (0.84) (0.58) 
Inverse Mills ratio 
  
0.567***   
   
(2.80)      
     Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Included Included R2 (OLS)  0.298    Adj. R2 (OLS)  0.254    Mean VIF  1.290    Wald test    10.243***  Hausman test     14.723*** Observations  1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
Note: Four estimation procedures are used: Ordinary least-squares (Column 1), Heckman two-stage (Column 
2), Maximum likelihood estimation (Column 3) and generated IV approach (Column 4). The first-stage results 
are reported in the Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics (column 1) and 
z-statistics (columns 2 to 4) presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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4.5 A closer look at the causes of less underpricing in unionized IPOs 
In this section I discuss on potential causes of the significant negative relation between 
unionization and IPO underpricing. According to my hypothesis development, this negative 
relation stems from the modest demand for and less favorable assessment of the issuing firm 
by investors. I examine IPO pricing during the bookbuilding process (section 4.5.1) and the 
aftermarket volatility (section 4.5.2). I extend my results to include the effect of unionization 
on first-day returns by using an exogenous variation in the strength of labor unions (section 
4.5.3). 
4.5.1 Unionization and IPO pricing 
Modest demand by investors may affect not only initial performance but also IPO pricing 
during the bookbuilding period because prices reflect the ex-post level of investors’ demand 
(Santos, 2017). Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) predict that when salient agency costs 
and ex-ante uncertainty are present, investors will price-protect themselves by means of a 
larger discount on IPO firm value. I anticipate that investors will lower their bidding prices 
when it comes to unionized issuers and that this, in turn, will suppress the average limit price 
of IPO during the bookbuilding process. I also anticipate that such attitudes will affect the 
offer price of IPO because underwriters set a more conservative price when the average limit 
price is low (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003). In short, I posit that investors’ reluctance to 
participate in unionized IPOs, as expressed through modest bidding for IPO, will drive offer 
price downwards. 
I take a further step beyond the negative offer price revisions in unionized IPOs (see 
Table 3) and conduct multivariate analyses of the effect of unionization on price revisions. 
Following the relevant studies, I operationalize bookbuilding turbulence in terms of the offer 
price deviation from the midpoint of the initial filing price range (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001, 2003; Hanley, 1993). I 
maintain the same covariates as in my main regressions because the pricing for bookbuilding 
participants and aftermarket investors is driven by the same factors (Lowry and Schwert, 
2004). 
Table 6 reports the coefficients of all estimation methods as follows: the Heckman 
two-stage procedure in column 1, the MLE two-equation treatment model in column 2, and 
the instrumental variables method in column 3. My results indicate a downward price 
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adjustment for unionized IPOs because D_UNION attains a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient at 1% across all estimation methods. This negative effect lends support 
to my inference that unionization is associated with the modest demand for and less favorable 
assessment of the issuing firm by investors. Ultimately, the offer price is pushed downwards. 
Table 6 The impact of unionization on offer price revisions (Dependent variable = LNREVISIONS). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) Heckman MLE IV 
D_UNION -0.116*** -0.168*** -0.271*** 
 
(-3.56) (-9.47) (-4.24) 
LNPROCEEDS 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 
 
(9.47) (9.23) (8.55) 
AGE -0.007 -0.003 0.001 
 
(-1.51) (-0.77) (0.21) 
NASDAQ -0.007 -0.013 -0.024** 
 
(-0.78) (-1.42) (-2.00) 
INTERNET 0.014 0.015 0.013 
 
(1.11) (1.29) (1.08) 
TECHNOLOGY 0.005 0.004 -0.008 
 
(0.40) (0.30) (-0.59) 
VC 0.009 0.003 -0.007 
 
(0.96) (0.27) (-0.68) 
UNDERWRITER 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 
(2.60) (2.80) (2.58) 
BIG4 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(-0.74) (-0.55) (-0.52) 
OVERHANG 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 
(4.09) (4.05) (3.95) 
PRIMARY -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 
 
(-1.30) (-1.17) (-0.66) 
LEV -0.011** -0.011* -0.013** 
 
(-2.07) (-1.77) (-2.14) 
DEPS -0.017** -0.017** -0.022** 
 
(-2.15) (-2.03) (-2.36) 
DOTCOM 0.016 0.019 0.004 
 
(1.03) (1.29) (0.25) 
CRUNCH -0.063 -0.059 -0.093 
 
(-1.20) (-1.26) (-1.29) 
(intercept) 0.030 0.008 0.014 
 
(0.23) (0.29) (0.43) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.062***   
 
(3.28)      
   Industry & Year Effects Included Included Included 
Wald test   54.224***  Hausman test   24.979*** Observations 1,568 1,568 1,568 
Note: Three estimation procedures are used: Heckman two-stage (Column 1), Maximum likelihood estimation 
(Column 1) and generated IV approach (Column 3). The first-stage results are similar to those reported in 
Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with 
asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers 
are rounded up to third decimal place. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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4.5.2 Unionization and aftermarket volatility 
I inquire whether unionization influences subsequent returns in the same manner as it does 
initial stock market performance. If true, stock returns of unionized IPOs would be less 
volatile because of the modest demand for and less favorable assessment of the issuing firm 
by investors. I operationalize aftermarket volatility with the standard deviation of daily 
returns (Ritter, 1984) over three distinct time intervals after the IPO date, namely 60 days, 
120 days, and 365 days. Since IPO stocks tend to be volatile immediately after the IPO date, I 
omit from my calculations the first 7 trading days (similarly to Gounopoulos, et al., 2017). 
Table 7 Volatility profile of unionized and non-unionized IPOs. 
Panel A: Summary statistics and univariate analysis - full sample 
Variable Unionized IPOs (N = 208) Non-Unionized IPOs (N = 1,360) Mean diff. Mean Min Max StDev Mean Min Max StDev 
Volatility (60 days) 0.028 0.01 0.111 0.015 0.047 0.004 0.19 0.028 0.019*** 
Volatility (120 days) 0.029 0.009 0.089 0.014 0.047 0.006 0.146 0.026 0.019*** 
Volatility (365 days) 0.03 0.011 0.096 0.014 0.049 0.007 0.169 0.025 0.018*** 
Panel B: Summary statistics and univariate analysis - propensity score matched sample 
Variable Unionized IPOs (N = 201) Non-Unionized IPOs (N = 201) Mean diff. Mean Min Max StDev Mean Min Max StDev 
Volatility (60 days) 0.028 0.01 0.111 0.015 0.037 0.005 0.133 0.019 0.009*** 
Volatility (120 days) 0.029 0.009 0.089 0.013 0.038 0.007 0.129 0.019 0.009*** 
Volatility (365 days) 0.03 0.011 0.096 0.014 0.039 0.011 0.1 0.017 0.009*** 
Splits the sample into unionized and non-unionized groups, based on D_UNION variable at firm-level. The last 
column compares the differences in mean values across groups and statistical significance of differences 
reported are based on t-tests. 
Note: The symbol *** indicates significance at the 1 % level (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third 
decimal place. 
 
Panel A of Table 7 compares, for each subsample, the mean, minimum, maximum, 
and standard deviation of aftermarket volatility. Across all distinct time intervals, the mean 
volatility of unionized issuers is significantly lower at 1% than their non-unionized 
counterparts. It is important to note that the mean volatility of the former sample (2.8%) is 
40% lower than that of the latter sample (4.7%), which effect persists over time, unionized 
IPOs being approximately 38% less volatile after 120, as after 365 days. 
Arguing that additional factors such as firm size, issue time, and industry affiliation 
may influence aftermarket volatility, An and Chan (2008) propose that comparisons be 
conducted under a propensity score matched (PSM) design. I repeat comparisons using a 
nearest-neighbor matching approach (see Section 4.6.2 for description of the matching 
process) because conducting comparisons between treatment (unionized) and control (non-
unionized) units which share so many characteristics are less likely to be affected by 
self-selection (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Panel B of Table 7, consisting of 201 matching 
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pairs, reports summary statistics for the aftermarket volatility of the PSM sample. 
Aftermarket volatility remains lower for unionized IPOs and the difference in means is 
statistically significant at 1% throughout all time intervals. I interpret my results to mean that 
initial investor assessment of the issuing firm is realized in the long run and that less discord 
in the value of unionized IPOs obtains. 
4.5.3 Incremental union power and IPO underpricing 
I use an exogenous variation in the strength of labor unions, namely whether Right-to-Work 
legislation has been enacted at the state level (Chino, 2016; Marciukaityte, 2015; Qiu and 
Shen, 2017) in order to provide a fuller picture of the effect which unionization has on IPO 
underpricing. According to the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act - 1935), when a 
union receives more than 50% of the votes in a bargaining unit, that union is entitled both to 
represent all employees of the unit and to demand union fees and dues from them. This union 
entitlement, however, has been toppled by the passage of RTW laws since the mid-1940s, 
according to which unions may collect payments from union members on a voluntary basis. 
Arguably, RTW laws constrain union by limiting organizing activity, curtailing financial 
resources, and weakening power in states where such legislation has been enacted (Ellwood 
and Fine, 1987). 
I divide my sample according to the effective year of RTW laws at the state level 
(available through the National Right to Work Committee) in order to analyze the effect of 
incremental union power and underpricing. Among the first states to adopt RTW laws were 
Arkansas and Florida (in 1944), followed by 19 more states through the mid-1990s. During 
my sample period 1997-2014, the number of states further increased by 3, as Oklahoma 
(2001), Indiana (2012), and Michigan (2013) adopted RTW laws. Table 8 reports the 
coefficients of all estimation methods as follows: the Heckman two-stage procedure in 
columns 1 and 4, the MLE two-equation treatment model in columns 2 and 5, and the 
instrumental variables method in columns 3 and 6. I observe that whether or not a state has 
enacted RTW legislation the effect of unionization is negative, though more prominently 
negative in regions with incremental union power.26 D_UNION is statistically significant at 
1% states with RTW laws, but insignificant for states without (apart from IV estimates in 
26 I also conducted analyses using the enactment of RTW laws as a natural experiment, and isolated a sample of 
46 IPOs located in the three states with adoption of RTW laws within my sample period, namely Oklahoma, 
Indiana and Michigan. My analyses indicated no relationship between unionization and IPO underpricing. 
However, the number of observations (only 46 IPOs) is too small, making any statistical inferences unreliable. 
116 
                                                 
The impact of labor unionization on underpricing of U.S. IPOs 
column 6). The Wald test for homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients (columns 7 
to 9) shows that the difference in coefficients between RTW and non-RTW states is 
statistically significant at 1% across all estimation methods. Thus, I demonstrate that 
incremental union power reduces underpricing. 
Table 8 The impact of unionization on IPO underpricing in states with/without Right-to-Work laws 
(Dependent variable = LNUNDERPRICING). 
Variables 
RTW States Non-RTW States Difference in coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Heckman MLE IV Heckman MLE IV (1) - (4) (2) - (5) (3) - (6) 
D_UNION -0.132 0.881 -2.017** -1.386*** -1.283*** -2.082*** 1.254*** 2.164*** 0.065*** 
 
(-0.21) (1.59) (-2.03) (-3.59) (-3.94) (-2.95) (10.553) (44.273) (8.701) 
LNPROCEEDS 0.077 0.054 0.181 0.227*** 0.224*** 0.268*** -0.15*** -0.169*** -0.087 
 
(0.81) (0.53) (1.42) (4.14) (3.98) (4.30) (7.474) (9.081) (1.966) 
AGE -0.044 -0.115 0.058 0.034 0.028 0.061 -0.078 -0.143** -0.003 
 
(-0.53) (-1.27) (0.62) (0.59) (0.48) (0.94) (1.846) (5.918) (0.002) 
NASDAQ -0.023 0.126 -0.205 0.114 0.121 0.025 -0.137 0.005 -0.229 
 
(-0.13) (0.72) (-1.13) (0.94) (1.02) (0.17) (1.271) (0.002) (2.547) 
INTERNET -0.177 -0.232 -0.043 0.257* 0.266* 0.257* -0.435*** -0.498*** -0.3** 
 
(-0.56) (-0.72) (-0.13) (1.81) (1.90) (1.82) (9.374) (12.614) (4.542) 
TECHNOLOGY 0.549** 0.533* 0.448 0.396*** 0.402** 0.357** 0.153 0.131 0.091 
 
(2.22) (1.86) (1.42) (2.63) (2.41) (2.00) (1.032) (0.622) (0.258) 
VC 0.430** 0.516*** 0.280 0.313*** 0.320*** 0.231* 0.117 0.196 0.049 
 
(2.44) (2.76) (1.43) (2.69) (2.60) (1.67) (1.018) (2.531) (0.124) 
UNDERWRITER 0.282* 0.264 0.278 0.424*** 0.418*** 0.415*** -0.142 -0.154 -0.137 
 
(1.83) (1.61) (1.64) (4.30) (4.15) (4.10) (2.061) (2.33) (1.832) 
BIG4 -0.342** -0.385** -0.335** 0.012 0.006 0.039 -0.354*** -0.391*** -0.373*** 
 
(-2.12) (-2.36) (-2.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.30) (9.835) (9.817) (8.287) 
OVERHANG 0.014* 0.013 0.015 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.001 -0.001 0 
 
(1.66) (1.33) (1.39) (3.25) (4.18) (4.39) (0.031) (0.08) (0) 
PRIMARY -0.361** -0.421*** -0.230 -0.080 -0.084 -0.076 -0.281*** -0.337*** -0.154 
 
(-2.39) (-2.84) (-1.36) (-0.77) (-0.84) (-0.74) (7.325) (11.402) (2.189) 
LEV -0.295* -0.320* -0.273 0.031 0.032 0.022 -0.326*** -0.352*** -0.295*** 
 
(-1.94) (-1.77) (-1.52) (0.52) (0.59) (0.41) (30.573) (42.163) (29.073) 
DEPS -0.035 0.008 -0.105 -0.124 -0.125 -0.132 0.09 0.134 0.027 
 
(-0.23) (0.05) (-0.62) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.19) (0.737) (1.582) (0.06) 
DOTCOM 0.527* 0.564 0.404 0.674*** 0.666*** 0.574*** -0.146 -0.102 -0.17 
 
(1.69) (1.56) (1.01) (3.46) (3.37) (2.69) (0.565) (0.266) (0.638) 
CRUNCH -0.948 -0.810 -1.317* 1.260* 1.303*** 1.066 -2.208*** -2.113*** -2.383*** 
 
(-1.01) (-1.62) (-1.75) (1.86) (2.97) (1.53) (10.686) (23.168) (11.758) 
(intercept) 0.604 0.541 1.516** 0.160 0.168 0.149    
 
(0.43) (0.73) (2.13) (0.12) (0.44) (0.37)    Inverse Mills ratio -0.158    0.682***       
 
(-0.44)    (2.99)          
  
    
 
  
   Industry &  
Year Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included    
Wald test  6.341      9.105***      
Hausman test     3.145*     6.620***    
Observations 460 460 460 1,108 1,108 1,108    
Note: Three estimation procedures are used: Heckman two-stage (Columns 1&4), Maximum likelihood estimation 
(Columns 2&5) and generated IV approach (Columns 3&6). Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-
statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % 
levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. The last columns report the 
t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare the difference in coefficients between regression results. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. 
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4.6 Sensitivity testing 
4.6.1 Alternative definition of unionization 
I substitute my main unionization proxy (i.e., existence of collective bargaining coverage 
(D_UNION)) with three alternative specifications. First, I measure unionization based on the 
percentage of unionized employees (PCT_UNION) as derived from company filings. This 
percentage, however, is underreported when compared to D_UNION. Second, I use data from 
the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD)27 in order to estimate an industry 
level unionization proxy (UNION_IND) by multiplying the percentage of employees covered 
by collective bargaining in the industry with the number of employees over lagged total 
assets (see, for example Chen, et al., 2011a, 2012; Chyz, et al., 2013; Hilary, 2006). Running 
the models again, I find that all coefficients of alternative unionization proxies are negative. 
PCT_UNION is statistically significant at 1%, and UNION_IND is insignificant (see Table 9). 
Since the insignificant results for UNION_IND show the potential material measurement 
errors between industry- and firm-level unionization proxies, these results cast doubt on the 
reliability of this industry-level proxy. 
27 Industry-level data are available through the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD) which is 
compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Since UMCD data are available in Census Industry 
Classification (CIC) codes, I employed the methodology described in footnote 23 to transform CIC into SIC 
codes. 
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Table 9 Alternative measures of unionization and the impact of unionization on IPO underpricing 
(Dependent variable = LNUNDERPRICING), OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp Sign (1) (2) 
PCT_UNION - -0.013***  
  
(-3.13)  UNION_IND -  0.001 
   
(0.38) 
LNPROCEEDS - 0.151*** 0.136*** 
  
(3.05) (2.75) 
AGE - -0.027 -0.034 
  
(-0.58) (-0.76) 
NASDAQ + 0.117 0.151 
  
(1.27) (1.63) 
INTERNET + 0.230* 0.216 
  
(1.74) (1.61) 
TECHNOLOGY + 0.513*** 0.531*** 
  
(3.54) (3.63) 
VC ? 0.494*** 0.511*** 
  
(5.03) (5.26) 
UNDERWRITER + 0.346*** 0.333*** 
  
(4.00) (3.83) 
BIG4 - -0.080 -0.093 
  
(-0.78) (-0.90) 
OVERHANG + 0.015*** 0.014*** 
  
(4.13) (4.02) 
PRIMARY + -0.162** -0.168** 
  
(-1.98) (-2.03) 
LEV - -0.022 -0.007 
  
(-0.41) (-0.13) 
DEPS - -0.046 -0.058 
  
(-0.53) (-0.67) 
DOTCOM + 0.627*** 0.587*** 
  
(3.53) (3.30) 
CRUNCH ? 0.470 0.529 
  
(0.96) (1.11) 
(intercept)  0.469 0.531* 
  
(1.46) (1.67) 
   
   Industry & Year Effects  Included Included R2  0.302 0.29 Adj. R2  0.258 0.245 Mean VIF  1.276 1.260 Observations  1,525 1,552 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. See Appendix A for variable definitions 
 
4.6.2 Propensity score matched approach 
Although I rely primarily on Heckman, MLE, and IV approaches to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns, I repeat my analysis employing a PSM approach. I use observable firm-level 
characteristics in order to moderate the differences between treatment (unionized) and control 
(non-unionized) samples.  
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Table 10 The impact of unionization on IPO underpricing, subsequent to propensity score matching 
(Dependent variable = LNUNDERPRICING), OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp Sign (1) (2) (3) 
D_UNION - -0.390**   
  
(-2.02)   PCT_UNION -  -0.016***  
   
(-3.36)  UNION_IND -   0.002 
    
(1.45) 
LNPROCEEDS - 0.048 0.031 0.027 
  
(0.46) (0.29) (0.26) 
AGE - 0.068 0.079 0.042 
  
(0.83) (0.91) (0.52) 
NASDAQ + 0.223 0.233 0.277 
  
(1.26) (1.26) (1.56) 
INTERNET + 0.255 0.426 0.392 
  
(0.56) (0.93) (0.82) 
TECHNOLOGY + 0.513 0.510 0.652* 
  
(1.42) (1.40) (1.67) 
VC ? 0.132 0.230 0.236 
  
(0.56) (0.94) (1.01) 
UNDERWRITER + 0.312* 0.325* 0.238 
  
(1.66) (1.66) (1.23) 
BIG4 - -0.092 -0.041 -0.072 
  
(-0.45) (-0.19) (-0.34) 
OVERHANG + 0.021** 0.022** 0.020* 
  
(2.05) (2.04) (1.84) 
PRIMARY + -0.368** -0.411** -0.395** 
  
(-2.12) (-2.30) (-2.20) 
LEV - -0.050 -0.099 -0.039 
  
(-0.44) (-0.84) (-0.34) 
DEPS - -0.128 -0.079 -0.126 
  
(-0.73) (-0.43) (-0.69) 
DOTCOM + 0.329 0.604 0.348 
  
(0.64) (1.20) (0.65) 
CRUNCH ? 1.718 1.619 1.847* 
  
(1.53) (1.43) (1.88) 
(intercept)  3.562*** 3.605*** 3.330*** 
  
(4.24) (4.19) (3.81) 
       Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Included R2  0.253 0.288 0.248 Adj. R2  0.085 0.103 0.078 Mean VIF  1.258 1.240 1.218 Observations  402 360 396 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
up to third decimal place. See Appendix A for variable definitions 
 
In the first step, I use the same set of unionization determinants as described in 
Section 4.3.3.1 in order to fit a probit model that estimates the likelihood of each IPO being 
unionized (propensity score). In the next step, I employ a nearest-neighbor matching 
approach without replacement, and based on closeness to the predicted value from the first 
step, I can match firms that are unionized and non-unionized, the only restriction being that 
matching pairs belong to the same year and to the same two-digit SIC industry. This process 
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yields 201 matching pairs.28 When I conduct additional analyses using the PSM sample, I 
verify that the magnitude of D_UNION remains unaffected, though statistically significant at 
5% (see column 1 in Table 10). The effect of unionization on IPO underpricing persists when 
employing alternative unionization proxies (as described in Section 4.6.1) because either 
proxy attains a negative coefficient and stays statistically significant at 1% for PCT_UNION 
and insignificant for UNION_IND. 
4.6.3 Alternative sampling and measurements 
As a robustness exercise, I repeat my main analyses and extract firm-level unionization from 
a firm’s registration statement S-1 or correspondingly amended S-1/A, as Xing, et al. (2017). 
I employ the same process as for my main unionization measure (see Section 3.3.2) and 
identify firms which report (D_UNION_PROSP) and which do not report union 
representation. I conduct additional robustness exercises: I measure underpricing at the end of 
the eleventh trading day and first trading month (Chambers and Dimson, 2009), I exclude all 
IPOs which belong to the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sectors (2-digit SIC 60-67) 
(Lowry and Shu, 2002), and I winsorize all continuous variables at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles (Gounopoulos, et al., 2017). None of these variations change my results. 
  
28 Despite my PSM design successfully moderates the differences between unionized and non-unionized IPOs, I 
don’t achieve sufficient reduction in standardized differences across covariates, as their values lie outside the 
threshold of ±20 (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). I redesign PSM and include various caliper constraints, ranging 
from [0.2-0.01], that yield: 1) standardized differences outside the threshold of ±20, and 2) extremely small 
samples. Although PSM may not be perfect, many studies suggest that it facilitates in conducting more accurate 
analyses (see for e.g. Conniffe, et al., 2000; Rubin, 1997). I use PSM sample only as complementary to my main 
analysis. 
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4.7 Summary and conclusion 
In my study, I bring to the fore the role of organized labor in the IPO process by investigating 
its impact on the pricing behavior during the first trading day. My empirical evidence 
suggests a significant negative relation between labor unionization and IPO underpricing. In 
light of the perfect correlation between underpricing and retail demand (Santos, 2017), I 
argue that this negative relation is a reflection of the modest demand of investors who are 
reckoning with the salient agency costs and information asymmetries typical of unionized 
firms. Simply put, unionization of a firm discourages investors from participating in the IPO. 
This effect is more pronounced for firms headquartered in states where RTW legislation has 
not been enacted because RTW laws strip unions of certain powers. 
In order to understand the potential mechanisms causing the negative relation between 
labor unionization and IPO underpricing, I examine both the pre- and post-IPO periods. I 
reveal that although underwriters commence the price-discovery process from a high starting 
point, both modest demand and an inclination toward price-protection in investors drive offer 
prices downwards. When I track trading of unionized IPO shares for up to a year’s time 
following the IPO event, I document significantly lower aftermarket volatility than in their 
non-unionized counterparts. I conclude that unionization constitutes a significant cost for the 
issuing firm and that a firm’s unionization status represents an important determinant of IPO 
valuation. 
My study carries important implications for managers and market participants, such as 
shareholders and underwriters. Since it reduces the expected influx of capital, labor 
unionization restricts a firm’s access to public financing. Managers and shareholders will 
want to factor unionization into their decision to bring the firm to the public arena. My 
findings will benefit underwriters who, now cognizant of a union’s effects on offering price 
and first-day returns, can adjust their IPO pricing strategy to the presence or absence of 
organized labor in a firm. And in general, market participants should be aware that the 
negative relation between labor unionization and IPO underpricing is more prominent in 
regions where legislation is supportive of the organizing activities of unions. 
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4.8 Appendix A - Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: IPO pricing 
FIRST-DAY RET The difference between the first secondary market closing price available on CRSP 
and IPO offer price, divided by IPO offer price. This variable is transformed into the 
regression models by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm 
(LNUNDERPRICING). 
REVISIONS The difference between IPO offer price and midpoint of initial filing price range, 
divided by the midpoint of initial filing price range. This variable is transformed into 
the regression models by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm (LNREVISIONS). 
(Source: SDC). 
Panel B: Unionization 
D_UNION 1 if the company's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, as 
reported in company filings, and 0 otherwise. 
PCT_UNION The percentage of a company's employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, as reported in company filings. 
UNION_IND Industry level unionization, calculated as the product of the percentage of unionized 
employees, from Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD), in the 
industry with the number of company’s employees, over lagged total assets, as in 
Hilary (2006). 
Panel C: IPO characteristics 
PROCEEDS Gross proceeds, in millions of U.S. dollars, raised by the IPO. The variable is 
estimated as shares offered times the offer price. This variable is transformed into the 
regression models by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm (LNPROCEEDS). 
(Source: SDC). 
FIRM_AGE The number of years elapsed since firm's foundation to IPO date, using foundation 
dates from the Field-Ritter database. The variable is transformed into the regressions 
by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm (AGE). (Source: Field-Ritter database) 
NASDAQ Binary indicator that equals 1 for NASDAQ listings, and 0 otherwise. (Source: SDC). 
INTERNET Binary indicator that equals 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, and 0 otherwise. As Internet 
firms are classified those with business description sections in Thomson Financial 
SDC containing any of the words “Internet”, “Online”, “eBusiness”, “eCommerce”, 
and “Website”. (Source: SDC) 
TECHNOLOGY Binary indicator that equals 1 for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 
3578 (i.e. computer hardware); 3661, 3663, 3669 (i.e. communications equipment); 
3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (i.e. electronics); 3812 (i.e. navigation 
equipment); 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (i.e. measuring and controlling devices); 
3841, 3845 (i.e. medical instruments); 4812, 4813 (i.e. telephone equipment); 4899 
(i.e. communications services); and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378,7379 (i.e. 
software), and 0 otherwise. (Source: SDC) 
VC Binary indicator that equals 1 for firms with venture capital backing, and 0 otherwise. 
(Source: SDC). 
UNDERWRITER Binary indicator that equals 1 for new listings engaging underwriters of the highest 
prestige ranking (a value of 9) in the Loughran and Ritter (2004) database, and 0 
otherwise. 
BIG4 Binary indicator that equals 1 for the existence of a reputable auditor, and 0 
otherwise. Reputable auditors are considered the big four (namely, Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, Deloitte, Ernst and Young, and KPMG). (Source: SDC & Compustat). 
OVERHANG The ratio of the shares that pre-IPO shareholders retain over the number of new 
shares issued in the offering. (Source: SDC). 
PRIMARY Binary indicator that equals 1 if the offering is exclusively primary, and 0 otherwise. 
(Source: SDC). 
DOTCOM Binary indicator that equals 1 for IPOs within the 1999–2000 period, and 0 otherwise. 
CRUNCH Binary indicator that equals 1 for IPOs within the financial (‘credit crunch’) crisis of 
2007–2008, and 0 otherwise. 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued) 
D: Firm fundamentals 
DEPS Binary indicator that equals 1 for positive earnings during the last fiscal year prior to 
IPO per share, and 0 otherwise. (Source: Compustat). 
LEV The ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the last fiscal year prior to IPO. 
(Source: Compustat). 
Panel E: Unionization determinants 
PTWORK Natural logarithm of the fraction of part-time workers per CIC industry. (Source: 
NBER CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups File). 
CASH Total cash and investment securities over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
LAT Natural logarithm of total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
INVENTORY Levels of inventory over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total 
assets at year-end, multiplied by 100. (Source: Compustat). 
TANGIBILITY Net property plant and equipment over total assets. (Source: Compustat). 
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4.9 Appendix B - First-stage results for main analysis 
Table B1 Determinants of unionization for IPO firms (Dependent variable = D_UNION), probit analysis. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) Heckman MLE IV 
PTWORK -3.115*** -3.005*** -0.580** 
 (-4.35) (-4.09) (-2.08) LAT 0.107* 0.091 0.062*** 
 (1.77) (1.61) (5.42) CASH -1.284*** -1.637*** -0.080** 
 (-3.86) (-5.14) (-2.32) INVENTORY 0.756** 0.663* 0.108 
 (1.96) (1.85) (1.00) ROA 0.003 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.75) (0.14) (-0.80) TANGIBILITY 0.622*** 0.567*** 0.120** 
 (3.76) (3.72) (2.11) LNPROCEEDS -0.063 -0.018 -0.012 
 
(-0.79) (-0.22) (-0.92) 
AGE 0.237*** 0.199*** 0.042*** 
 
(4.88) (3.92) (3.91) 
NASDAQ -0.496*** -0.434*** -0.092*** 
 
(-4.23) (-3.64) (-4.21) 
INTERNET -0.808 -0.712** -0.000 
 
(-1.38) (-2.04) (-0.03) 
TECHNOLOGY -0.548*** -0.476*** -0.082*** 
 
(-3.29) (-3.17) (-2.59) 
VC -0.582*** -0.472*** -0.061*** 
 
(-3.22) (-2.67) (-3.83) 
UNDERWRITER 0.180 0.253* -0.001 
 
(1.41) (1.92) (-0.07) 
BIG4 0.249* 0.236* 0.018 
 
(1.82) (1.75) (1.06) 
OVERHANG -0.003 -0.000 -0.001** 
 (-0.39) (-0.05) (-2.14) PRIMARY 0.180 0.160 0.023 
 (1.57) (1.46) (1.27) LEV 0.060 0.055 -0.001 
 
(0.62) (0.87) (-0.17) 
DEPS -0.114 -0.060 -0.031 
 (-1.00) (-0.56) (-1.61) DOTCOM 0.032 0.191 -0.055* 
 (0.18) (1.06) (-1.69) CRUNCH -0.293 -0.253 -0.134 
 (-1.16) (-1.03) (-0.83) (intercept) -1.389*** -1.419*** 0.057 
 (-3.55) (-3.53) (0.54)       Observations 1,568 1,568 1,568 
Pseudo R2 0.384 0.384 0.422 
This table reports the fist-stage results of Table 5, for Heckman (Column 1), Maximum likelihood estimation 
(Column 2) and IV approaches (Column 3). 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded 
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In this thesis, I examine the impact of labor unionization on corporate matters. I argue that 
unionization inflates corporate contractual complexities and disparities between the 
principal’s interests and employees’ claims, and thus, have a catalytic impact on corporate 
matters. Specifically, I investigate the impact of unions on monitoring costs (Chapter 2), on 
CSR reporting (Chapter 3), and on IPO underpricing (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 2 examines how monitoring costs, which constitute important elements of 
corporate operations and firm value, are affected by labor unionization. My empirical results 
indicate that auditors charge unionized firms a significant fee premium because of the higher 
complexities of contractual relations and the incremental business risk. I systematically study 
the potential mechanisms behind this impact and find that it is due less to a higher risk of 
litigation than to the excess effort in and the more thorough execution of the audit procedures. 
I further document that monitoring costs are significantly higher in regions where legislation 
and dominant political ideologies are supportive of labor unions. I demonstrate to the 
contrary that auditors assess as less risky unionized contexts with employee participation in 
ownership because employee ownership aligns employee claims and other shareholder 
interests, and thereby reduce the cost of monitoring accordingly. My findings carry important 
implications for market participants, shareholders, and managers. Investors and analysts 
should include in their analysis the fact that monitoring costs are significantly higher in 
unionized contexts and particularly in unionized corporations located in regions where 
legislation and dominant political ideologies are in favor of unions. My research helps 
managers and shareholders to recognize that employee participation in ownership alleviates 
the underlying opposition inherent to unionization and in this way, reduces monitoring costs 
while enhancing firm value. 
In chapter 3, I investigate the impact of unionization on CSR reporting. Unions are 
institutionalized to give a stronger voice to workers, so the presence of any union increases 
the complexities which characterize the employee-management relationship. My findings 
suggest that managers of unionized firms more intensively disclose standalone CSR reports 
as a mechanism for managing the pressure exerted by stakeholders, such as labor unions. The 
impact of unionization on CSR reporting proves to be robust to alternative definitions of 
unionization as well as to specification issues related to variable omission. I demonstrate that 
managers’ propensity to CSR reporting increases significantly in regions where corporate 
spatial clustering, legislation, and a dominant political ideology are supportive of labor 
unions and congruent with their values. The implications of Chapter 3 are important for 
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managers, market participants, and union leaders. Managers of unionized firms can adopt 
CSR reporting as a long-term strategic tactic that (1) facilitates communication with salient 
stakeholders and (2) reduces information asymmetries between management and unionists. 
Market participants such as business analysts, investors, and shareholders should factor CSR 
engagement in unionized contexts into their financial decision-making analyses because CSR 
reporting is employed strategically to weaken tensions and divisions with organized labor. 
Potential outcomes are reductions in the agency costs of labor and in the cost of capital. 
Union leaders should be aware that CSR reporting serves as a mechanism for managers either 
(1) to strengthen the “ideological psychological contract” between the company and the 
employees or (2) to undermine the stature and power of the unions. 
In Chapter 4, I provide insights into the role of organized labor in the IPO process and 
especially into pricing behavior during the first trading day. I evidence a significant negative 
relation between labor unionization and IPO underpricing, attributable to investors’ modest 
demand. I posit that investors reckon with the salient agency costs and information 
asymmetries typical of unionized firms, and thus, unionization has a catalytic impact on 
discouraging investors from participating in the IPO. I systematically study the mechanisms 
which potentially create this impact and find that unionized IPOs are characterized by 
downward price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility, both clear manifestations of 
investors’ modest demand for participation in the issue. I further demonstrate that the effects 
of unionization on underpricing is more prominent in regions where legislation is supportive 
of unions. My findings will be of importance to managers and market participants such as 
shareholders and underwriters. Managers and shareholders alike should factor unionization 
into their decision to bring the firm to the public arena because organized labor reduces the 
expected influx of capital and thus restricts a firm’s access to public financing. Underwriters 
should adjust their IPO-pricing strategy according to the unionization status of the firm 
because of the negative impact of unionization on offering price and first-day returns. And 
more broadly, I inform market participants that the negative relation between labor 
unionization and IPO underpricing is more prominent in regions where legislation is 
supportive of the organizing activities of unions. 
This thesis furthers our understanding of the impact of labor unionization on the 
corporate matters of monitoring costs, CSR reporting, and IPO underpricing. Despite my 
effort to ensure the robustness of the results and the validity of the inferences through 
additional tests, some limitations of my work must be noted. I acknowledge that my empirical 
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investigations are restricted to the U.S., so my findings are limited to specific geographical 
borders. Any generalization of my results cannot be made lightly. I actively encourage 
researchers to employ cross-country datasets in order to overcome this limitation. It would be 
interesting to focus on non-Western contexts where are found different institutional and 
industrial settings as well as different cultures and histories of unionization. Such future 
research will help provide generalizable conclusions which are stable because internationally 
applicable. 
My study opens up new paths for industrial relations research. It would be interesting 
to investigate the impact of organized labor on firms’ financial reporting decisions and 
financial reporting quality. It would be important as well to shed light on the benefits enjoyed 
by unionized firms that do issue CSR reports. Relevant areas for such an investigation might 
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